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My main  thesis  is  twofold:  I  will  account  first  for  the  difference between
problems of supererogation, and then for their relatedness. First, I will claim that it is
very likely that there is no  one problem of supererogation,  but rather a family of
problems of  supererogation.  Secondly,  I  will  claim  that  the  problems  of
supererogation are related due to the fact that they present conflicts between various
aspects of supererogation and one particular view about morality, a view that I will
call the “legalistic” view of morality or “morality of law”. Therefore, a first step in
my approach of  the problem of supererogation will be to show that what has been
considered  as  “the”  problem of  supererogation  consists,  rather,  in  a  multitude  of
problems intricately linked. The second and the third chapters of the thesis will be
concerned with this enterprise, of differentiating between various kinds of problems
of  supererogation.   A  second  step  will  be  to  show  that  most  problems  of
supererogation  are  connected  because  they  are  engendered  by an  opposition  to  a
particular view of morality.  This will be the main point of the fourth chapter. My
position  will  be  that  whenever  a  moral  theory  has  adopted  (explicitly  or  not)  a
legalistic  view of morality,  that theory will  become a hostile  environment  for the
concept of supererogation. I will end by proposing some hypotheses about what could
be  a  more  welcoming  theoretical  environment  for  supererogation,  namely  by
proposing “morality of virtue” as a likely candidate.
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Chapter One:  Morality and Supererogation
1.0. What is Supererogation?
Intuitively  and commonsensically,  we usually recognize  morally  admirable
good deeds.  If considerable sacrifice is involved, we are usually quick to admit (at
least in case of heavy sacrifices) that such sacrifices are not to be demanded from
anyone.  This  is  a  rough sketch  of  the moral  phenomenon said to  be  exemplified
especially  by  saints  and  heroes  (even  though  more  humble  examples  are  not
excluded). Our admission that this kind of deeds cannot be morally demanded brings
other  corollaries  (or  maybe  just  different  formulations);  for  example,  we  would
presumably  be  ready  to  admit  that  there  are  some  things  that  can  be  morally
demanded, some things that can be morally required from each of us, but these cases
of sacrifice are not among them. Moreover, when someone does a highly valuable
good deed that cannot be demanded, it is said that she or he went 'beyond duty'. One
also  seems  to  accept  without  difficulty  that  such deeds  are  morally  praiseworthy
while their omission is not (or not always) blameworthy.
The commonsensical  picture  of  supererogation  seems  to  bring  forth  several
concepts  belonging  to  the  arsenal  of  moral  discourse:  moral  requirement,  duty,
morally  good,  moral  value,  praiseworthy  and  blameworthy.  The  usual  general
characterization of supererogation also goes along these lines:
1
Supererogatory acts are those which lie 'above and beyond the call of 
duty'. Such acts characteristically enjoy a very high degree of value, 
probably more value than any other act available to the agent. (...) 
actions which is not wrong of the agent not to do. (Dancy 1998, 
p.173)
Recent  books  covering  the  topic  of  supererogation  start  by  this  rough
characterization: "It is often said that works of supererogation involve going beyond
the  call  of  duty,  doing  good  in  a  way  that  transcends  the  requirement  of  moral
obligation1" or "Supererogation is the technical term for the class of actions that go
'beyond the call  of duty'.  Roughly speaking,  supererogatory acts  are morally good
although not (strictly) required.”2
However, strict definitions of supererogation will try to take into account more
theoretical  notions, such as obligation, permission, right and wrong, consequences
and  intentions.  One  might  suspect  that  our  ready  recognition  of  this  moral
phenomenon is more intricate and refined than what we can usually describe, and that
our usual vocabulary does not keep up with the actual capacities of discrimination.
Therefore, technical definitions have been designed trying to take into account more
dimensions,  such as the intent  or consequences of the action.  For example,  David
Heyd (1982) offers in his book the following definition of supererogatory action:
1) Neither obligatory nor forbidden
2) The omission is not wrong, it does not deserve sanction or criticism
3) Morally good by intended consequences and intrinsic value
1    Mellema (1991, p.3).
2   Heyd (2002/2016).
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4)  Done  voluntarily  for  the  sake  of  someone  else’s  good  and  is  thus
meritorious 
Gregory Mellema (1991) criticizes Heyd's definition and offers his own along these
lines:
1) Fulfills no moral duty or obligation
2) The performance of the supererogatory act is morally praiseworthy
3) The omission of the act is not morally blameworthy 
This is only a sketch of what it  is usually said about supererogation.  But one can
already  guess  the  kind  of  problems  it  raises:  first,  problems  of  boundaries  and
demarcation  brought  by  any  rivalry  among  definitions;  second,  problems  of
membership of particular types of actions (is some particular type of moral action
supererogatory or foolish? If an action is brave but not very useful, does it count as
supererogatory?). Last but not least, problems of existence may appear, as there are
authors denying that supererogation exists in the above description, namely that there
are morally good actions one is under no obligation to perform, or that one may omit
good actions without any kind of blameworthiness. In this view, the commonsensical
point is just a manner of speaking without any serious support from the actual moral
concepts employed. 
In the next section I will explain in more detail which kind of problems are
considered to fall under the heading “the puzzle of supererogation” and which ones
are not.
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1.1. What is the Problem of Supererogation? 
It was called a 'puzzle' by Heyd (1982), a 'paradox' by Horgan and Timmons
(2010),  or  was recognized simply as a  'problem'.  The 'problem of supererogation'
designates not so much a problem within the domain of supererogatory deeds and
their  characterization,  but  rather  the  strange  effect  supererogation  has  on  other
domains, its status as a trouble-maker when attempts are made to include it in larger
theories.
Maybe one should say it from the start: the problem of supererogation is not
about identifying which good deeds are supererogatory and which are not. Also, it is
not  about  taking  sides  in  the  dispute  among   supererogationists  (i.e.  the  ones
maintaining  that  there  are  actions  rightly  described  as  supererogatory),  anti-
supererogationists (i.e. the ones maintaining that deeds of saints and heroes do not go
'beyond  duty'  and  that  they  are,  in  some  sense,  morally  required)  and  quasi-
supererogationists (i.e. the ones maintaining that heroic and saintly deeds go 'beyond
duty' and are praiseworthy, but failing to act supererogatorily does imply some degree
of blameworthiness). 
At  first  sight,  one  might  suspect  that  there  is  no  problem at  all,  probably
because supererogation is familiar enough for our pre-theoretical intuitions, and does
not  appear  to  be  a  very  different  kind  of  moral  enterprise  when  theoretically
considered.  One  may  be  under  the  impression  that  supererogation  is  just  about
morally  good  deeds  –  extremely  good deeds  –  but  nevertheless  just  good deeds;
therefore, one might suppose, they should have the theoretical status of every other
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good deed in  whichever  moral  theoretical  frame we choose  to  account  for  them.
However, complications quickly escalate as soon as one tries, following the venerable
steps of Urmson, to fit the good deeds (the ones usually regarded as supererogatory)
within the classical division among deontic categories. According to Urmson's (1958)
seminal  paper  “Saints  and  Heroes”,  an  excellent  moral  deed  cannot  usually  be
regarded as forbidden, therefore the deed can be seen as either obligatory or merely
permitted. If one considers that all morally good deeds are obligatory in some sense,
then  this  is  an  anti-supererogationist  position,  according  to  which  there  are  no
supererogatory  deeds.  However,  such  a  position  will  usually  face  difficulties  in
explaining away the commonsensical moral intuition that one can go beyond what is
morally required. On the other hand, if one considers that some extraordinary good
deeds  are  merely  permitted,  not  obligatory,  then  it  would  appear  that  these
extraordinary good deeds are a matter of moral indifference, for they can be omitted
or not, as the agent pleases. I will discuss Urmson's position in more detail in the next
section. For now, an approximate description of the problem could be the following:
supererogation, in its commonsensical understanding, seems to be the point where it
is claimed that  the 'ought' cannot and should not follow the 'good'. Supererogatory
actions are good but they cannot be required or demanded from anyone, at least not in
the commonsensical understanding of what we owe to our fellow human beings. Not
doing a certain supererogatory action does not seem to be blamable (at least not in
paradigmatic  cases),  therefore  the  agent  does  not  seem to  be  under  any  kind  of
obligation  to  act  supererogatorily.  But  why should  it  be  the  case  that  we  cannot
demand what we deem to be a good, and sometimes even an excellent action? 
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The  puzzle  of  supererogation  starts,  I  believe,  with  a  simple  question:  if
someone needs help and you are able to provide it, is helping a moral duty (or a moral
obligation,  or  something  one  ought  to  do)?  The  voice  of  commonsensical  moral
intuition will most likely reply that indeed, it is a moral obligation to help, when able.
But  the  devil  is  in  details,  and  as  soon  as  enough  details  are  provided  to  this
hypothetical  situation,  the  above unqualified  answer will  not  match  our  intuitions
anymore. For example, if we can provide help by sacrificing our own life, would that
be something we ought to do3? The commonsensical view will hesitate to call such
extreme  sacrifices  'a  moral  duty'  or  to  regard  them as  something  to  be  required.
Another,  related,  way  of  underlining  the  dormant  conflict  between  these
commonsensical moral intuitions, is to contrast the view that there is a duty to help
those in need with the equally commonsensical  view that there is such a thing as
'going beyond duty' or doing more than is required. Obviously, if each time one helps,
that is only a matter of fulfilling a duty, then there should be no such thing as 'going
beyond duty'. 
I believe that the root of the puzzle of supererogation may be said to consist in
the difficulty of harmonizing these two intuitions: that one can do more than it is
required and that any good deed ought to be done. However, the puzzle itself appears
more  often  formulated  as  a  question,  a  question  assuming  already that  there  are
actions that go beyond duty, namely: why should it be the case that we cannot morally
require what we deem to be a good, and sometimes even an excellent action? David
3 An interesting feature (to be discussed in the next chapter) of this kind of intuition is that the moral
obligation can be maintained when stated in the first person, but the intuition breaks down in the
second or third person: one may say "I have a duty to help anyone in need", but the statement "you
have a duty to help anyone in need" will not enjoy the same plausibility.
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Heyd's formulation, for example, is "how can the moral good not be required as a
duty”.4 Other formulations, e.g. Jonathan Dancy's  in  Moral Reasons,  underline the
difficulty  involved in  accounting  for  omissions  of  good acts  that  do  not  seem to
deserve to be called "wrong".
My position is that this puzzle has deceiving simplicity. This not to say that it
is difficult to answer (even though this might be true in some sense), but to say that it
hides a multiplicity of related problems. For example, Heyd presents the puzzle in
terms of a problematic relation between morally good actions and duty, while Dancy
speaks  of  the  absence  of  a  highly  valuable  action  not  being  wrong  –  these  are
significantly different, albeit related terms. In my view, the image conjured by 'the'
puzzle  of supererogation is  that  of an intricate  network of conceptual  connections
where 'the problem' can shift easily from one nexus to another. Consequently,  my
position will be that the expression "the puzzle of supererogation" it is more likely to
refer  to  a closely related  family of  problems,  rather  than to  a  single well-defined
problem. 
This point of view is strongly suggested not only by 'the' puzzle's wide variety
of formulations, but also by the wide variety of purposes authors have when taking
upon them to solve it. For example, Urmson, who started the contemporary discussion
about supererogation in "Saints and Heroes", considers that the puzzle is meant to
point to the need for a different kind of deontic category, beyond the classical three,
namely permission, obligation and interdiction. 
4     Heyd (2002/2016).
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For  Horgan  and  Timmons,  in  "Untying  a  Knot  from  the  Inside  Out:
Reflections  on  the  'Paradox'  of  Supererogation"  (2010),  the  point  of  solving  the
paradox  is  to  discover  a  new  role  that  moral  reasons  can  play,  namely  a  "non-
requiring, moral merit-conferring role" while denying that "the only way in which a
moral reason can favor an action is by tending to require that action."
(…) we propose what we call a nonrequiring, “moral merit-conferring”
role that a moral reason can play and that makes sense of the very idea 
of supererogatory acts: acts that are completely morally optional, but 
good and morally meritorious to perform. (Horgan and Timmons 
2010, p.50)
For Dancy, in Moral Reasons, a solution to the puzzle amounts to finding the
relation  between  the  evaluative  and  the  deontic  domains,  as  the  existence  of
supererogation requires a gap between what is required (i.e. right or wrong, in the
deontic domain) and what is good (i.e. what is considered valuable, in the evaluative
domain).  Susan  Wolf  (1982)  has  a  different  perspective  about  the  role  of
supererogation: having a theoretical justification for the distance that supererogation
presupposes between what is morally good and what is obligatory, is a salutary trait of
a moral theory. That is because the distance between what is morally good and what
one ought to  do would limit  a  tendency she considers  pernicious,  namely that  of
giving  too  much  weight  to  moral  considerations  (by  making  morally  good deeds
obligatory) at the expense of considerations regarding one's well-being.
These are quite different enterprises but they all invoke supererogation and its
puzzles.  The  general  'misfit'  status  of  supererogation  brings  along  a  difficulty  in
exactly  pinpointing  one  single  problem and  its  significance:  it  seems  to  'disturb'
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several respectable moral notions and theories at once. Therefore, the view that I will
take is to treat 'the' puzzle of supererogation as a cluster of problems, rather than as a
single problem, and to distinguish between their various conceptual shades. This is a
methodological choice which will find its justification in the distinctions to be made
in the course of the following chapters. It is, however, just a methodological choice,
not  a  fully-fledged  thesis  (the  thesis  would  be  "the  problem  of  supererogation
consists,  actually,  of  many related  problems")  because,  lacking a  well-known and
agreed upon criterion of identity for problems (i.e. how do we know two problems are
actually the same problem or not?), I cannot claim to have a verdict. However, for the
same reason, namely the lack of a criterion, the opposing view is bound to face the
same  difficulty.  The  ostensible  heterogeneity  of  formulations  and  purposes  is,  I
believe, an argument that makes my approach (i.e. the "many problems" approach)
more reasonable than the usual, opposing approach (i.e. the "one problem" approach).
To conclude, the main task of the present research will be to show that the
problem of supererogation actually consists of many related, but different problems,
depending  upon  the  theoretical  context  in  which  supererogation  is  taken  into
consideration. 
I think this is a good place to make a couple of terminological choices. I will
prefer  the  terms  ”problem”  or  “puzzle”  as  they  seem to  have  a  larger  sphere  of
applicability  than  ”paradox”.  Authors  do  speak  about  “the  paradox  of
supererogation”, even though the problem does not have the classical formal structure
of a paradox, namely, if one chooses x, then one quickly arrives by logical means at
not-x. I presume a looser sense of ”paradox” is being used, namely one in which you
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arrive at a contradiction, but a contradiction with a commonsensical and widely held
belief,  not an internal contradiction of a theory.  However,  in order to not stir any
confusion about the claims involved in using the term ”paradox”, I will not use this
term unless it is present in quotation.
To repeat, my position is that one should rather speak about "problems" of
supererogation than "the" problem of supererogation. However, a large majority of
authors speak about "the" problem or "the" puzzle;  I can only speculate about the
reason behind this formulation. Perhaps not much thought was given to the matter or
perhaps  it  is  just  a  way of  gesturing  towards  a  cluster  of  problems  without  any
implication  of a  commitment  towards a  certain  view on the matter  of  uniqueness
versus multiplicity.  Given  the  overwhelming  majority  of  authors  that  express
themselves  in  this  manner,  I  will  have  to  follow  it  sometimes,  especially  when
describing their position; however, this will be just a manner of speaking.
1.2. The Structure of my Approach to Supererogation
My main  thesis  is  twofold:  I  will  account  first  for  the  difference between
problems of supererogation, and then for their relatedness. First, I will claim that it is
very likely that  there is  no  one problem of supererogation,  but rather  a family of
problems of  supererogation.  Secondly,  I  will  claim  that  the  problems  of
supererogation are related due to the fact that they present conflicts between various
aspects of supererogation and one particular view about morality, a view that I will
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call the “legalistic” view of morality or “morality of law”.  Therefore, a first step in
my approach of  the problem of supererogation will be to show that what has been
considered  as  “the”  problem of  supererogation  consists,  rather,  in  a  multitude  of
problems intricately linked. The second and the third chapters of the thesis will be
concerned with this enterprise, of differentiating between various kinds of problems
of  supererogation.   A  second  step  will  be  to  show  that  some  problems  of
supererogation are, actually, connected because they are engendered by an opposition
to a particular view of morality. This will be the main point of the fourth chapter. My
position  will  be  that  whenever  a  moral  theory  has  adopted  (explicitly  or  not)  a
legalistic  view of morality,  that  theory will  become a hostile  environment  for the
concept of supererogation. I will end by proposing some hypotheses about what could
be  a  more  welcoming  theoretical  environment  for  supererogation,  by proposing a
“morality of virtue”.
The first  chapter  will  be dedicated  to  describing the problem and its  main
concepts: supererogation and  moral obligation.
I  believe  that  a  good  place  to  start  the  analysis  of  the  problem  of
supererogation is the very article that started the conversation about supererogation in
ethics,  namely  Urmson's  ”Saints  and  Heroes”.  Urmson  does  not  use  the  word
”supererogation” (he discusses, instead, about saintly and heroic actions) and does not
explicitly formulate a problem of supererogation. However, his discussion of saintly5
5 Urmson explicitly states that the word “saintly” does not carry any religious meaning in his usage.
“Saintly”  here only refers  to actions that are extraordinarily good from a moral  standpoint and
which go against most people's inclinations towards self-preservation or well-being – that is, they
presuppose a serious sacrifice on the part of the agent. My usage of the term will be partially in line
with his, in that I will not employ the word in the religious meaning either, but I will not take it to
have some special connection to supposed general inclinations. 
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and heroic actions is a good starting point because he first recognizes the challenges
posed  by  these  kinds  of  supererogatory  actions  to  classical  moral  theories  (he
comments on utilitarianism, Kantianism and intuitionism) and he is the first to notice
that these theories need to make changes to accommodate the commonsensical moral
fact of saintly and heroic behavior. But Urmson's most important point, I believe, is
about a certain sub-class of heroic and saintly action being inadequately subsumed
under either the  obligatory or the  permitted moral categories. He argues that some
heroic and saintly actions cannot be seen as obligatory because ”to characterize an act
as a duty is so to demand it”,6 and they cannot be reasonably demanded (I will discuss
his argument in more detail in the next section). For example, one cannot demand a
soldier to sacrifice his life in order to save his comrades by throwing himself on a
grenade (Urmson's example). This kind of action cannot be seen as merely morally
permitted  either,  because  they are  not  indifferent  for  morality  (they  are  excellent
moral deeds). This is, I think, an important move, one that brings to the fore front of
the discussion the problem of permissions in morality.
As I see it, there are two main issues when connecting moral permission and
obligation  with  supererogation.  First,  it  is  a  matter  of  delimitation  between  the
domain  of  the  obligatory  versus  the  domain  of merely  permitted:  supererogatory
deeds are those that supposedly go 'beyond' what is obligatory, and therefore they go
beyond a certain 'threshold'  of obligation (what Urmson would call  ”the minimum
positive demands upon one's fellow men”7). This threshold is supposed to work as a
delimitation between what is obligatory and what is merely permitted, but authors will
6    Urmson (1958 p. 214).
7    Urmson (1958, p. 214).
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sometimes  deny  that  there  is  such  a  threshold.  Secondly,  it  is  a  matter  of
discernability within the domain of morally permitted actions: oftentimes the problem
will be how to distinguish between kinds of morally permissible deeds, i.e. how to
distinguish between the ones permitted because they are morally indifferent, from the
ones  permitted  because  they  cannot  be  required  (even  though  they  are  morally
excellent). 'The' problem of supererogation will sometimes be identified with the first
issue and sometimes with the second. 
In the following section I will discuss Urmson's position. For him, the problem
of supererogation seems to be about how one can justify that some heroic and saintly
deeds are non-obligatory but also not morally indifferent, and so to draw attention to
the fact  that  there is a  trove of different kinds moral  actions that are negligently
gathered under the label ”merely permitted”. After Urmson's position, I will discuss a
direct reply to it by Elizabeth Pybus (1982), for whom the problem of supererogation
shifts  towards  the  first  issue,  namely  an  issue  of  delimitation  between  moral
obligation and permission. Her position is a good example of anti-supererogationism
because  she  denies  that  there  is  a  domain  of  merely  permitted  morally  excellent
deeds;  for her,  all  morally  excellent  deeds are,  in  a  certain  sense,  required.  After
Pybus, in order to illustrate an opposite position and an actual attempt to systematize
the domain of moral obligation versus moral permissions, I will discuss Chapter V
from Mill's Utilitarianism. This is the discussion included in the first chapter.
The second chapter will be entirely dedicated to act-consequentialist and act-
utilitarian theories with their respective problems of supererogation. The problem of
supererogation, in its various versions, is a matter of interest for several contemporary
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utilitarian  and  consequentialist  positions,  mainly  because  supererogation  has  little
room in a theoretical framework where maximization of the good is required. I will
discuss Scheffler's (1982), Slote's (1984), Dreier's (2004), and Zimmerman's (1993)
attempts  to  harmonize  the  commonsensical  idea  of  supererogation  with
consequentialist/utilitarian frameworks.  
The third chapter is concerned with presenting the problem of supererogation
in terms of reasons for action, where supererogation is seen from the standpoint of a
larger narrative. Dancy (1993), Nagel (1986) and Raz (1975) will be discussed with
an emphasis on their view about the problem of supererogation and where it fits in the
larger picture. 
The fourth and last chapter will bring all these perspectives together: this is
where I will try to show that a large majority of problems of supererogation are born
out of an opposition to a certain way of seeing morality.  As a consequence,  they
emerge as different but related problems of supererogation.
This chapter structure corresponds, with approximation, to a division one can
easily spot when reading about the status of supererogation in ethics. The first two
chapters  will  present  mainly  conceptions  of  supererogation  that  are  discussed  in
classical terms of duty or obligations and permission. The main focus will be the role
of obligations and permissions in morality, mainly because supererogation challenges
these roles. The third chapter will present conceptions of supererogation in terms of
reasons for action. This division of theoretical frameworks is neither exclusive nor
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exhaustive, but it largely corresponds to two possible views that one might have about
the problem of supererogation.  The usual, general formulation of the problem can be 
a) How one could explain that acting in a morally excellent manner is sometimes not
obligatory?
Or (the negative):
b) How one could explain that not acting in a morally excellent manner is sometimes
permitted?
In both these formulations, one has a choice: to concentrate on the last part of
the  question,  namely  on  being  permitted  versus being  obligatory  and the  dispute
emerging from this opposition; or, to concentrate on the earlier part of the question,
namely the  one referring  to  acting or not  acting according to  some obligation  or
permission. This is a different emphasis, the one preferred by the authors who speak
in  terms  of  reasons  for  action.  Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  one  emphasis
excludes the other.  Both sides will  consider the entire question and, therefore,  the
classical moralists will be concerned with what it means to be allowed to act or not to
act according to a rule or in light of an ideal;  while authors speaking in terms of
reasons for action will be concerned with actions that are permitted or obligatory. 
To repeat, this division is not a sharp one: there will be utilitarian authors in
the second chapter who speak in terms of reasons, for example Dreier (2004). Also,
this  division  is  not  exhaustive:  there  might  be  problems  from the  family  of  the
problem  of  supererogation  that  are  comprised  in  neither  of  these  two  frames.8
8  For  example,  approaching  supererogation  from  the  perspective  of  deontic  logic  might  issue
different problems. 
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Nevertheless, I have chosen this structure because I think it is a simple and clear way
of dividing between possible ways of seeing the problems raised by supererogation. 
1.3. Urmson about Saints and Heroes
To recall, Urmson (1958) does not use the word ”supererogation” and he does
not explicitly formulate a problem of supererogation.  However, a large part of his
article  “Saints  and  Heroes”  is  devoted  to  establishing  a  distinction  between  a
”minimum of positive demands” of morality (or ”basic rules”) and ”higher flights of
morality”,  the latter  being exemplified by heroic  and saintly behavior.  His aim in
making this distinction is to separate between what he sees as morally obligatory (i.e.
duties or ”basic rules” or ”minimum requirement for living together”)9 and ”acts of
moral worth” that are non-obligatory (i.e. some saintly and heroic acts). The specific
worry that brings him to make this distinction is that some excellent moral acts, like
some heroic acts, might be either ignored or deemed obligatory: ”I want to explain the
difficulty  quite  frankly,  and  to  explain  why  I  think  that  we  properly  recognize
morality that goes beyond duty”.10 To explain why a certain kind of heroic action is
not, and should not be, deemed obligatory is, actually, to answer the question “Why is
it  the  case that  a  certain  kind of  excellent  moral  deed is  not,  and should not  be,
obligatory?”  This  question  is  quite  close  to  the  commonsensical  version  of  the
problem  of  supererogation,  namely,  “Why  should  it  be  the  case  that  we  cannot
9  Urmson (1958, p. 209).
10    Urmson (1958, p. 210).
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demand  what  we deem to  be  a  good,  and  sometimes  even  an  excellent  action?”
Therefore,  I  think  it  is  very  plausible  to  claim that  Urmson  does  speak of  some
version of the problem of supererogation, even if he does not label it explicitly in this
manner. 
In order to understand Urmson's view about the problem of supererogation, I
believe the context of his inquiry is relevant.  His main purpose is  to show that  a
certain category of moral acts are usually disregarded by the major moral theories,
which, in this way, might overlook some important facts of morality. Urmson appears
to believe that the main culprit for this overlook is the usual threefold classification of
moral actions:
Moral philosophers tend to discriminate, explicitly or implicitly, three 
types of action from the point of view of moral worth. First, they 
recognize actions that are a duty, or obligatory, or that we ought to 
perform, treating these terms as approximately synonymous; second, 
they recognize actions that are right in so far as they are permissible 
from a moral standpoint and not ruled out by moral considerations, but 
that are not morally required of us (...); third, they recognize actions 
that are wrong, that we ought not to do. (Urmson 1958, p.198)
I think it is interesting that Urmson specifies three kinds of characterizations
for the first category, namely “a duty, or obligation, or that we ought to perform”. It is
true  that  most  authors  treat  the  three  terms  as  “approximately  synonymous”.
However, if one chooses to distinguish among the three, then this might affect some
conceptions of supererogation. Elizabeth Harman (2016), for example, distinguishes
between what is obligatory and what one ought to perform, and therefore she thinks
that a supererogatory action is not obligatory, but it might be the case that the agent
ought to perform it, all things considered. She calls the omission of a moral act a
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“morally permissible moral mistake”: something that it is not obligatory and so it is
morally permissible, but a moral mistake nevertheless because one ought to do their
best in all circumstances, and not doing this is a moral mistake. 
Urmson  does  not  claim  that  all  classical  theories  use  this  threefold
classification  (he  admits  that  some theories  have  a  twofold  classification,  namely
obligatory and forbidden). However, it is a widespread classification that he considers
to be inadequate: 
To my mind this threefold classification, or any classification that is 
merely a variation on or elaboration of it, is totally inadequate to the 
facts of morality; any moral theory that leaves room only for such a 
classification will in consequence also be inadequate. My main task in 
this paper will be to show the inadequacy of such a classification by 
drawing attention to two of the types of action that most 
conspicuously lie outside such a classification; (Urmson 1958, p.199)
The two types of actions that lie outside the classification are certain kinds of saintly
and heroic  actions.  Urmson believes  that  commonsense morality  easily recognizes
and distinguishes between three types of saintly and heroic action:
a)  We usually call  someone a  saint  when fulfilling  their  duty involves  an
action going against “inclination, desire or self-interest” that “would lead
most  people  not  to  do  it”;  also,  we usually  call  someone  a  hero  when
fulfilling their duty involves actions that most people would not do because
of “terror, fear, or a drive to self-preservation”.11
b) We also usually call  someone a saint  when fulfilling their  duty is done
“without effort” even if the action goes against inclination, desire or self-
11 Urmson (1958, p.200).
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interest.  The  same  addition  is  made  for  the  case  of  heroic  action  as
described for case a).
c)  Both  cases  of  actions  done  “resisting  to  desire  and  self-interest”  and
“resisting to fear and self-preservation” (i.e. saintly or heroic), done with or
without effort, can be also met when there is no duty involved. These are,
as Urmson puts it “actions that are far beyond the limits of his duty”.12
I have two comments about Urmson's division. First, that the conditions he
describes  for  heroic  and saintly  action,  namely  going against  self-interest  or  self-
preservation,  are  another  hallmark  of  supererogation.  They amount  to  saying  that
extraordinary good moral action requires sacrifices on the part of the agent. However,
they will not play a further role in Urmson's argumentation about the deontic status of
these actions. They serve only as elements of identification for a certain kind of moral
deeds. 
Secondly, it is clear from this division that only some saintly and heroic acts
are  considered  by  Urmson  supererogatory,  i.e.  not  falling  under  the  category  of
obligation or duty. This is an important aspect to be kept in mind when arguing about
supererogation because some anti-supererogationist authors will argue that saintly and
heroic acts are, actually, someone's duty (Pybus (1982) and New (1974), for example)
They are not everyone's duty, but they are a duty for specific categories of agents who
have special kinds of commitments. Their argument is directed against the claim that
the sacrifice of the agent acting supererogatory is too demanding, too burdensome to
be required. The typical reply is that some heavy sacrifices are, actually, duties by the
12   Urmson, (1958, p.201).
19
standards of commonsense morality, and therefore, a demanding sacrifice cannot be
the sole reason why an action cannot be deemed a duty.  Urmson's division can be
seen as a rejection of this kind of objection against supererogation. He accepts that
some very costly sacrifices can be duties (see categories a) and b) above). However,
this does not mean that there are no other kinds of costly sacrifices, namely the ones
that cannot be required and cannot be seen as duties. Both kinds of sacrifices (the
ones that are obligatory and the ones that are not) are present in the commonsense
moral  panoply,  and therefore a proper moral theory should be able to account for
both. 
Urmson goes  on to  argue that  the  third kind  of  heroic  and saintly  actions
cannot  be  appropriately  described  as  merely  permissible  or  as  obligatory,  which
makes the threefold division inappropriate:
To summarize, I have suggested that the trichotomy of duties, 
indifferent actions and wrongdoing is inadequate. There are many 
kinds of action that involve going beyond duty proper, saintly and 
heroic actions being conspicuous examples of such kinds of action. 
(Urmson 1958, p.215)
Urmson leaves open the possibility that there are other kinds of action, beside
saintly and heroic, that can be said to go beyond duty.13 He argues at length that these
acts are not only perceived by commonsense morality as non-obligatory, but also that
this status can be justified from a theoretical point of view. His justification is that
some moral acts are non-compulsory because it is desirable that, to the highest extent
possible,  our  moral  activity  be  practiced  without  constraint.  Some  constraints  are
13   He mentions that any example of “going a second mile” would qualify as an action going beyond
duty proper. 
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necessary for living together as a society, but not all moral deeds are or should be
obligatory: 
In the case of moral duties we act to some extent under constraint. We 
have no choice but to apply pressure on each other to conform in these 
fundamental matters; here moral principles are like public laws rather 
than like private ideals. But free choice of the better course of action is 
always preferable to action under pressure, even when the pressure is 
but moral. When possible, therefore, it is better that pressure should 
not be applied and that there should be encouragement and 
commendation for performance rather than outright demand and 
censure in the event of nonperformance. (…) But, while there is 
nothing whatever objectionable in the idea of someone's being pressed 
to carry out such a basic duty as promise-keeping, there is something 
horrifying in the thought of pressure being brought on him to perform 
an act of heroism. (Urmson 1958, pp.213-4)
Urmson does not say why he believes “free choice (…) is always preferable to
action under pressure” and I will not venture to guess. I will only say that his division
between basic duties and “higher flights of morality” is quite similar to Mill's ideas
about moral constraints (they will be discussed in detail in Chapter II). The important
point for this research is how he sees the problem of supererogation. Even though he
does  not  ask  the  question  explicitly,  I  believe  Urmson  responds  to  an  implicit,
presupposed opposition to the idea that some excellent moral deeds might be non-
obligatory.  Therefore, he probably presupposed a question about why some saintly
and heroic deeds are not obligatory. But this just one part of the question, because he
wants  to  say that  they are neither  obligatory nor  merely permitted.  Being merely
morally permitted would mean, for Urmson, that they are morally indifferent. This
has to be wrong because they are obviously laudable from a moral point of view. This
is why I think Urmson's version of the problem of supererogation is: “How can one
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explain  that  some  saintly  and  heroic  acts  are  neither  morally  indifferent  nor
obligatory?” 
In the next section the problem of supererogation is seen from a standpoint
that purports to contradict Urmson's main tenet, namely that some saintly and heroic
actions are not and should not be obligatory. 
1.4. Pybus’ Anti-supererogationist Position and Virtue 
Elizabeth Pybus' position about supererogation is an example not only of a
view explicitly criticizing Urmson, but also an example of how surreptitiously one's
view about supererogation might change.
In her reply to Urmson, Pybus (1982) seems not to be concerned with the
problem  of  supererogation.  This  is  because  her  position  is  explicitly  anti-
supereogationist, clearly stating that “such acts do not exist”:
Since  the  conclusion  of  his argument has  led  to  the widespread use
of  the  term  'acts  of supererogation', and  since  I  do not  believe  that
such  acts exist, I propose to argue that  the actions  with which  he is  
concerned  not only can, but should, be contained  within  the  
traditional  classification.(Pybus 1982, p.190)
Therefore, in her case, it would seem that it makes no sense to ask how one
could  explain that some excellent moral acts are not obligatory, since it appears there
are no such moral acts, and that all excellent moral acts are, in some sense, obligatory.
It appears that there is nothing to be explained. Nevertheless, in spite of having a
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trenchant opposition to supererogation, Pybus shifts the meaning of one essential term
in the picture and the problem of supererogation may, in this way, make a comeback.
I will explain in more detail  below what are some steps in that direction,  and the
justification for them. The essential point of Pybus' position is, I think, that in order to
be able to say that all morally excellent deeds are a matter of obligation or duty, she
changes the meaning of “duty”. Urmson (1958) was closely following Mill when he
was saying that duty is “something to be exacted, like a debt” or that “to characterize
an act as a duty is so to demand it”.14 Pybus (1986) explicitly rejects these ways of
seeing  duty.15 Even  though  the  alternative  is  not  clear  (how else  one  should  see
duty?), what Pybus wants to be able to say is that we all  ought to follow the moral
ideals embodied in heroic or saintly action (this would be our duty in her sense), even
if this is not something that can, properly speaking, be demanded from us. 
Therefore,  I  believe  that  Pybus'  rather  peculiar  version  of  the  problem of
supererogation can be said to be the following:  “How could one explain that heroic or
saintly  action  is  something  we  ought  to  aspire  to,  even  if  the  action  cannot  be
demanded?” I believe this is the main idea she is trying to support and explain in her
“Saints and Heroes” (1982). 
According to Pybus, Urmson is not right to claim that supererogation cannot
be contained in the traditional classification of actions into “duties, permissible and
wrong”  (“although such actions are not duties, they are clearly not wrong, and, more
significantly,  it  is  inadequate  to  describe  them as  permissible,  since  anyone  who
14 Urmson (1958, p. 214).
15   In her reply to McGoldrick's  criticism. 
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performs  such  actions  is  worthy  of  moral  praise”).16 Urmson  is  not  right  about
supererogation simply because the actions described by Urmson as “supererogatory”
actually fall,  according to Pybus,  under the category of obligation.  They are,  in a
certain sense, a duty. To be sure, Pybus is not saying that everyone has an obligation
to jump on a grenade (as in Urmson’s example) or to sacrifice themselves. However,
she is saying that we have a duty to strive to actually be as morally good as we can:
By this I do not mean that we should do what the saints and heroes do,
but that we must recognize that if we consider such actions susceptible
of moral praise, we commit ourselves to saying that what leads to the 
performance of those actions is part of the equipment of the morally 
good person which we should all try to be. What I am getting at, 
therefore, is that in praising what lies behind the actions, i.e. 
dispositions, or, more specifically, particular virtues. (Pybus 1982, 
pp.196-7)
Pybus believes that when (and if) we commend heroic and saintly acts we usually
commend them from a moral point of view (it could be an aesthetic point of view, but
that leads to no commitment according to Pybus). Our commendation of heroic or
saintly acts as moral acts cannot be just a matter of mere contemplation; if the act is
moral, then more than just contemplation is called for:
For if, in commending those who perform certain sorts of acts, we do 
not commit ourselves to the view that those people are the sort of 
people we ought to be, we are not expressing a moral point of view at 
all. I cannot at the same time say that something is a moral ideal, and 
feel that I have no sort of obligation to pursue it. (Pybus 1982, p.195)
Therefore,  when  commending  a  saintly  or  heroic  act  as  a  moral act  we  thereby
commit ourselves to the ideals or values presupposed by those acts. In other words, it
16 Urmson (1958, p.193).
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commits us to being a certain kind of person and, as a consequence, to act in a certain
manner.17
If I endorse someone’s behaviour, and regard him as a saint or hero, by
which I mean a morally good man of a special sort, then what I am
saying  or  doing  in  commending  him?  I  would  suggest  that  if  my
commendation  is  genuinely  moral,  then  my  genuine  act  of
commendation does commit me to saying that this really is how man
ought to be. But if I do have a genuine moral view that this is how
people ought to be, then I must think that I, and others, ought to live up
to  this,  and  regard  those  who  do  not  as  falling  short  of  the  moral
standard. (Pybus 1982,p.194)
Therefore,  our  commendation  of  a  heroic  or  saintly  act  implies  our  recognition
(explicitly or not) that a certain ideal is worthwhile pursuing in general, not only for
me as an observer, but for everyone. That, for Pybus,  is  the move that brings ”ought”
and “should” into the picture, because commending a certain type of action is the
same with saying that ”we should all try to be” a certain kind of person:
To say, therefore, that someone is a saint or a hero, and thereby to 
express a moral judgment, is to say that that person has succeeded in 
being what we all ought to be. He is realizing the worthwhile through 
his actions. (Pybus 1982, p.196)
Therefore,  Pybus  is  not  simply  saying  that  what  Urmson  calls
”supererogatory”  is actually obligatory.  The picture is more complicated than that.
What she is saying is that as long as saintly and heroic deeds are considered morally
admirable,  then they lay out  before us a  requirement,  something expressible  by a
”should” or “ought”, a moral ideal to be actually pursued if it  is to be thought as
17 I think McGoldrick (1984, p.524) puts it best: "Thus, when we praise the saint or hero we do not
commit ourselves to saying that all should do similar acts. We commit ourselves only to the view
that all should aim at having, or inculcating within themselves, the dispositions and habitual virtues
which give rise to and provide the main spring for actions of that type.”
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genuinely moral. Even if Pybus is not maintaining that we have an obligation to act
heroically or saintly, but only that we should strive to be as good as we can, the usual,
commonsensical objections come to mind: that even pursuing an ideal cannot be a
matter  of  duty  and  that  no  one  should  (morally  or  prudentially)  be  justified  in
demanding heroic or saintly deeds. In a more elaborate form, these commonsensical
objections are brought against Pybus by McGoldrick (1984) in her article “Saints and
Heroes: A Plea for the Supererogatory”.
McGoldrick’s first point is that it does not seem to be a matter of duty to strive
towards a certain (moral) ideal. Even if one accepts that morality involves developing
habitual  dispositions  that lead to commendable acts,  there is  something strange in
maintaining that morality involves this development18 as a matter of duty.
The second point can be derived from the first. One of the consequences of
making  adherence  to  high  moral  values  into  a  duty  seems  to  be  that  one  should
constantly put others before herself or himself. This is, again, an unlikely candidate
for a requirement.
McGoldrick’s third point is that the status of saintly and heroic deeds seem to
more closely resemble the practice of gift-giving than the practice of exacting a debt
(the latter being the one associated by Urmson with duty proper). 
However, when Pybus replies19 to all these objections an interesting picture
emerges. It turns out that the objections are misguided, according to Pybus, because
she does not have in mind the kind of obligation that would make these objections
18 McGoldrick  accuses  Pybus  here  of  petitio  principii;  however,  I  will  skip  the  details  of  the
argument, as they do not contribute to the plausibility of the counter-argument.
19  In ”A Plea for the Supererogatory: A Reply”.
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valid.  When  she  says  that  we  all  have  an  obligation  or  that  we  all  ”should”  do
something, Pybus is appealing to a different understanding of ”obligation”. We are
not told exactly how are we supposed to understand obligation in this new light, but
Pybus is adamant in distinguishing it from Urmson’s picture of obligation, namely “a
duty which is expressible in rules and can be exacted from all”20. She says that if we
understand  obligation  in  Urmson’s  sense,  then  saintly  and  heroic  deeds  are  not
obligatory.  However  they  may  be  said  to  be  obligatory  in  another  sense  (which
remains mysterious apart from examples):
Now, if moral obligations are seen as quasi-legal ones, so that others 
may expect me to fulfill them, or to punish non-fulfillment, then 
beneficence is not obligatory.21 But that seems to require us to see all 
moral obligations as obligations of justice, and this is perhaps 
misleading. (...) 'They need our help, so we must give it' is a coherent 
moral judgment. We are not suppressing, nor need we add, the premise
'They are entitled to it'. (…) But if really good people are benevolent 
and loving, and exemplify the ideal to which human beings can aspire, 
then why should we not regard it as an ideal to which we should all 
aspire? (Pybus 1986, pp.530-1)
Therefore,  according  to  Pybus,  heroic  action  is  not  obligatory  if  by
”obligation” one understands something that can be required by others and which can
imply punishment for non-compliance with the requirement. 
Pybus does not insist on this point, but her aim in contradicting Urmson seems
to be more comprehensive than merely establishing a status for supererogatory deeds.
Namely, she seems to aim at a different picture of morality altogether, a picture where
the practice  of  morality  cannot  be  distinguished from the  contemplation  of  moral
deeds;  if  we want  to  be able  to  take ourselves  seriously about  morality,  then  we
20    Pybus (1986, p.194).
21    My italics.
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cannot be mere spectators. And this is where moral obligation intervenes, but it is an
obligation of cultivating virtue rather than acting in a certain manner or in certain
circumstances:
As  far  as  morality  goes,  though,  we  are  all (barring  psychopaths) 
players,  and  not  merely  spectators.  We  need, therefore,  to  adopt  
the  techniques  of  the  good  people.  Because,  to  do what  is  
morally  worth  doing,  we  need  virtues,  we  ought  to  develop  the 
virtues  to  enable  us  to  do  what  is  morally  worth  doing. (Pybus 
1986, p.527)
She indicates further that she takes the consequence of this position to be quite far
reaching.  One of the consequences,  for example,  is  that  her  position  is  not  about
keeping the threefold classical division of moral categories; rather, her position is that
the classical deontic categories (however many they may turn out to be) should be
accompanied by a whole new background regarding virtues:
The  point  is,  I  think, that  the  apparent  inadequacy  of  that  
classification  arises  from  the assumption  that  actions  can  or  
should  be  morally classified  on  their own,  without  any  reference  
to  the  background  of  the  character  and motives  of  the  agent. (...) 
Actions  will  still be wrong,  permissible or obligatory,  but  an 
adequate  account  of morality will not  use  this  classification  of  
actions  on  its  own,  without  the required  account  of  virtue. (Pybus 
1986, p.529)
From her reply to McGoldrick, it would appear that Pybus does not want to simply
leave the classical  classification  as it  is,  but  to modify it  in  a way different  from
Urmson's  proposal.  And  this  different  way  is  a  different  way  of  thinking  about
obligation altogether. In the next section I will discuss how this affects the status of
supererogatory behavior.
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To conclude,  Pybus’  position  seems to  be more  complex  than her  explicit
categorical  denial  of supererogation would lead us to suspect.  She first  states that
without obligation there can be no morality; and therefore Urmson, by placing heroic
action outside obligation, is actually placing supererogation outside morality:
In distinguishing between a morality of duty and a morality of 
aspiration, Urmson is (as his uneasiness suggests) unnecessarily 
lowering the concept of duty, and he is, strictly speaking, putting his 
aspirations or ideals outside morality altogether.22 (Pybus 1982, p.195)
However, then she goes on to say that the obligation she believes to be central
to morality is not obligation in the ”quasi-legalistic” strong sense that Urmson was
using.  Therefore,  instead  of  extending obligation  into  the  domain  of  “morality  of
aspiration” (as one might be tempted to believe from the bellicose expression of her
initial  position),  she  seems  to  claim  that  a  certain  weaker  sense  of  obligation  is
appropriate for an undivided domain of morality. 
This  might  be regarded as  a  reasonable  strategy if  one keeps  in  mind  the
dilemma presented by supererogatory deeds: on the one hand it seems obvious that
one can do more than required, on the other hand making heroic action not required
and therefore merely permissible, seems to allow for indifference towards excellent
moral  behavior.  Pybus’  solution  to  the  dilemma  appears  to  take  the  form  of  a
compromise: supererogation is made obligatory and required, thus alleviating fears
from the second horn of the dilemma (because it cannot appear as indifferent to the
moral  pursuit).  The  argument  given for  this  obligatory  status  is  that  one’s  moral
admiration cannot be merely contemplative; it has to result in a practical commitment
22  My italics.
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in order to be moral at all. However, this obligation is not of the kind that allows for
punishment for omission or of the kind that would justify expectations from others –
in order to alleviate worries coming from the first horn of the dilemma (because, in
this way, heroic action is not obligatory in the strong sense of “obligatory”).
One obvious problem with this kind of answer is the mysterious nature of such
an obligation.  Another, less obvious problem, I think, is the way in which Pybus’
position agrees with a common moral intuition while obscuring an important problem.
The appeal of Pybus’ position comes, I think, from the fact that it supports our moral
intuition that, indeed, we should help other people in need, and we should be as good
as we can possible be. What this kind of formulation obscures, I think, is the deep
divide that might run between a first-person point of view and a second- or third-
person point of view. If we say ”you should be as good as possible” or “they should
be  as  good as  possible”  it  becomes  clear  that  this  is  demanding  something  from
someone  else,  as  opposed  to  the  situation  where  I  say  “I  should  be  as  good  as
possible”. We are not usually inclined to assert the same kind of demandingness to
both points of view because such a requirement seems justified only when it comes
from me to myself, not when it comes from me to somebody else, or from somebody
else towards me. Using the pronoun ”we” obscures the divide between my demands
for  myself  and  my demands  for  others  because  it  gathers  everyone  in  a  kind  of
semantic solidarity such that it is hard to distinguish between  points of view: is it
”our” demand towards ”us” or is it “our” demand towards someone else? Of course
“we” should be as courageous as possible and “we should” save lives; the problem is:
should we save lives by sacrificing  ourselves or by sacrificing  someone else? In the
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second case, I think, the counter-intuitiveness becomes obvious, but Pybus does not
seem to be aware of the this ambiguity present in the employment of ”we”.
The way in which Pybus chooses to diffuse the tension present in the dilemma
(i.e. to solve the problem of supererogation), namely to eliminate the compulsory (as
she puts it, ”legalistic”) aspect of moral obligation, such that supererogation would be
"obligatory"  without  being  actually  mandatory,  has  consequences  for  the  way  in
which Pybus represents the domain of morality as a whole. If obligation is central to
morality,  as  Pybus  claims,  and  the  sense  of  “obligation”  is  changed,  then  it  is
reasonable to assume that the whole moral landscape changes.    In order to exemplify
a larger philosophical narrative where moral obligation is, indeed, seen “as something
to be exacted like a debt”, the next section is dedicated to J.S. Mill and his conception
about beneficence and duty.
1.5. Mill on Beneficence and Morality
 
To recall, for Pybus (1982) the problem of supererogation was  “How could
one explain that heroic or saintly action is something we ought to aspire to, even if the
action cannot be demanded?”, while for Urmson, the problem consisted in asking:
“How can one explain that some saintly and heroic acts are neither morally indifferent
nor obligatory?” The main difference between the two positions was the way in which
the authors understood the concept of duty. Urmson took duty to be “something to be
exacted like a debt”, that is to say, something that would have negative consequences
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when omitted. While for Pybus this was a “legalistic” conception of duty which was
not appropriate for the moral domain. However, Urmson was following a venerable
tradition seeing duty the way he did, and he was echoing Mill when he distinguished
between “basic duties” and “higher flights of morality”. In this section I will try to
determine  what  the  place  of  supererogation  is  according  to  Mill's  views  about
morality, duty and beneficence.
Mill  does  not  use  the  word  “supererogation”  and  he  does  not  explicitly
formulate a problem of supererogation. However, his Chapter V from Utilitarianism
discusses duty and what can be said to go beyond duty.23
Utilitarianism, in virtue of its requirement of maximizing the good, is usually
seen as a theory not favoring the thought that supererogation might exist: if it is a duty
to do your best in any circumstances,  one cannot be said to go beyond duty.  This
general consideration sheds a peculiar light on the case of John Stuart Mill.
In Chapter V, Mill's main concern is to show that, in spite of our intuition to
the contrary, Justice is actually a province of the domain of Expediency, i.e. it rests on
utility.  Mill admits that Justice seems to most people to have a specific imperative
character (strict rules, stern demands, punishable transgressions), and, in this respect,
it seems to be very much unlike our impression of what is merely useful. He attributes
the  imperative  character  associated  with  the  idea  of  justice  to  a  certain  "strong
feeling" that one has in matters of justice. The problem of showing that Justice is
actually a province of Utility becomes, therefore, the problem of showing that the
23 Mill will be discussed in the first chapter because his view of moral obligation has something in
common with Urmson's.  He is  not placed  in  the second chapter  because  Chapter  II  comprises
mainly contemporary act-utilitarian position.
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"strong feeling" associated with the idea of justice does not have to be something
inexplicable and sui generis, but can be generated by "general laws of our emotional
constitution",  the  workings  of  which  would  satisfy  the  need  to  protect  a  certain
interest, to preserve something with a high utility value. In short, the problem is to
show that the "common attribute or collection of attributes" gathered under the label
"justice"  could  be  said  to  arouse  a  strong feeling  because  of  an  association  with
something regarded by everyone as extremely useful:
If in everything which men are accustomed to characterise as just or 
unjust, some one common attribute or collection of attributes is always
present, we may judge whether this particular attribute or combination 
of attributes would be capable of gathering round it a sentiment of that 
peculiar character and intensity by virtue of the general laws of our 
emotional constitution, or whether the sentiment is inexplicable, and 
requires to be regarded as a special provision of Nature. If we find the 
former to be the case, we shall, in resolving this question, have 
resolved also the main problem: if the latter, we shall have to seek for 
some other mode of investigating it. (Mill 1861, p.177)
This being the target, Mill's strategy is to look into the different components of the
idea of justice. He finds that one usually speaks of “just” and “unjust” in the case of
legal rights, moral rights, attribution of merit, promises or contracts (everything that
may  involve  “breaking  faith  with  any  one”), partial  and  impartial  behavior  and
problems  of  equality.  As  all  these  seem related  but  nevertheless  a  heterogeneous
bunch, Mill takes a more historical approach in the idea that he might find something
common:
Among so many diverse applications of the term justice, which yet is 
not regarded as ambiguous, it is a matter of some difficulty to seize the
mental link which holds them together, and on which the moral 
sentiment adhering to the term essentially depends. Perhaps, in this 
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embarrassment, some help may be derived from the history of the 
word, as indicated by its etymology. (Mill 1861, p.181)
The “mental link” resulting from historical considerations turns out to be the idea of
“legal constraint”24 together with the associated threat of a punishment, even if matters
of justice are not always matters of law; because, as Mill explains, even if there is no
law actually regulating some things we consider unjust, we still have a feeling that
some transgressions are wrong and they should be punished. 
Once  arrived  at  the  idea  of  wrongness-that-needs-to-be-punished,  Mill's
journey starts to become relevant for the idea of supererogation and its place within
the domain of morality, even if this was not his main point of interest.
1.5.1. Justice, Morality, Worthiness and Expediency
Mill claims that, even though the idea of punishment for wrongdoing is the
desired  “mental  link”  connecting  various  aspects  of  the  idea  of  justice,  this
characteristic limits a domain that is larger than the domain of justice strictly.  It is
something specific to the domain of morality in general, therefore not providing, as
Mill complains, a difference between justice proper and other “moral obligations”:
The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and 
progressive growth of the idea of justice. But we must observe, that it 
24 P. 181: "Thus the idea of legal constraint is still the generating idea of the notion of justice, though
undergoing several transformations before that notion, as it exists in an advanced state of society,
becomes complete."
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contains, as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral 
obligation in general. For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, 
which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of 
injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything 
wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in 
some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his 
fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own 
conscience. (Mill 1861, p.183)
The picture emerging here is that of the domain of moral obligation delimited
by the  idea  of  punishment;  within  this  domain  there  is  a  distinction  between the
domain of justice and the domain of "other moral obligations". Mill does not provide
on the spot the difference between the two sub-domains but goes on to distinguish this
“realm of punishment” from its complementary, something that he calls “Worthiness”
and which, we are to understand, does not belong, strictly speaking, to the domain of
morality (because it has no expectation of punishment in case of inaction, punishment
being considered inappropriate in this case). 
This  other  domain,  of  Worthiness,  is  one  where  there  are  other  kinds  of
interactions, not pertaining to duty or “moral obligation”; in these cases there is no
place for blame or rightful punishments:
There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people 
should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or 
despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do;
it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, we 
do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. (Mill 1861, 
p.184)
Accordingly, “oughts” and punishments of any kind belong to the domain of right and
wrong which is different from the “desirable or laudable”. Mill explains that an action
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is  assigned to  one  domain  or  another  depending  upon our  wish  to  see  the  agent
compelled or exhorted to act:
(...) that we call any conduct wrong, or employ instead, some other 
term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person
ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say that it would be 
right to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, 
according as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, 
compelled or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner. (Mill 
1861, p.184)
This is the realm of Worthiness, for Mill,  where no punishment is applicable, and
agents can be only persuaded or exhorted; it is different from the domain of morality
in  general.  And,  within  the  domain  of  morality,  Mill  still  has  to  account  for  the
difference between justice and general obligation:
This, therefore, being the characteristic difference which marks off, not
justice, but morality in general, from the remaining provinces of 
Expediency and Worthiness; the character is still to be sought which 
distinguishes justice from other branches of morality. (Mill 1861, 
p.184)
To summarize, Mill seems to be distinguishing, at this point, between three domains:
a)  justice – the narrowest; 
b) general obligation – together with justice constitutes the whole domain of
right and wrong, that is to say of morality, i.e. of what is punishable -if-
wrong
c)  Worthiness  –  the  domain  of  praise  where  punishment  for  omission  is
inappropriate; therefore, situated outside morality
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From the characterization given by Mill to the domain of Worthiness, it would seem
the perfect  fit  with the  idea of supererogation:  nobody is  under  any obligation  to
perform this kind of action (it seems to be implied that Mill has in mind a kind of
action that has good consequences), their omission is not punishable, someone can be
"persuaded or exhorted" but not coerced. However,  if one is persuaded to include
supererogation  in  this  third  category,  Mill's  classification  would  also  place
supererogation outside morality. And, to thicken the plot, Mill speaks of beneficence
and generosity as categories belonging to moral obligation (b), not to Worthiness. His
justification for this is fully discussed in the next section.
1.5.2. Mill's Puzzle: to be or not to be an Anti-supererogationist
The difference  between justice  and wider  moral  obligations  resembles,  for
Mill, the one made by ethical writers of his time between perfect and imperfect duties:
Now it is known that ethical writers divide moral duties into two 
classes, denoted by the ill-chosen expressions, duties of perfect and of 
imperfect obligation; the latter being those in which, though the act is 
obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our 
choice, as in the case of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed 
bound to practise, but not towards any definite person, nor at any 
prescribed time. (Mill 1861, p.185)
If it is a moral duty to practice beneficence ("we are bound to"), and as a moral duty,
punishment in some form is appropriate for not doing one's duty, then it would seem
that Mill is approaching by this stance the anti-supererogationist position or, at least, a
quasi-supererogationist position. This is because one might see punishment as a form
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of constraint and, if the omission of a beneficent deed is worthy of punishment, then it
would  mean  that  the  agent  is  not  free  to  do  or  not  to  do  the  beneficent  action.
Alternatively,  one  might  say  that  beneficence  is  laudable  but  its  omission  is
blameworthy  so  it  deserves  some  kind  of  punishment:  this  would  be  a  quasi-
supererogationist  position.  But  immediately  after  presenting  his  readers  with  this
distinction, Mill takes a step back. The trait chosen by Mill to distinguish between
perfect and imperfect "obligations" is not so much the liberty to choose the occasion
of practicing beneficence as it is the presence of an opposing right: 
In the more precise language of philosophic jurists, duties of perfect 
obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides 
in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are those 
moral obligations which do not give birth to any right. I think it will be
found that this distinction exactly coincides with that which exists 
between justice and the other obligations of morality. (Mill 1861, 
p.185)
Mill  only  goes  on  to  underline  that  no  specific  person  has  a  right  to  demand
beneficence  from  someone:  "No  one  has  a  moral  right  to  our  generosity  or
beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any
given individual."
Moreover, he dismisses the claims of "mankind" as whole to our beneficence
or charity because such a claim would blur the lines between justice and the rest of
the moral domain:
For if a moralist attempts, as some have done, to make out that 
mankind generally, though not any given individual, have a right to all 
the good we can do them, he at once, by that thesis, includes 
generosity and beneficence within the category of justice. He is 
obliged to say, that our utmost exertions are due to our fellow 
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creatures, thus assimilating them to a debt (…). Wherever there is a 
right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence: 
and whoever does not place the distinction between justice and 
morality in general where we have now placed it, will be found to 
make no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality in 
justice. (Mill 1861, p.186)
One  problem  immediately  arising  from  this  argument:  if  beneficence  cannot  be
demanded either by "given individuals" or "mankind", then in what sense is it still a
duty, albeit an indirect one? What kind of binding force is Mill talking about when he
says that "we are bound" to practice beneficence if it is not the rightful demand of
someone or the general 'everyone'? 
Mill does address the problem of what exactly it is to have a right. He claims
that: 
When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid 
claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the 
force of law, or by that of education and opinion. If he has what we 
consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something 
guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right to it. If we 
desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by right, we think 
this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take 
measures for securing it to him, but should leave him to chance, or to 
his own exertions. (Mill 1861, p.189)
Taking this definition of right into account, what would then be Mill's verdict
on beneficence? The emerging picture is a rather complicated one, seemingly hesitant
between  classical  supererogationist  claims  and  classical  anti-supererogationist
stances, but not necessarily incoherent.
Mill wanted a distinction within morality, namely between justice and "other
moral  obligations".  This  distinction  is  supposed to  be  similar  to  the one between
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perfect and imperfect duties. And up to this point, by making beneficence a duty and
claiming that it is something we are "bound to practice" he seemed to have inclined
the balance towards anti-supererogationism. However, by grounding the distinction in
the presence/absence of a right and by saying that neither a person nor mankind has a
right to our beneficence, things become rather complicated because one is confronted
with a 'duty' that no one has the right to ask us to perform. Admittedly, Mill objects to
the terminology: he says that "duties of perfect and imperfect obligations" is an "ill-
chosen expression" but we are left to guess the reason for his discontent. Even if one
chooses not to call beneficence a 'duty', Mill still says that it is something "we are
bound to practice". The question is: what would be binding on us if not a duty? 
To make things even more puzzling, let us consider the following aspect: the
domain of morality, where the difference between justice and beneficence is included,
appears to presuppose for Mill the idea of some kind of  punishment, if not by law,
then by public opinion or by "own conscience".
For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of 
law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of 
any kind of wrong. We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to 
imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for 
doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by 
opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. (Mill 1861, p. 184)
Mill insists that the idea of penal sanction ("the essence of law”) is associated
not  only with injustice,  but  with wrongdoing in  general;  wrongdoing ought  to be
punished by law or by opinion of fellows, or by conscience, but it requires a kind of
price to be paid, the perpetrator "owes” something, "like a debt”:
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(...) It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a 
person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it. Duty is a thing which 
may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think 
that it might be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. (Mill 
1861, p.184)
Consequently, the following appears to be Mill's idea about the domain of morality: 
A) Morality includes the "hard core" of justice and, in addition to that, other
moral obligations.
B) Justice and the other moral obligations (like beneficence) have in common
the  idea  of  some  kind  of  a  punishment  for  not  complying  with  their
demands, and this is why they both are included in "morality" in general –
because this is that distinguishing characteristic of the domain of morality.
C) Justice and other moral obligations (like beneficence)  are different (and
Mill insists upon the requirement of not conflating the two) because justice
presupposes a  right  (of the person asking for justice)  while  beneficence
does not.
Taking this picture into account, what follows when one fails to be beneficent
is that this person has committed something wrong and therefore should be punished
for committing something immoral. However, how is this punishment to be enforced
and  by  whom  since  this  non-virtuous  person  has  not  infringed  upon  any  right?
Certainly not by law. One might guess, maybe by society, by the disapproval of peers
etc. However, according to Mill's definition, the person wronged by the agent's lack of
virtue does not have "a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it,
either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion." Therefore, society is
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not under an obligation to make sure that the non-virtuous become virtuous or act
beneficently either by law or by opinion. Therefore the disapproval of society for not
being beneficent might occur, but it is not morally bound to punish the perpetrator.
Because,  as  Mill  claims,  if  someone  does  not  have  a  right  to  beneficence,  then
"society ought not to take measures for securing it to him, but should leave him to
chance,  or  to  his  own exertions".  Where  does  this  leave  us  regarding  the  whole
concept of punishment for a wrong, then? 
The situation is puzzling because it would seem that a punishment is due for
the non-virtuous, however the appropriateness of this punishment does not come from
the law or public  opinion and the ones affected by the lack of virtue (persons or
human societies as a whole) cannot demand it (because they do not have a right), even
though Mill seem to admit that a wrong was committed. 
The only way in which I can make sense of Mill's claim might seem a bit ad
hoc, but it is the only way in which I can see all the pieces of the puzzle fitting with
each  other.  Mill  mentions  three  main  ways  of  being  punished  for  a  wrong
committed:" if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by
the reproaches  of his  own conscience."  The first  two, namely law and opinion of
fellow-creatures are excluded by Mill's considerations about rights because he says
that,  where there is no right,  society does not have to intervene by law or public
opinion to see that action done or a punishment enacted. Only the third remains as a
viable option, namely "reproaches of his own conscience". In other words, the only
punishment  appropriate  for the non-virtuous person may come only from himself.
This  interpretation  will  be  sustained,  I  think,  by  further  considerations  regarding
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Mill's strong inclination towards supporting individual freedom (to be discussed in the
next section). 
The question to be considered here, relative to this interpretation of Mill, is
what (if anything) it can bring to light about supererogation. The difficulty of the task
consists in the ambiguous status of a “punishment” that comes from within the agent.
Is this something we can rightly call “blame” or punishment? 
If one considers the answer to be “Yes”, then virtues like beneficence are not
properly  speaking  supererogatory  for  Mill,  because  the  failure  to  act  is actually
followed by blame. Mill would rather fit into the category of quasi-supererogation in
this interpretation. 
If  one  considers  the  answer  to  be  “No”,  then  Mill's  position  is  closer  to
supererogationists, but I think the more interesting consequence is that this kind of
answer raises questions about the binding moral force that is not the force of duty, in
the first place; and then questions about how blame or punishment can be different if
it comes from myself to myself or if it comes from someone else for myself. One
might wonder if Mill's expression "we are indeed bound to practice [beneficence]"
does not hide the same ambiguity of the pronoun “we” already discussed for Elizabeth
Pybus: should one understand that “we” are “bound” by our own conscience or by
others?
The  next  section  discusses  in  more  detail  Heyd's  opinion  about  Mill  and
supererogation.
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1.5.3. Heyd about Mill
Heyd  (1982)  thinks  that  Mill  is  simply  undecided  between  anti-
supererogationism and supererogationism, even though he seems to be sympathetic
towards the latter:
Mill oscillates between a reductionist, essentially anti-
supererogationist attitude, and a recognition of meritorious non-
obligatory acts. Like Kant, he is faced by some moral beliefs that 
cannot be justified in the framework of his rigorous theory. But unlike 
Kant, Mill is surely inclined to supererogationism. (Heyd 1982, p.83)
I  will  argue  in  this  section  that  Heyd's  argument  for  seeing  Mill  as  also
inclined towards anti-supererogationism does not have much force if one takes into
account Mill's final position about morality and utility.
Mill's sympathy towards supererogationism might come, according to Heyd,
from Mill's deep commitment towards individualism and freedom. His brief remarks
about  perfect  and  imperfect  duties,  beneficence  and  generosity,  come  from
Utilitarianism, but the sympathetic attitude might come from On Liberty:
The broader justification for this supererogationist deviation from the
utilitarian principle is outlined in Mill's  On Liberty, which takes the
opposite starting-point to that of Utilitarianism. While the principle of
utility  takes  the  point  of  view  of  the  general,  overall  good  whose
promotion is the duty of every individual, the principle of liberty puts
the  emphasis  on  the  rights  of  the  individual  and  the  limits  of  the
legitimate subordination of his interests to the public or general good
(…). (Heyd 1982, p.85)
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But the two directions, claims Heyd, cannot be reconciled, unless utility is taken to
include the value of individual freedom:
Although Mill tries to reconcile these two principles by suggesting that
utility should be understood 'in the largest sense' (so as to include 
considerations of liberty), I think that the two are ultimately 
incompatible, and hence that Mill cannot claim to be a pure utilitarian. 
The distinction between the supererogatory and obligatory as is drawn 
by Mill himself can be justified in terms of utility only on the basis of a
very extended sense of 'utility'. (Heyd 1982, p.85)
However, this is not Heyd's main reason for seeing Mill as sometimes taking
the anti-supererogationist position. Heyd thinks, first,  that by making beneficence an
"imperfect duty" Mill cannot regard it as supererogatory; second, there is something
corresponding to supererogation in Mill, namely the domain of Worthiness, but this
domain  is  excluded from morality  proper,  so supererogation  would have no place
within morality:
[The] distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, which implies a
denial of supererogatory acts, is drawn within the sphere of 'morality in
general'. But this sphere is marked off by Mill from 'the remaining 
provinces of Expediency and Worthiness'. (…) So although there is no 
room for supererogation beyond justice (i.e. in the realm of imperfect 
duty), there might be room for it 'beyond morality'. (Heyd 1982, p.84)
The main ground for which I do not think this should be a problem for Mill's
sympathy for supererogation  is to be found in Mill's answer to his own problem, his
original problem: the connection between utility and justice. As I have pointed out,
his main concern in Chapter V is not morality or supererogation. Mill wants to show
that it plausible to regard Justice as a province of Expediency. His way of showing
this is to point out that the strong feeling usually associated with justice (but not with
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utility in general) comes from two instincts (i.e. "the impulse of self-defense and the
feeling  of  sympathy")  naturally  associated  to  something  that  everyone  regards  as
supremely useful: security. As this is extremely valuable (Mill would probably like to
say “useful”) to anyone, the strongest feelings (like the desire to retaliate and punish
perpetrators) will be associated with any threat to security and, as a consequence, the
harshest imperatives and most sacred rules will gather around protecting security. The
strong feelings associated with the idea of justice are, therefore, a consequence of
very high utility. As the utility decreases for things that are in the vicinity of 'being
safe',  so  does  the  feeling  of  urgency;  if  utility  decreases  enough,  the  thirst  for
retaliation and the feeling of being endangered (i.e. unsafe) might even disappear for
cases where something we regard as useful (but not extremely useful) is threatened.
And this is how Mill explains the difference between justice and Worthiness, between
the domain where a punishment awaits the trespasser and the domain where no such
thing seem to be appropriate: the behaviors that we only praise and exhort are about
things that are not important enough for our survival so that we would grant them a
protection by stern rules:
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which 
we must never forget to include wrongful interference with each 
other's freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxims, 
however important, which only point out the best mode of managing 
some department of human affairs. (…) By merely giving to each other
prudential instruction or exhortation, they may gain, or think they gain,
nothing: in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence 
they have an unmistakable interest, but far less in degree: a person may
possibly not need the benefits of others; but he always needs that they 
should not do him hurt.25 Thus the moralities which protect every 
25 This is also an additional psychological argument from Mill: I will uphold firmly rules of justice
because  I  might  need  others  to  uphold  them  for  me  (when  in  danger  myself);  but  the  same
argument  loses  force  when it  is  made about  beneficence  instead of  security:  it  does  not  seem
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individual from being harmed by others, either directly or by being 
hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once those 
which he himself has most at heart, and those which he has the 
strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed. (…) 
Now it is these moralities primarily, which compose the obligations of 
justice. (Mill 1861, p.189)
I believe Mill's solution to his problem is important because it results in a picture
where the differences between justice and the other domains ("imperfect duties" and
Worthiness) are differences of degree, namely they are distinguished by degrees of
utility. They are all provinces of Expediency, starting with Justice as the narrowest
sphere and the highest utility value, which sphere can be logically subsumed under
Morality  (larger  sphere,  lower degree  of  utility),  which  Morality  can  be  logically
subsumed under Worthiness, all of them being sub-domains of Expediency. In this
picture, there is no real difference in kind between what belongs to Morality and what
belongs to  Worthiness.  Therefore  some actions  (like  beneficence)  that  do not  fall
under justice (which means no one has a right to demand them) might deserve some
kind  of  punishment  (or  remorse)  when  omitted;  some  other  actions  with  good
consequences will not deserve even a slight punishment when omitted. As Mill makes
clear, this also depends on their consequences, i.e. on utility.26 Therefore, there can be
no question, in this interpretation, of excluding supererogation from Morality, because
plausible for everyone to say that they need to be beneficent because they themselves might need
beneficence someday.
26 Mill  about  beneficence:  “It  is  noble  to  be  capable  of  resigning  entirely  one's  own portion  of
happiness, or chances of it: but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own
end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask,
would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr  did not believe that it  would earn for others
immunity from similar sacrifices? (…) All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the
personal  enjoyment  of  life,  when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the
amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is
no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting
proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should." (p.147)
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there is no firmly defined domain of Morality; there are only degrees of utility. Mill
himself speaks about a domain of morality because he recognizes a peculiar feeling
attached to a certain zone from the domain of Expediency; but that feeling, he claims,
is just the subjective expression of a high degree of utility. 
Therefore, supererogation might be very well said to inhabit, in Mill's picture,
an approximate domain of utility where no punishment is sought for omitting to act
towards obtaining utility. This is already a great victory in a Utilitarian environment.
Not only is there no maximization of utility required, we are also told by Mill  that
one has no right to require it. With this unusual (for a Utilitarian) provision in place,
the domain of supererogation within this frame seems to be firmly established. Even
if one drops the complicated considerations about beneficence and punishment from
the  previous  section  and  considers  that,  for  Mill,  beneficence  simply  is  not
supererogatory, there is still room for saying that certainly there can be other types of
acts considered supererogatory proper in Mill's view. No doubt, this would depend on
what  do we choose  to  call  “beneficence”.  For  example,  it  is  not  controversial  to
include charity among beneficent actions.  One can conjecture that it  is possible to
regard charity as one of those actions which, in Mill's view, nobody has a right to
demand, but which, at the same time, can elicit the agent's remorse when omitted (i.e.
there is a 'punishment' of sorts for omission, and therefore the act can be said to fulfill
a 'moral obligation'). Beyond this kind of act there should be acts that belong to the
province of Worthiness, i.e. of high value and showing virtue,  acts that cannot be
required but only praised and commended. Heroic acts, e.g. of saving other people's
lives by placing one's own in danger, cannot be plausibly seen this way, I believe,
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because their omission might be plausibly followed by regret or remorse; therefore,
Mill's own criterion would not place them exactly outside moral obligation even if
they cannot be required. It is also not so clear that they can be called “beneficent” -
someone saving one's  life  is  not exactly  a “benefactor”,  but is,  rather,  a “savior”.
However, I think that the most plausible candidate for Mill's province of Worthiness
is not a certain kind of good action (its omission can almost always be followed by
remorse), but a certain kind of virtuous life. A virtuous life (dedicated to finding a
cure for a certain disease, for example) cannot be required, but it is admirable and
commendable.  Also,  the question if  the omission of a virtuous life  would lead to
remorse,  does  not  make much  sense,  and therefore,  one can  be sure to  leave  the
province of “moral obligation” behind and to enter the domain where supererogation
is possible. 
1.6. Different Questions, Different Views about Morality
Mill's view about morality and its provinces provided a map where one could
establish a place for supererogation (deeds that are admirable and good the omission
of which does not deserve any punishment) even if that was not Mill's intention. What
we call today supererogatory acts would fit, according to Mill's characterizations of
these domains, somewhere in between Moral Obligation and Worthiness, overlapping
partially with both. However, the main point in describing Mill's position was to offer
an illustration of a classical position regarding moral obligation in a strong sense, or,
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as Pybus would put it, in a 'legalistic' sense. Mill explicitly states that the concept of
moral obligation is just an extension of the idea of justice, which idea of justice is
relying, in turn, on the idea of punishment for transgressions: 
For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of 
law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of 
any kind of wrong. We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to 
imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for 
doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by 
opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. (Mill 1861, p.183)
Mill's  aim  was  to  show  that  the  common  sense  usually  manifests  strong
feelings and supports the idea of punishment for injustice, because unjust actions are
actions going against something of very high utility in a society: life and safety. When
the  omission  of  certain  moral  actions  or  transgression  of  certain  moral  rules  will
present a smaller loss for society, they tend not to be punished harshly or not to be
punished at  all.  This  is  a  picture   of  moral  obligation  where obligation  comes  in
degrees  (of  utility),  but  it  is  nevertheless  a  picture  where,  not  fulfilling  one's
obligation brings about deserved punishment and where obligation can be, indeed,
“exacted  like  a  debt”.  Urmson  has  a  similar  picture  (he  calls  his  own  position
“utilitarian”, even though it is not painted in degrees of utility): there are “basic rules”
of morality, essential to the survival of society and, therefore, deemed obligatory as
their  transgression  is  punishable;  but  there  are  also   “higher  flights  of  morality”,
admirable deeds that are not and should not be required. Urmson affirms that 
(...) while there is nothing whatever objectionable in the idea of 
someone's being pressed to carry out such a basic duty as promise 
keeping, there is something horrifying in the thought of pressure being 
brought on him to perform an act of heroism. Though the man might 
feel himself morally called upon to do the deed, it would be a moral 
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outrage to apply pressure on him to do such a deed as sacrificing his 
life for others. (Urmson 1958, p. 214)
Urmson does not address the question why such a pressure would be regarded as
horrifying. This would have been an important question to answer because it points at
some moral limits for what is can be demanded from a moral agent. Nevertheless,
even absent such considerations,  I  believe  that  one can notice  that,  by comparing
positions  regarding  the  problem of  supererogation,  a  more  general  point  of  view
emerges:  not  only  about  moral  obligation,  but  about  how  one  sees  morality  in
general. 
Mill  depicts  the  province  of  Morality  as  an extension  of  Law because,  he
thinks, some kind of punishment should be attached to the omission of a moral duty.
This consideration is revealing, not only about his view on moral duty, but also about
the way in which morality is seen as a domain governed by law-like rules. One may
contrast this conception with Pybus', who rejects this view of obligation a morality as
“legalistic”. For her, matters of moral obligation are matters regarding moral ideals
and aspirations. Urmson proposes something that appears to be in between: morality
has two domains, one of “legalistic” obligations that can be “extracted like a debt”,
and  another  one  reserved  to  “higher  flights  of  morality”,  namely  aspirations  and
ideals. 
The  complete  picture  is,  of  course,  more  complicated  than  that.  Mill  also
envisaged a domain of aspiration and ideals (i.e. the province of Worthiness), but this
appears to be different from Morality. This is what prompts Heyd's accusation that
Mill  has  banished  supererogation  outside  Morality.  I  have  already  discussed  his
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argument and why I think this accusation is not well-founded. My point here is just
that the discussion about the problems surrounding supererogation seems to quickly
escalate towards discussing the status of moral obligation and the image of morality
in  general.  I  believe  that  discussing  moral  obligation  leads  to  discussions  about
morality in general because morality is very often seen to be obligation-centered. But
this a theme to be fully discussed in Chapter Four. 
The next chapter will explore the various problems that supererogation can
raise in a consequentialist or utilitarian theoretical framework. 
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Chapter Two: Supererogation, Consequentialism and Utilitarianism
2.0. Utilitarianism, Consequentialism and Supererogation
Ethical theories, of both utilitarian and deontological persuasion, tend to have
difficulties in accommodating the commonsensical intuition that some morally good
deeds cannot  be  required,  i.e.  in  accommodating  supererogation.  As Heyd  (1982)
notices,  in  their  "pure  but  crude  forms",  the  two  kinds  of  ethical  theories  have
difficulties  in  accommodating  supererogation  for  different  reasons:  deontological
theories because they tend to assume that the domain of the morally good is exhausted
by duty (in various forms); utilitarian theories have difficulties because they tend to
require  uncompromised  maximization  of  the  good,  not  leaving  any  space  for
extraordinary good deeds that should not be required (in the first chapter, it was New
(1974) illustrating this position).  This does not mean, of course, that more refined
versions of the two cannot  attempt to accommodate supererogation (the degree of
their success is another matter).
To 'accommodate' supererogation means that some plausible explanation has
to be given within the theory for the commonsensical intuition that morally excellent
deeds cannot be required. That is to say, they will attempt an answer the puzzle of
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supererogation,  the  one  generally  expressed  in  vague  and  general  terms  by  the
question 'how can one explain that morally excellent deeds cannot be required?'
The purpose of this chapter is to present several ways in which act-utilitarians
(and sometimes act-consequentialists) refine their theories in order to accommodate
intuitions  about  supererogation.  My  aim  is  to  show  that  the  various  solutions
presented to the puzzle of supererogation are actually solutions of slightly different
problems that  can be formulated about supererogation.  Some of the differences  in
posing the problem will come from changes in or restrictions on the meanings of key
terms, others will come from variations in the theoretical settings adopted in order to
accommodate supererogation. 
2.1. Supererogation under Utilitarian Lenses
The commonsensical notion of supererogation has, I claim, deceptive clarity
and simplicity. This might be because it constitutes only a broad outline of a possible
problem: the details are to be filled in by anyone trying to figure out an explanation
for the tenets of supererogation. Hurka and Schubert (2012), for example, paint this
broad outline in the following manner:
The concept of supererogation has two sides. On one side, a 
supererogatory act isn’t morally required; on the other side, it’s 
somehow better than its alternative, or “beyond” duty in a sense that 
connotes superiority. (Hurka and Schubert 2012, p.8)
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This is not the only characterization in these terms, of the two sides of supererogation.
Here is another similar characterization:
Supererogatory acts have at least two essential features: i) they must 
be morally optional in the sense of being neither obligatory nor 
forbidden and ii) they must be in some sense morally superior to some
other act that the agent may permissibly do instead. Differing 
accounts of supererogation typically vary in terms of what they take to
be the relevant sense of moral superiority. (Portmore 2003, p.326)
This two-parts view of supererogation seems straightforward. And yet a multitude of
questions  are  left  unanswered:  how is  the  threshold  established?  What  makes  the
supererogatory deed superior? Is it  superior because of the sacrifice of the agent?
Could  one imagine  deeds  that  go  beyond  duty  with little  or  no  sacrifice?  Vessel
(2010), for example, identifies several possible reasons (proposed by various authors
discussing  supererogation)  for  which  supererogatory  deeds  are  said  to  be  better:
because the action is praiseworthy or because of the risk involved for the agent or
because the benefit for others makes it superior.
Most concur that supererogatory action must be morally optional: 
neither morally obligatory nor morally forbidden. Furthermore, 
supererogatory action must be in some way especially valuable, more 
valuable in this way than some competing morally permissible 
alternative. The sense in which supererogatory action must be more 
valuable than a competing morally permissible alternative, however, is 
a matter of rich controversy. Some believe that supererogatory action 
must be morally better than a competing permissible alternative. Some 
believe that the performance of supererogatory action confers more 
moral praiseworthiness upon its agent than would the performance of a
morally permissible competitor. Still others believe that supererogatory
action must benefit others to a greater extent than a morally 
permissible alternative. This author is inclined to endorse this latter 
analytic requirement on the term "supererogatory." (Vessel 2010, 
p.302)
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There are many other features that can be added to the simple two-parts view
of  supererogation  in  order  to  make  possible  a  full  theoretical  explanation.  For
example,  one  feature  that  does  not appear  in  consequentialist  and  utilitarian
discussions  of  supererogation  (as  it  is  not  considered  significant  for  this  kind  of
theory) is the intention of the agent: does the agent have to have a good intention in
order for the action to count as truly supererogatory? The features that  do appear in
consequentialist discussions of supererogation sometimes fill in the general picture of
supererogation,  and sometimes  transform it;  for  while  sometimes  consequentialist
and utilitarian theories adapt themselves to accommodate supererogation, sometimes
the  concept  of  supererogation  is  adapted  to  fit  an  utilitarian  frame. To  see  this
process  of  double  influence  unfolding,  one  needs  to  look  at  the  outline  of  a
consequentialist/  utilitarian  theory  and  notice  which  basic  traits  of  these  theories
come  into  conflict  with  which  basic  traits  of  the  commonsensical  concept  of
supererogation. This is the task of the present section.
Several  authors27 have  noticed  that  the  compelling  idea  at  the  core  of
consequentialism is the one underlining a connection between the moral value of an
action and the goodness of its outcome.  Philippa Foot28 expresses this connection,
between what is morally right and good consequences, as “it can never be right to
prefer a worse state of affairs to a better”. Scheffler has two formulations, a stronger
one in his 1988 introduction to  Consequentialism and Its Critics, namely “so far as
morality is concerned, what people ought to do is to minimize evil and maximize the
good” (Scheffler 1988, p.1) and a weaker one in The Rejection of Consequentialism:
27 For example, Philippa Foot (1985), Samuel Scheffler (1982, 1988) and Douglas Portmore (2003).
28    Utilitarianism and the Virtues”, p. 227 in Scheffler (ed.).
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I believe that utilitarianism refuses to fade from the scene in large part
because, as the most familiar consequentialist theory, it is the major 
recognized normative theory incorporating the deeply plausible-
sounding feature that one may always do what would lead to the best 
available outcome overall. (Scheffler 1982, p.4)
Also,  Portmore  in  “Position-Relative  Consequentialism,  Agent-Centered
Options,  and  Supererogation”  maintains  that  consequentialist  theories  adopt  “the
compelling idea that it can never be wrong to bring about the best state of affairs.”29 
Now, the idea that “one may always do what would lead to the best available
outcome overall” per se does not necessarily clash with the commonsensical view of
supererogation,  namely  with  the  idea  that  someone  may  or  may  not  do  morally
excellent  deeds.  However,  some  tension  is  raised  by  the  idea  that  “what  people
ought30 to do is (…) to maximize the good” or by the idea that “it can never be right to
prefer a worse state of affairs to a better”. 
Obviously the passage from “one may always commit actions with the best
outcome” to “one ought to commit actions with the best outcome” is the one creating
problems for a supererogationist position. This is a fairly obvious point of conflict
between allowing a morally good deed (according to a supererogationist frame) and
requiring a morally good deed. However, the conflict runs deeper than that and takes,
I  believe,  a  more  complicated  shape.   For  once  we  add  several  classical
consequentialist and utilitarian features to this basic, compelling idea (in whichever
formulation one might prefer) the conceptual landscape becomes more complicated
and presents more opportunities of conflict. Even here, where I have tried to match
29    Portmore (2003, p. 304).
30    My italics.
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two  basic  ideas,  the  basic  idea  of  supererogation  and  the  core  intuition  of
consequentialism, things are more complicated than a mere conflict of permission vs.
obligation.  For  what  supererogation  allows  is  not  exactly  the  same  thing  that
consequentialism requires. Involved in the commonsensical idea of supererogation (as
the two-parts has made clear) view is just a notion of “better” moral deed (this is what
is allowed but not required), not necessarily a notion of “the best”. In addition, the
commonsensical notion of supererogation neither excludes nor involves the idea that
it is  the outcome of the action that is evaluated as “better”. Usually,  in discussing
supererogation, it is the moral action that is evaluated as “better” without mentioning
if it is the outcome of the action or something else31 that made it “better”. As said
before, once the full theoretical apparatus of consequentialism and utilitarianism are
in place, on top of this basic intuition, the opportunities for conflict multiply.
Therefore, in order to make somehow clearer the differences, the conflicts and
the transformations  that  follow the reconciliation  attempts  between supererogation
and theories  of  consequentialist  inspiration,  I  will  provide  below a chart  of  main
points of conflict and how they tend to be resolved, namely by modifying the basic
supererogation concept or the consequentialist theory.
a) The impersonal scale measuring the good
First, one might notice that in characterizing the two sides of supererogation
(being neither obligatory nor forbidden and being morally better than alternatives) the
second part is left vague; we are told that the supererogatory action is “better in some
31 As it was suggested, it might have been the sacrifice of the agent that were taken into account, not
necessarily the consequences of his action, when the verdict of the evaluation comes out as morally
better.
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sense”  but  one is  left  to  fill  in  the  details  as  one chooses.  This  is  exactly  where
consequentialist  and  utilitarian  theories  supply  promptly  detailed  theoretical
constructions, so that “better” tends to acquire a quite technical sense. 
Act-consequentialism is generally characterized as a certain sort of 
view about the relation between an act's rightness and its 
consequences. An act-consequentialist holds that states of affair 
(outcomes, consequences) can be objectively or impersonally ranked 
according to their goodness and that any given act is morally right or 
permissible if and only if its consequences are at least as good, 
according to the impersonal ranking, as those of any alternative act 
open to the agent--the doing of an act being itself included among its 
consequences. (Slote 1984a, p.139)  
The impersonal  ranking of  states  of  affairs  is  therefore  used as  a  scale  in
determining the rightness of a moral deed: this is something completely new for a
commonsensical  view  of  supererogation.  Supererogation  seen  through
consequentialist  lenses  will  have  to  adopt  at  least  some  parts  of  this  way  of
accounting for what it means for one deed to be “morally better” than others. In this
sense, doing a supererogatory action is “better” than not doing it because its outcome
would rank higher on the impartial/impersonal scale of good states of affairs.
I think that the concept of supererogation is not, at first sight, incompatible
with such a procedure of impersonal/impartial measurement. However, once the point
of  view of  the  agent  comes  into  discussion  (and it  has  to  be  taken  into  account
because the agent is being prescribed a highly demanding kind of moral behavior),
the impersonal character of the scale will become problematic, and several authors32
32 Scheffler (1982), Slote (1984), Portmore (2003).
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will look for a way to make room for the agent's point of view when measuring the
goodness of the outcome. 
b) Required optimization or maximization
Second, supererogation, in its commonsensical understanding, lacks not only
explanations about what “better” moral deeds might mean, but also the idea of an
optimal or maximally good moral deed. On the consequentialist side, this idea is one
of the hallmarks of the theory:
Among ethical theories, those that I call 'act-consequentialist' may be 
characterized roughly as follows. Such theories first specify some 
principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worst from 
an impersonal point of view. (…) After giving some principle for 
generating such rankings, act-consequentialists then require that each 
agent in all cases act in such a way as to produce the highest-ranked 
state of affairs that he is in a position to produce.33 (Scheffler 1982, 
p.1)    
However, he adds that all kinds of consequentialism share these two features:
"ranking overall states of affairs impersonally and the general idea that the
best states of affairs are somehow to be promoted".34
An act-utilitarian is, according to the prevalent conception, an act-
consequentialist with a particular view about how states of affairs are 
to be impersonally ranked: roughly speaking, the goodness of states of
affairs depends only on the well-being, happiness, satisfaction, utility, 
or desire-fulfillment of the individuals who exist in those states of 
affairs and one state of affairs is better than another just in case it 
contains a greater sum of individual utilities, or a greater overall 
balance of satisfaction over dissatisfaction. Thus act-consequentialism
holds that a right act must be optimific, and the act-utilitarian, in 
addition, that optimizing always means maximizing the sum of 
individual well-being, desire fulfillment, etc. (Slote 1984a, p.139)
33   My italics.
34   Scheffler (1982, p.2).
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While  the  idea  of  a  maximum  of  good  in  itself  does  not  present  an
incompatibility with supererogation, the whole point in establishing a maximum is
that it becomes, by the lights of the utilitarian theory,  obligatory. Obviously, this is
one of the features of consequentialist and utilitarian theories that comes into conflict
with supererogation. It is already a commonplace35 to point out the incompatibility
between the requirement  of maximization  and supererogation:  if  supererogation  is
mainly about doing more than required,  then to require the maximum one can do
leaves no place for going beyond what is required. As the two (supererogation and the
maximization requirement) seem to exclude each other, one is forced to say either
that supererogation does not actually exist (and to explain away the commonsensical
moral intuition upholding its existence)36 or to say that consequentialist and utilitarian
theories should give up optimization or maximization, respectively. The route usually
taken is to accept that supererogation represents a robust intuition of common sense
morality  and  the  consequentialist  inspired  theories  should  adapt  in  order  to
accommodate it.  In this  sense, authors who want to stick to the basic intuition of
consequentialism while being able to accommodate supererogation,37 propose giving
up the maximization requirement and adopt instead a satisficing requirement, i.e. the
view  that  what  is  morally  required  is  to  do  something  “good  enough”  by  some
adopted standard, not something that is best. If this proposal indeed reconciles the
commonsensical notion of supererogation with consequentialism, will be discussed in
the following sections. 
35  See Heyd (1982), Mellema (1991), New (1974), Portmore (2003), Scheffler (1982), Slote (1984).
36     See New (1974) and Vessel (2010).
37     Slote (1984), Hurka and Schubert (2012), Dreier (2004).
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There are authors such as Zimmerman (1993) and Vessel (2010) who disagree
with  this  widely  held  verdict  of  incompatibility  between  supererogation  and
maximization  requirement.  Their  strategy will  be to try to keep the maximization
requirement while introducing other changes in the conceptual frame surrounding the
problem of compatibility of the two. 
To  conclude,  this  is  a  point  where  supererogation  imposes  some  serious
modification  upon the  consequentialist  frame,  the  modification  usually  taking  the
form of a rejection of the maximization (or optimization) requirement.
c) The threshold of supererogation as satisficing
Obviously missing from any consequentialist or utilitarian theory is the idea of
a threshold of what is required, beyond which one may permissibly act in order to
obtain even better outcomes. On the other side, supererogation is actually defined by
the existence of such a threshold. As a consequence, consequentialist theories trying
to accommodate  supererogation  will  usually adopt  a  kind of threshold of  what  is
required below the optimal or the maximum possible. The kind of threshold to be
discussed is the one given by the concept of  satisficing, where the outcome is not
supposed  to  be  the  best  possible  one,  but  one  that  is  “good  enough”  in  the
circumstances. This proposal will obviously create room for going “beyond what is
required”. Nevertheless, it will also leave some room for doubt and debate regarding
the success of capturing the commonsensical moral intuition of supererogation by this
theoretical device. 
d) The outcome of the action and the sacrifice of the agent as a cost
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The sacrifice  of  the agent  and the  overall  (presumably)  good result  of  his
deeds  are  not  quantified  or  measured  against  each  other  according  to  the
commonsensical  view of  supererogation.  In  a  consequentialist  or  utilitarian  frame
naturally  the  outcome  will  be  important  and  it  will  be  important  for  it  to  be
measurable/quantifiable. The impersonal maximization of the good is an idea usually
aiming at  something like the “greater good” of all. The problem with supererogatory
action is that the pursuit of the greater good by the agent might come with a heavy
cost  for  the  agent.  The two-part  image  of  supererogation  (that  is,  permission  and
superiority of the supererogatory action) does not mention the sacrifice of the agent as
a condition for something to be considered supererogatory. It only says that one is
permitted  not  to  do  it;  it  does  not  say  why.  However,  often  times  the  classical
paradigmatic examples of supererogatory actions are saintly and heroic deeds, which
tend to have a heavy cost for the agent and to bring very good outcomes (for the rest).
Even if sacrifice is not always present with supererogatory action, it is enough to have
some cases of supererogation that bring very good results with heavy cost (e.g. the
soldier  who  saves  many  lives  by  sacrificing  his  own  life)  in  order  to  generate
objections to theories of utilitarian inspiration. For in a classical “crude” version of
utilitarian theory such heavy sacrifices will be required in case they maximize the
result. Therefore, this trait of utilitarianism has become a classical objection usually
labeled as the  demandingness objection: it is too much to require from an agent in
certain cases to maximize the goodness of the outcome. Critics point out that this is
the point where the concept of supererogation, properly integrated, would bring some
relief from exaggerated utilitarian demands by making sacrifice and heavy cost for the
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agent optional. The manner in which authors attempt to make this integration is by
leaving the agent some latitude regarding the allocation of her time and effort: this is
where the agent-centered prerogatives make room for agent-favoring permissions and
agent-sacrificing  permissions  in  Scheffler  (1982),  Slote  (1984b)  and  Hurka  and
Schubert (2012).
These  points  from a)  to  d)  are  sensitive  points  where  supererogation  and
consequentialist  theories  collide.  Authors  who will  try to  make  supererogation  sit
comfortably with consequentialism and utilitarianism will modify either or both: they
will try to impose exceptions from the impersonal scale measuring the goodness of
the  outcome,  they  will  try  to  give  up  the  maximization  requirement  and  adopt
satisficing instead (which will function also as a threshold for supererogation) and
they will try to calculate what kind of sacrifice would be reasonable to be demanded
from the agent. All these points of conflict and modification will come out in the way
authors state what they each take to be “the” problem of supererogation. 
2.2. The Problem of Supererogation in Utilitarian Setting
    
The discussion up to this point has shown how the commonsensical notion of
supererogation  would  look  under  consequentialist  lenses  and  how the  attempt  to
accommodate  supererogation  sometimes  modifies  the  structure  of  theories  of
consequentialist inspiration. In short, it was about supererogation and consequentialist
theories modifying each other when cohabitation is sought.
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It  remains  to  clarify,  however,  some  of  the  consequences  of  this
transformation for the problem of supererogation. The problem 'how are we permitted
not  to  do  an  excellent  moral  deed?'  seems  to  receive  a  prima  facie categorical
negative answer from the usual consequentialist-utilitarian perspective, namely that
we are not allowed, if by “excellent moral deed” one understands “the action with the
best available outcome”. 
On closer examination,  however, this vague and general formulation of the
problem of supererogation takes, in this context, a slightly different shape. Adding an
impersonal scale of good outcomes and a notion of the best available outcome (that is,
modifying  the  problem  according  to  the  points  a),  b)  and  c)  from  the  previous
section), the general question becomes  'how are we permitted not to do an action
which has the maximizing/optimizing outcome impersonally/impartially considered?'
But this is not to say that the authors discussing supererogation in a consequentialist
setting focus on this problem with this single question in mind. 
First,  the  authors  discussing  how  to  acclimatize  supererogation  in  a
consequentialist environment often do not have supererogation as their primary focus
or concern. From various theoretical concerns the problem of supererogation emerges
as a manifold of particular problems, each with their own focus and own formulation
(narrower  than  the  general  frame  provided  by the  question  above).  For  example,
because  of  their  different  aims,  Scheffler's  approach  to  supererogation38 will  be
different  from  Slote's;39 Scheffler's  concern  may  be  formulated  as  '  How  are
38 The Rejection of Consequentialism (Scheffler 1982).
39   “Satisficing Consequentialism - I” (Slote 1984a).
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consequentialists permitted not to take into account the impersonal scale measuring
the goodness of states of affairs?' while Slote's would be best expressed, I believe, as
'How are consequentialists permitted not to perform the action providing the optimal
(best) outcome ?'. 
Second, depending upon how each particular theory will further specify the
meaning of some terms (for example “satisficing” as opposed to “maximizing”), the
resulting question about supererogation will be slightly different.  For example, one
may notice that ' to be allowed not to maximize' is actually a permission to do less
than the best, i.e. a permission to do something that is 'good enough'. Therefore the
general formulation of the problem of supererogation in this context may very well be
'how are we allowed to satisfice (i.e. not to maximize)?'; however, taking into account
that  “to  satisfice'  might  have  several  different  meanings  (as  suggested  in  Hurka
(1990) and Slote (2004)) the question itself might be posing different problems.
Even though the authors  discussing supererogation  might  refer  to  different
problems than the one in the general formulation (i.e. 'how are we permitted not to do
an  action  which  has  the  best  outcome  impersonally/impartially  considered?),  the
general  formulation  is  still  useful,  I  think,  for  orientation  purposes,  namely  for
distinguishing between various possible strategies of acclimatizing supererogation in
a consequentialist/utilitarian setting. Two strategies become immediately visible from
the general question: one can give up the requirement of “the best outcome” (i.e. of
optimizing/maximizing) from the first part of the question, or one can concentrate on
giving up the trait  of impersonal  scale  of  measuring  the outcomes (by having an
agent-centered approach rather  than an impersonal  one).  However,  there are more
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subtle strategies, not immediately made visible by the question. Other authors have
concentrated upon spelling out in more detail the scale(s) of value according to which
an action is considered “better” or “best”. 
Consequently, I will present these three strategies as listed:
A)  Giving  up  the  optimization/maximization  requirement  and  adopting  a
satisficing requirement instead.
B) Giving up the impersonal scale measuring the outcome (and adopt a more
agent-centered approach).
C) Introducing more than one set of values for measuring “the best” outcome.
My discussion will  follow this  division.  In  the  next  section  I  will  present
authors  upholding  the  satisficing  solution  (Slote  1984a,  Dreier  2004)  and  in  the
following section authors who want to modify the consequentialist frame by giving
up the impersonal character of the scale measuring how good is the outcome of an
action (Scheffler 1982). Then I will present Zimmerman (1993) with a rather unusual
attempt of mixing supererogation with maximization.
2.3. Satisficing as the Reconciliatory Solution between Supererogation 
and Consequentialism: Michael Slote
Usually,  when  supererogation  is  taken  into  account  in  consequentialist
contexts,  the main  concern is  not  the problem of  supererogation,  but  some larger
theoretical  point.  In  Slote's  case,  supererogation,  seen  as  a  carrier  of  powerful
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intuitions of ordinary morality, serves as a test for the consequentialist position, a test
meant  to  reveal  if  these  powerful  moral  intuitions  can  be  acclimatized  in  a
consequentialist environment. 
There are, famously,  a number of moral verdicts  upheld by common sense
morality  and  denied  by  consequentialist  inspired  theories.  Slote  himself  quotes
Bernard  Williams  and Samuel  Scheffler  as  prime  examples  of  authors  criticizing
consequentialism for its disconnect with important moral intuitions:  
Moreover, critics of optimizing consequentialism have recently 
tended to focus on one particular way in which such consequentialism
implausibly offends against common-sense views of our obligations 
of beneficence. They have pointed out that (optimizing) act-
consequentialism makes excessive demands on the moral individual 
by requiring that she abandon her deepest commitments and projects 
whenever these do not serve overall impersonally judged optimality. 
For example, it has been held by Samuel Scheffler (and others) that it 
is unfair or unreasonable to demand such sacrifice of moral agents, 
and by Bernard Williams (and others) that such requirements alienate 
individuals from their own deepest identities as given in the projects 
and commitments they hold most dear, thus constituting attacks on 
their integrity (integralness) as persons. (Slote 1984a, p.157)
Slote accepts that the traditional form of consequentialism (i.e. the one requiring an
optimization  of  the  overall  outcome)  cannot  accommodate  some  of  these
commonsensical moral intuitions. It is clear that the common moral sense will judge
the optimizing requirement as too demanding, especially in cases of great sacrifices. It
might be optimal for one soldier to die in order to save all the others, but this, the
common moral sense claims, cannot be demanded and the soldier failing to optimize
the outcome in this way cannot be blamed. However, claims Slote, this does not mean
that  consequentialism  as  such  should  be  abandoned,  for  one  may  abandon  the
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optimality requirement without abandoning the basic intuition of consequentialism,
namely that there is a connection between the rightness/wrongness of a moral deed
and its consequences. According to Slote, at least this one intuition of the common
sense morality regarding supererogation, namely the intuition that one is not always
required to act in a manner producing the best outcome, may be accommodated in a
consequentialist setting. 
He claims that act-consequentialism has been regarded as a “unitary moral
conception”, namely the conception that “the rightness of an act depends on whether
it produces the best consequences impersonally judged”,40 but this claim hides two
claims that are conceptually separable: first, that rightness of an act depends only on
how good consequences are, and second, “that the rightness of an act depends on its
having  the best41 consequences (producible in the circumstances)”.42 Therefore one
may uphold the first without endorsing the second, i.e. one may maintain that only the
good consequences make an act right, but also that these good consequences need not
be the best possible ones, but only “good enough” to make an act right:
Could not someone who held that rightness depended solely on how 
good an act's consequences were also want to hold that less than the 
best was sometimes good enough, hold, in other words, that an act 
might qualify as morally right through having good enough 
consequences, even though better consequences could have been 
produced in the circumstances? (Slote 1984a, p.140)
Therefore, Slote wants to advocate a new kind of consequentialism, one that
does not have the optimizing requirement. His strategy is to argue that a 'satisficing
40 Slote (1984, p.140).
41   My italics.
42   Slote (1984, p.140).
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consequentialism' (rather than the 'optimizing consequentialism') would agree more
with intuitions of common-sense morality of benevolence and would be, in this way,
more plausible:
And since the plausibility of various forms of consequentialism partly 
depends on how far their implications diverge from the deliverance of 
ordinary moral intuition, this new form of consequentialism may turn 
out to have some distinctive advantages over traditional optimizing 
forms of consequentialism. (Slote 1984a, p.152)
Slote borrows the notion of “satisficing” from the literature of economics and
his first examples of an agent plausibly settling for less than the best, but nevertheless
“good enough”, is the example of someone selling their house: they might accept not
the best price but something that is deemed a satisfactory price and is offered more
promptly.  The reason for accepting the lower price, claims Slote, is not an anxiety
about  not  being  able  to  sell  or  an indifference  towards  money,  but  simply  being
content  with “good enough”. A second example is “the snacker”:  the person who
chooses not have an extra snack offered for free even though they know they would
enjoy it and they do not fear any bad consequences. They simply decide they had
enough to eat: Slote considers this to be a kind of moderation, one that is not a form
of asceticism and which “it is difficult to see why it should count as irrational”.43 By
analogy,44 he claims,  we can make equal  sense of  cases of  moral  satisficing.  For
43    Slote (1984, p.145).
44 Dreier (2004) thinks that the analogy between rational calculus of advantages and the moral domain
does not work because rational satisficing does not make sense, but it makes sense for the moral
domain.  His criticism of Slote is  that  if  someone does not  take an extra snack,  like in  Slote's
“snacker” example, then that person is still maximizing her/his preferences because they prefer not
to snack. In order to satisfice one would have to prefer to snack while abstaining from eating the
snack:  “the Snacker’s  utility for the proposition that  he snack is higher  than his utility for  the
proposition that he abstains just in case he prefers to snack. If he prefers to abstain, then his utility
for abstaining is higher. Unless Slote means us to understand his Snacker to prefer to snack, even
though he chooses to abstain when the snack is readily available, his Snacker is indeed choosing the
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example, a hotel manager helping out a homeless family by giving them a spare room
has done nothing wrong if she did not offer them the best room. She did less than the
best, but nevertheless a commendable gesture of benevolence by offering something
that was good enough in the circumstances. Another example used by Slote is the
doctor who volunteers to go to a country in need of medical help. However, he is not
required to go to the country which is most in need; no matter where he chooses to go
(maybe following a personal interest), his gesture would be commendable even if the
outcome is not the best possible, but only good enough. Slote thinks that in this way,
a consequentialist theory can accommodate supererogation because it creates a kind
of threshold of what is required, one that the agent may go beyond: it was permissible
for both the doctor and the hotel manager to optimize, to do more that the required
“good enough” and that would have been supererogatory:    
One of the chief implausibilities of traditional (utilitarian) act-
consequentialism has been its inability to accommodate moral 
supererogation. But a satisficing theory that allows less than the best 
to be morally permissible can treat it as supererogatory (and 
especially praiseworthy) for an agent to do more good than would be 
sufficient to insure the rightness of his actions. Thus, if the person 
with special interest in India sacrifices that interest in order to go 
somewhere else where he can do even more good, then he does better 
than (some plausible version of) satisficing act-consequentialism 
requires and acts supererogatorily. But optimizing act-
option with the higher utility. He is not merely satisficing, but maximizing.” (p.141). However, this
is not what happens in the case of moral satisficing – a detailed discussion of his position will be in
the next section. Remarkably,  Dreier believes that rational satisficing presents the same kind of
puzzle as the puzzle of supererogation, only that in the case of supererogation the puzzle can be
solved: “The impossibility of supererogation looks to me to be the same as the impossibility of
rational satisficing. If I am right that something’s being better from a certain point of view is the
same thing as one’s having a reason to do it (or bring it about, etc.) from that same point of view,
then the coherence of supererogation is the same as the coherence of satisficing. Satisficing appears
to  ignore  reasons  that  one  admits  one  has.  And  so  does  merely  doing  one’s  duty  when  a
supererogatory act was available. Yet satisficing theory says that it can be reasonable to satisfice,
and  commonsense  morality  says  that  it  can  be  morally  acceptable  to  fail  to  perform  what  is
supererogatory. (p.148)
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consequentialism will presumably not treat such action as 
supererogatory because of its (from a common-sense standpoint) 
inordinately strict requirements of benevolence. (Slote 1984a, p.157)
Slote admits that  his solution needs elaboration.  The “good enough” of satisficing
needs specification. He reviews some conceptions about satisficing from Popper and
Bentham and reaches the conclusion that a certain percentage below the maximum
would probably be an appropriate conception of “good enough”.45 
The viability of Slote's solution is not the important point here, so I am not
going  to  try  to  decide  if  his  proposal  of  reconciliation  really  succeeds.  From the
perspective of the problem of supererogation, I believe there are two observations that
are important. 
First, the conflict he is trying to resolve is not about the demandingness of the
optimizing consequentialist theory. The demandingness objection is a fairly common
one against traditional utilitarian and consequentialist theories. The accusation against
theories of this kind is that they ask too much from the agent by making the optimal or
the maximal result obligatory because sometimes the best result comes with a very
large cost for the agent (for example, paradigmatic cases of saints and heroes involve
extreme sacrifices). And common sense morality objects that such large costs cannot
be demanded. This objection will be discussed in detail in the next section, where the
45 Hurka (1990) is critical of Slote here because, Hurka claims, Slote is equivocating between two
possible meanings for “satisficing”: the “absolute” and the “comparative”. The absolute satisficing
simply establishes a threshold of good enough action without reference to other alternatives present
to the agent. The comparative satisficing demands that the outcome of the action be “reasonably
close to the best” and so it  makes reference to the maximum possible. Hurka believes only the
absolute kind of satisficing would work for Slote's version of consequentialism because in a bad
situation only absolute satisficing would make sure that enough has been required from the agent,
enough to improve the situation significantly; the comparative satisficing, he claims, would only
ask for some kind of improvement on the bad situation (which would be some percentage of the
maximum). 
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impersonal aspect of consequentialism comes into play. Here it is important to notice
that the objection discussed by Slote against optimizing consequentialism is not the
same  as  the  demandingness  objection:  the  incongruity  between  common  sense
morality  and  optimizing  consequentialism  discussed  here  is  simply  that  common
sense morality accepts without problems that the agent might do less than the best
(even when there is no significant sacrifice involved on the part of the agent):
So the divergence between common-sense morality and standard 
(utilitarian) act-consequentialism with regard to such cases cannot be 
accounted for in terms of a disagreement over whether one can 
correctly require an agent to sacrifice his own desires, projects and 
concerns in the name of overall optimality. (Slote 1984a, p.151)
Slote points out that his example of the hotel manager helping out the homeless family
is an illustration of this idea: there is no major sacrifice in this case on the part of the
hotel manager, but common sense morality and the traditional consequentialist view
still diverge regarding the optimization requirement. Therefore, the agent may do less
than the best not because the optimization requirement asks too much (much more
than it  is reasonable to ask) but simply because it  seems perfectly acceptable and
reasonable  to  do less than what  optimization  requires.  In  short,  one is  allowed to
satisfice, not only when there is a large cost for the agent (and because of that) but
simply because it appears to be a reasonable option.
Secondly,  and  more  important,  Slote  points  out  that  the  concept  of
supererogation  obtained  by giving  up the  optimizing  requirement  is  not  the  same
supererogation concept featured in the commonsensical view about supererogation:
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Such consequentialism in effect then allows various sorts of 
compromise between the demands of impersonal morality and 
personal desires and commitments. To that extent, it allows greater 
scope for personal preferences and projects than traditional 
optimizing act-consequentialism does. However, it offers less scope 
than would be available on most common-sense views of what an 
agent may permissibly do. For ordinary morality would presumably 
allow an agent (capable of doing better) to pursue projects that do not 
contribute very much to overall human well-being, and satisficing 
consequentialism - unless it maintains a very weak view about what it
is to do enough good - will rule such projects out. (Slote 1984a, 
p.158)
The main point here, I think, is that even when one has made some room for
going beyond what is required (i.e. when satisficing is required, optimizing is not),
this  might  be  a  narrower scope for  supererogation  than  the  one  attributed  by the
commonsensical view. The doctor volunteering to take care of patients in a country
that she prefers, will behave supererogatorily if her plans change and she agrees to go
to  a  different  country,  where  help  is  most  needed  –  this  will  be  the  verdict  of
satisficing consequentialism. However, the doctor is required to reach this satisficing
threshold  (that  is,  to  go  to  a  country  in  need),  which  means  that  satisficing
consequentialism will  require some acts of benevolence that might be declared by
common  sense  morality  to  be  entirely  optional.  There  is  also  a  secondary  point,
namely that this restricted concept of supererogation is a kind of compromise between
the commonsensical notion of supererogation and the impossibility of supererogation
(within optimizing consequentialism). This compromise also makes room not only for
supererogation  but  also  for  a  more  personal  approach  to  morality.  To  recall,  the
consequences of an action were to be measured on an impersonal/impartial scale of
goodness for states of affairs. Slote is not arguing, like Scheffler (1982), that one may
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ignore at times this scale (because of an “agent-centered prerogative”) but he is saying
that given more choice (by not being under the obligation to optimize), agents may
choose something closer to their own plans and aspiration when they are only under a
satisficing  obligation.  The  doctor  in  Slote's  example  may  choose,  in  this  way,  a
country she is interested in, instead of the country most in need of medical assistance.
In conclusion, I think Slote's answer to (his way of seeing) the problem of
supererogation is rather complex. To recall, the generic problem of supererogation in
a consequentialist context was formulated as 'how are we allowed not to do an action
having the best outcome impersonally considered?'. Slote's version of the problem of
supererogation  is  rather  something like ‘how is  a consequentialist  allowed not  to
optimize (i.e. allowed to satisfice)?' - which is the same as asking if a consequentialist
is able to allow the existence of some sort of supererogation, because the obligation to
optimize would hardly leave any room for supererogation.46 One feature of his answer
is  that  the consequentialist  is  allowed not  to  optimize  because the  main  thesis  of
consequentialism (i.e. the connection between consequences and the rightness of an
action) can be separated from the optimization requirement and one might want to
drop the optimization requirement in order to be able to better match the intuitions of
common sense morality; according to common sense morality there is no difficulty in
accepting  that  someone  who  did  less  than  the  best  in  the  circumstances  has,
nevertheless did the right thing and has done something that was “good enough”. 
46 There are authors who do not agree with the incompatibility between optimization/maximization
requirement and the concept of supererogation; see Vessel (2010) and Zimmerman (1993).
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Another  facet of his answer is  the rationality aspect:  it  seems that  there is
nothing irrational in economic thinking or in moral thinking about wanting less than
the maximum possible. And therefore the answer to 'why are we allowed to satisfice?'
seems to be simply “because there is nothing irrational about wanting less than the
most one might be able to acquire”. This tenet might be more controversial, and Slote
himself  acknowledges  the existence  of  a  robust  philosophical  tradition  connecting
rationality with maximization of satisfaction: 
Even those opposed to consequentialism and utilitarianism as moral 
theories have tended to think that (extramoral individualistic) 
rationality requires an individual to maximize his satisfactions or to do
what is best for himself. (Slote 1984a, p.141)
He does not elaborate this point in his “Satisficing Consequentialism”, but he tries to
make a case for the rationality of satisficing elsewhere, namely in “Two Views of
Satisficing” (2004). He brings a virtue ethics perspective to this problem, his basic
idea being that always looking to maximize might not necessarily bring more good or
a better  quality of life  (because lacking the virtue of moderation does not always
result in enjoyment).
2.4. Dreier's Moral Satisficing
 An outline  of  Jamie  Dreier's  position  is  conveniently  given in  the title:  in
“Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn't” he claims
that  while  satisficing  does  not  make  sense  for  matters  of  prudential  value  and
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economic  context,  satisficing  makes  sense in  a  moral  context.  This  is  an unusual
position to have if one keeps in mind that the concept of satisficing was borrowed
from economics literature. Also notably,  he criticizes Slote for his assumption that
examples taken from the domain of economics could be made analogous to the ones
from the moral domain: Dreier claims that the “good enough” of someone selling a
house on the spot for a lower price is not the same as the “good enough” of someone
offering not the best room, but a room to a homeless family, even though they might
present a prima facie similar structure. The similarity consists in the fact that both are
examples of agents choosing an option that, they admit, weighs 'less' on the scale of
good than another option available to them. 
Briefly, the reason why he thinks rational satisficing does not work is that in
normal, rational cases, agents will always maximize their preference, never satisfice.
What Slote and others have described as cases of satisficing are actually, according to
Dreier,  cases of maximizing one's  preferences.  For let  us take the example of the
person selling their house. If they sell it for a lower price because they do not want to
wait  longer  in  incertitude,  then  this  is  their  preferences,  so  they  are  actually
maximizing their preferences even if they accept a lower price (because the utility is
higher for a satisfied preference, even if the price obtained is lower). In order to truly
satisfice, Dreier claims, the person selling the house would have to have a certain
preference to which they attach the highest utility (e.g. to obtain a higher amount of
money) and then to go against that very preference (i.e. to accept less). In short, in
order to truly satisfice, one would have to prefer more money and then accept less
money  (which  has  an  irrational  air  about  it).  Instead,  what  typically  happens  in
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examples like this one, claims Dreier, is that one prefers time and so accepts less
money, which is perfectly rational and this is why the example sounds plausible, but it
is a maximizing example, not a satisficing one;47 in order to satisfice one would have
to accept less of the same thing that one prefers. 
 It is the same for Slote's example of the “snacker”: if the person does not take
a snack then this is their preference and the higher utility is attached to it; in order to
satisfice they would have to actually prefer the snack and at the same time abstain
from it:
(...) the Snacker’s utility for the proposition that he snack is higher 
than his utility for the proposition that he abstains just in case he 
prefers to snack. If he prefers to abstain, then his utility for abstaining 
is higher. Unless Slote means us to understand his Snacker to prefer to
snack, even though he chooses to abstain when the snack is readily 
available, his Snacker is indeed choosing the option with the higher 
utility. He is not merely satisficing, but maximizing. Could the 
Snacker be choosing the option that he does not prefer, all things 
considered? It is hard to see how that is possible. If it is possible, then 
it is hard to see how it could be rational. (Dreier 2004, p.141)
Dreier maintains that rational satisficing and supererogation48 are confronted
with similar puzzles because they both describe kinds of behavior where the agent
chooses to ignore certain reasons (if it is granted that “option x being better” is the
same as “having a reason to choose x”) and that is difficult to explain: 
The impossibility of supererogation looks to me to be the same as the 
impossibility of rational satisficing. If I am right that something’s 
47 For how our intuitions might incline towards supporting a “maximizing” or “satisficing” verdict
depending upon the kind of example and context we use, one can read Jenkins and Nolan's article
“Maximizing,  Satisficing and Context” (2010).  Their thesis, in short,  is  that one will side with
“satisficing” if “best” is understood in context as meaning “the few at the top” and with maximizing
if “best” is understood as meaning “the one at the top”. 
48   He might imply that supererogation is a kind of satisficing.
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being better from a certain point of view is the same thing as one’s 
having a reason to do it (or bring it about, etc.) from that same point 
of view, then the coherence of supererogation is the same as the 
coherence of satisficing. Satisficing appears to ignore reasons that one
admits one has. And so does merely doing one’s duty when a 
supererogatory act was available. Yet satisficing theory says that it 
can be reasonable to satisfice, and commonsense morality says that it 
can be morally acceptable to fail to perform what is supererogatory. 
(Dreier 2004, p.148)
Supererogation, presumably,  involves a kind of “better”,  the moral “better”
choice that the agent is allowed to ignore. It is, therefore, a kind of moral satisficing
where even if the agent accepts one choice is better than another, the agent can still
not  choose the  better  one.  It  would  seem that  it  is  the same structure  as  rational
satisficing where one has a preference, i.e. something one considers as “better” but
satisficing allows the agent to ignore the reasons making the choice “better” and settle
for less. 
The structure invoked here by Dreier is, I believe, one of conflict of reasons.
For let us say that an agent may choose between A and B as courses of action and the
agent admits that B is, in some sense, better  than A; by hypothesis, the agent has
reason to choose B. Then, if the agent chooses A, this is, at least at first sight, difficult
to explain.  Both rational satisficing and supererogation may be said to follow this
pattern: the agent is allowed to refuse what she herself said is the better choice or
chooses  what  she  admits  to  be  less  good,  ignoring  reasons  that  were  previously
accepted as good reasons. It would seem that in deliberation the agent has decided
that the overall balance of reasons inclines towards B and nevertheless is allowed to
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choose A without any penalty or accusation of irrationality or inconsistency or (in the
moral case) harm done:
Morality, we are inclined to think, is a matter of what reasons one has 
from the moral point of view. When there is a supererogatory act 
available, it would be better for you to perform it. So surely you have 
a reason, from the moral point of view, to perform the act. You may 
have some reason not to perform it, but at least typically you will have
no reason from the moral point of view to refrain from it (if you do 
have some such reason, then it will ordinarily be outweighed by the 
reason you have to perform, because by hypothesis it is better to 
perform). But now it is hard to see how it could be permissible, from 
the moral point of view, to refrain from doing something that you 
have an undefeated reason (from that very point of view) to do. (…) 
In what sense is it “all right,” “permissible,” “not wrong” to fail to 
act? There seems to be no sense at all. (Dreier 2004, p.148)
However,  according  to  Dreier,  while  supererogation  may  benefit  from  a
reasonable explanation of this puzzle, rational satisficing may not. His explanation for
why there is a way out of the puzzle in the moral case is that there can be at least two
points of view in a moral situation, while there can be only one point of view in the
rational satisficing, the view of “all things considered”. To explain the two points of
view  he  presents  the  reader  with  the  example  of  a  stranger  losing  their  hat  by
accident; should one try to help by fetching it back (which would be supererogatory)
or not? According to one point of view (the beneficent point of view) one should try
to help, while according to the justice point of view, there is nothing to be said in
favor of fetching the hat:
Still, I want to suggest something like that explanation. Maybe there 
isn’t just one “moral point of view.” Maybe there are (at least) two. 
To borrow from virtue theory, one point of view we can adopt is the 
point of view of the perfectly virtuous agent (...); or, less ambitiously, 
just the beneficent agent. From this perspective, there is everything to 
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be said in favor of fetching the stranger’s hat and nothing to be said 
against it. Failing to fetch the hat is falling short of perfection (in this 
dimension) and not permissible at all. But we can also adopt a less 
ambitious perspective – that of the just person (maybe ‘dutiful’ would 
be a better word).From the point of view of justice, there isn’t 
anything to be said in favor of going to all that trouble to get a 
stranger’s hat. If I do go to all the trouble, that doesn’t make me more 
just. The suggestion is that judgments of wrongness are made from 
the point of view of this less demanding virtue, whereas judgments of 
what would be better or worse are made from the more ambitious 
point of view. (Dreier 2004, p.149)
The two moral points of view are a solution to the puzzle because now there is an
explanation why one would praise a course of action as 'better' only to desist from that
course of action: option B is better from a point of view that is different from the
point of view which favors A. In choosing A, one is not acting against their own
accepted reasons, but one is simply choosing another reason, from another point of
view.  In  short,  one  point  of  view  recommends  A  and  another  point  of  view
recommends B; B is “better” only from the second point of view and, therefore, there
is nothing irrational in choosing A if one chooses another point of view. A possible
objection could be that even so, the balance of reasons in general must have been
inclined one way or the other and the permission to choose as one may please against
it or in accordance with it, is still strange. That is, when balancing A against B the two
points  of  view are  confronted  and  one  must  win.  To  this  Dreier  replies  that  the
balance of reasons, i.e. the overall or 'all things considered' point of view does not
need to be a moral perspective. Therefore the two moral points of view may preserve
their distinctive appeal without one being declared the winner in their confrontation:
In any case, my suggestion for how supererogation is possible is that 
there are two perspectives from which the two different sorts of 
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ethical standards are derived. What looked like a contradiction is 
merely a conflict: From the one perspective certain facts are reasons, 
and from the other they are not. Although it is true that at some point 
the two perspectives must be commensurated, the conflict is not 
reintroduced as a contradiction because the point of view from which 
we make our all-things-considered judgment needn’t be an ethical 
perspective. (Dreier 2004, p.150)
Dreier thinks that rational satisficing cannot divide this way between points of view
because the perspective of rational satisficing is simply the perspective of "all things
considered”. 
I will not discuss if  Dreier is right and  moral satisficing is different from
rational satisficing. The main point of this section is to see what are his formulation
and solution to the puzzle of supererogation as identified by him. The problem of
supererogation is not necessarily posed in a utilitarian context, as Dreier does not pay
attention to outcomes of the action or how one is supposed to measure them. He just
assumes that one is able by whatever means to ascertain that to act supererogatorily is
in some sense better than not, and he leaves the problem at that. Therefore the specific
utilitarian formulation, namely 'How are we allowed not to do an action with the best
outcome  impersonally  evaluated?'  is  not  relevant  for  his  considerations.  For  even
though he is preoccupied with maximizing and satisficing, his problem seems to be a
meta-problem: it is not about the actual question if/how one is allowed to do less than
the good available to an agent and the moral complications of this situation; rather, it
is about the concept of 'satisficing' and if it makes sense. One might think that Dreier's
specific  question is  'How are we allowed to choose an action  that is  just  morally
satisficing, not maximizing?' However, Dreier does not worry about the moral merits
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of satisficing  versus maximizing or how is one supposed to establish a satisficing
threshold, or about fitting supererogation in a consequentialist frame (like Slote). His
main  worry seems  to  be  the  threat  of  irrationality  for  an  agent  who admits  B is
morally 'better' (in some sense) than A and then is allowed to choose A. 
Therefore, I think that the problem of supererogation in this case is something
of the form 'How is it not irrational for an agent to admit that an option is 'better' than
the other and to act against this evaluation by choosing the lesser option – in both
moral  and prudential  domains?'  Dreier’s explanation  for  the moral  domain  is  that
there  are  at  least  two points  of  view in  the  morality  domain  and therefore,  what
appears as 'better' from one point of view does not have to be so from the other.
2.5. The Impersonal Trait of Consequentialist Evaluations
When confronting the question 'How are we permitted not to do an action with
the  best  outcome impersonally  evaluated?'  some  authors  have  chosen to  drop the
optimization requirement, namely that one should always choose the action with the
best outcome – and the result was that satisficing emerged as a solution. To recall, the
solution was that we are allowed not to optimize/maximize because less than the best
could  be  'good  enough'  from  a  moral  point  of  view.  Once  the  requirement  is
established at the 'good enough' level, the agent may be said to go beyond what is
required and therefore some room is made for supererogation (even though it might
not have the same wide scope as the commonsensical notion of supererogation; some
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things required by satisficing might end up as purely optional from the point of view
of common sense morality).
This is not the only strategy available in order to acclimatize supererogation in
consequentialist and utilitarian environments. Another strategy, sometimes involving
satisficing,  is  based on an objection against  the  impersonal and impartial kind of
evaluation demanded by consequentialist and utilitarian frames. At first sight, it does
not seem to be a connection between supererogation and the impersonal aspect of
consequentialist/utilitarian evaluation of states of affairs. However, once the agent is
allowed to depart in various ways (e.g. by being allowed to give more weight to his
own  preference)  from  the  impersonal/impartial  way  of  measuring  the  overall
goodness of the outcome, the obligation to maximize is implicitly dropped and this
usually makes room for a notion of supererogation.
The objection against impartiality has a tradition and is well known as coming
from Bernard Williams. He describes impartiality in morality in general as being
(…) something which, indeed, some thinkers have been disposed to 
regard as the essence of morality itself: a principle of impartiality. 
Such a principle will claim that there can be no relevant difference 
from a moral point of view which consists just in the fact, not further 
explicable in general terms, that benefits or harms accrue to one 
person rather than to the other. (…) from the moral point of view, 
there is no comprehensible difference which consists just in my 
bringing about a certain outcome rather than someone else's producing
it. (Williams 1981, p.96)
Impartiality  is  not  a  fault  of  utilitarians  only;  theories  of  Kantian  and
deontological persuasion have also thought that being impartial and impersonal are
main ingredients of being moral.  Nevertheless, utilitarianism has a specific way of
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demanding impartiality,  one  implied  by the way the  sum of  individual  utilities  is
supposed to be calculated. Nobody's happiness is supposed to matter more and the
only thing that matters is the maximization of the total, a total in which any kind of
individuality is lost (as in any sum total). The acute problem of this view becomes
evident  when  the  utilitarian  demands  that  any  resource  of  time  and  energy  be
dedicated to the maximization of the sum total. It would seem that there is no room
left  for  the  agent  to  be  involved  in  personal  projects  that  do not  bring  sum total
maximization of utility:
It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the
utility network which the projects of others have in part determined, 
that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and 
acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. It is 
to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his 
action in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel 
between the input of everyone's projects, including his own, and an 
output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which 
his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and 
decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is 
most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack 
on his integrity. (Williams 1981, p.117)
This kind of critique of utilitarianism, about the tendency of utilitarian theories to
require the atrophy of the personal, has prompted attempts of reconciliation between
the  impersonal  approach  and  an  agent-centered  approach.  Such  an  attempt  is
Scheffler's agent-centered prerogative.
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2.6. Scheffler's Agent-centered Prerogative and Making Room for 
Supererogation 
Scheffler  (1982)  lists  two  classical  objections  to  theories  of
consequentialist/utilitarian inspiration, one of the “view from nowhere” regarding the
distribution relations between agents in a utilitarian scenario and the other from the
point of view of the agent making decisions in a consequentialist manner.  The first
one is that utilitarianism prescribes ignoring the unhappiness of a few if this leads to a
maximization  of  overall  happiness.  The  second is  Bernard  Williams'  worry  about
utilitarianism resulting in alienation from one's own life projects. Scheffler argues that
Williams'  worry  about  alienation  is  rather  vague.  If  it  means  that  utilitarianism
demands that sometimes we give up our own plans when these would extract a large
cost or impose too much damage on the others, then this does not seem wrong and it
is  something required by pretty much all  non-egoistic  moral  theories,  not only by
utilitarianism. However, a charitable interpretation of Williams' objection would be,
according to Scheffler, that alienation takes place, not because the agent is required to
give  up to  some of  his  projects,  but because  the agent  is  required to  evaluate  all
personal  projects  by  reference  to  the  impersonal  scale  measuring  the  capacity  to
increase the overall goodness or happiness; this is quite unnatural because this is not
how we usually evaluate our projects:
Utilitarianism thus requires the agent to allocate energy and attention 
to the projects and people he cares most about in strict proportion to 
the value from an impersonal standpoint of his doing so, even though 
people typically acquire and care about their commitments quite 
independently of, and out of proportion to, the value that their having 
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and caring about them is assigned in an impersonal ranking of overall 
states of affairs (Scheffler 1982, p.9)
Notably,  Scheffler considers this  second objection as an objection not only
against  utilitarian  theories,  but  also  against  any  kind  of  consequentialist  theory
because they share the theoretical  feature of impartial  ranking of overall  states  of
affairs.
Scheffler's proposal for tackling this difficulty is the introduction of an agent-
centered prerogative which is meant to make it permissible for the agent to spend
resources on projects evaluated out of proportion with the impersonal scheme:
On a plausible view of this kind the answer to the question of whether
an agent was required to promote the best overall outcome in a given 
situation would depend on the amount of good he could thereby 
produce (or evil he could avert), and on the size of the sacrifice he 
would have to make in order to achieve the optimal outcome. More 
specifically, I believe that a plausible agent-centered prerogative 
would allow each agent to assign a certain proportionately greater 
weight to his own interest than to the interests of other people. It 
would then allow the agent to promote the non-optimal outcome of 
his choosing (...) (Scheffler 1982, p.20)
Not  any  kind  of  project  may  receive  this  permission,  of  ignoring  the
impersonal ranking, but there will be some. I will not enter into the details  of his
proposal  here,  like  the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  permissible  to  ignore  the
impersonal ranking, how the greater weight for the agent’s plans will be assigned,
difficulties of this view and so on. Whatever the details of this proposal, one thing
becomes clear, there is room made for supererogatory conduct:
Since it would permit people to devote energy and attention to their 
projects and commitments out of proportion to the weight from the 
impersonal standpoint of their doing so, the view would lack the 
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feature that generates that objection. But at the same time, it would 
certainly on such a view always be permissible for an agent to bring 
about the best available state of affairs. Thus there might be an agent 
who willingly sacrificed his own projects for the greater goods on this 
view his conduct would be supererogatory. (Scheffler 1982, p.22)
Scheffler main focus here is not, obviously, supererogation. Rather, the main
concern  appears  to  be  finding  a  way  to  meet  certain  objections  (related  to  the
impersonal/impartial way of evaluating outcomes) raised by common sense morality
against consequentialist and utilitarian theories. This is an enterprise similar to Slote's
(1984), but while Slote was  keeping the impersonal ranking of states of affairs and
was proposing a lower threshold for what is morally required on that scale, Scheffler
wants  to  proclaim the  agent's  independence  from the  impersonal  scale in  certain
circumstances (circumstances in which the scale may be legitimately ignored).
Scheffler's main question might be said to be 'How could consequentialism
allow  the  outcome  of  a  moral  action  not  to  be  evaluated  according  to  the
impersonal/impartial ranking of the states of affairs?' His solution, (that the agent has
sometimes the prerogative to give more weight to his own plans and therefore is not
under the obligation to perform the action with the best result impartially considered)
becomes  only  tangentially  also  a  solution  for  the  problem  of  supererogation.
However,  it  is,  without  doubt,  one  way  in  which  supererogation  may  fit  in  an
utilitarian frame, thereby providing a possible answer to the question 'How are we
allowed  not  to  do  an  action  with  the  best  outcome  impartially/impersonally
evaluated?'. 
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The  answer  is  that  the  agent  is  allowed  sometimes  not  to  take  into
consideration  the  obligation  of  optimization/maximization  because  the  agent  is
allowed sometimes  to  evaluate  the  outcome of  his  action  independently  from the
evaluation  on the impersonal  scale.  This  is  the  agent's  prerogative,  to  be morally
permitted in certain circumstances to ignore the demand of producing the impersonal
best  ranking  outcome  and  thereby  to  ignore  the  maximization  demand.  In
circumstances where the agent has this prerogative, she might choose nevertheless to
take into account the demands of the impersonal ranking at a cost for her own plans.
This is the spot where supererogation falls into place: when the agent is allowed to
choose between ignoring and taking into account the demanding impersonal scale, the
agent might choose the "greater good” of the impersonal demands and act in this way
supererogatorily. The examples are not difficult to find: Slote's doctor may choose to
go  to  a  country  where  her  medical  help  is  going  to  have  the  greatest  impact
(impersonally judged) or in a country where the impact is more modest, but the doctor
might have a personal interest in being there; in this case, going to the first country,
where the impact is greatest, is supererogatory. 
There  are  several  assumptions  here  that  Scheffler  does  not  discuss.49 In  a
comparison of the outcomes of personal plans with outcomes of the actions prescribed
by the impersonal ranking, the assumption seems to be that the impersonal ranking is
going to be more demanding, i.e. it is going to ask for more things to be sacrificed.
This needs not to be always the case. For example, a personal plan may sometimes
involve much more sacrifices of well-being than the impersonal demands of morality:
49    This is not a criticism, nor, for that matter, surprising since supererogation was not his main topic
of discussion.
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the impersonal evaluation of outcomes might require the doctor to go to the country
most in need, but joining a religious order might require going to the county most in
need,  celibacy and  asceticism.  Another  supposition  added  to  the  one  that  the
impersonal ranking would be the most demanding is that sacrifice on the part of the
agent is an indication of morally better outcomes impersonally judged. This needs not
be always the case either.50 The larger picture of presuppositions seems to be divided
in two: on the one hand, actions made according to personal plans would presuppose
less sacrifice from the agent and moral outcomes scoring lower on the impersonal
scale of the good (i.e. the outcomes would be less good for others but better for the
agent); on the other hand, actions made by accepting the demands of the impersonal
scale would presuppose more (or more serious) sacrifices from the agent and they
would score higher, even highest on the scale (i.e. the outcomes would be best for
others but less good for the agent). This is a common assumption, but by no means an
unassailable one. Especially in a consequentialist framing, one cannot take for granted
that the greater the sacrifice of the agent, the greater the value of the outcome will be. 
However, Scheffler's claim that there is room made for supererogation by his
agent-centered prerogative is not affected by the issue I have just raised. What is new
and remarkable about his way of seeing supererogation is that there is no threshold,
properly speaking, that the agent would go above and beyond. The agent is presented
with a choice (in the circumstances where the prerogative is allowed) of doing more
for herself (i.e.  personal plans) or more for others (paying heed to the impersonal
ranking). She is permitted to do either and there is an option where she would do
50 For an illuminating discussion of how sacrifice might lead to worse overall results, one might see
Jean Hampton, “Selflessness and the Loss of the Self “(1993).
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more by impersonal  standards. But in choosing to take into account  and obey the
obligation presented by the impersonal scale, she does not go beyond an established
threshold of obligation  that  was lower on the same scale.  She simply has chosen
another scale (a more demanding one). This is a concept of supererogation that is
different from the commonsensical one. And not only is the concept of supererogation
at issue here slightly different  from the commonsensical  one: the question is  also
slightly different. For Scheffler's agent-centered prerogative is not exactly an answer
to the general question 'How are we allowed not to do an action with the best outcome
impersonally  evaluated?',  but  rather  to  the  more  specific  question  'How  are  we
allowed  to  ignore  sometimes  the  demands  of  impersonal  ranking  of  outcomes  in
moral action?'.
2.7.  Zimmerman on Supererogation and Sets of Values
Zimmerman (1993) is one of the authors51 who believe that supererogation and
the maximization requirement  are not incompatible.  Up to this  point,  the question
'How can we be allowed not  to do an action with the best outcome impersonally
evaluated?' has received various interpretations and various answers. All of them are
more or less, attempts of making supererogation go along with  consequentialist or
utilitarian  positions.  Some  authors  assumed  that  the  main  problem  was  the
requirement of  'best outcome', i.e. of maximization and they proposed satisficing as
51 One  could  also  see  Vessel  (2010)  “Supererogation  for  Utilitarians”  for  several  varieties  of
utilitarianism accommodating various versions of supererogation.
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an answer (like Slote (1984) and Dreier (2004)); other authors have assumed that the
main problem was the requirement to have the outcome of the action impersonally
evaluated  and  they  proposed  ways  of  making  the  impersonal  measuring  non-
obligatory in certain circumstances (like Scheffler's prerogative);  yet  other authors
have supposed that the main problem consists in making more room for permissions
within the utilitarian frame (like Hurka and Schubert (2012) with agent-favouring and
agent-sacrificing  permissions)  while  giving  a  reason  for  the  superiority  of  the
supererogatory act. 
Zimmerman's way of seeing the problem involves the difficulty of keeping the
requirement  of  maximization  while  making  room  for  (some  concept  of)
supererogation:
The question of direct concern is this. Does a theory according to 
which what one ought to do is the best that one can do imply that 
supererogatory acts are impossible? (...) [I]t will be argued here that 
the implication does not hold. It will be argued, that is, that such a 
theory can in fact accommodate supererogation. (Zimmerman 1993, 
p.373)
This does not mean he does not acknowledge the difficulty of the problem and
the  likelihood  of  it  being  a  challenging  problem.  The  classical  incompatibility
between the two is well-known:
The point might be put this way. In those cases where it is left to the 
agent's discretion whether to do A or B, where A would be 
supererogatory and B not, A is superior in value to B. In such cases, 
maximizing theories imply that neither A or B is optional; on the 
contrary, A is obligatory (in the absence of any third alternative of 
equal or superior value) and B wrong. Thus maximizing theories 
imply that supererogatory acts are impossible. (Zimmerman 1993, 
p.375)
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Zimmerman's  reasoning  starts  from  taking  both  maximization  and  the
optionality involved in supererogation at face value: if one accepts both, then what
would follow? If both A and B are permitted, the reasoning goes, then they must be
equal  in  value,  according  to  the  maximization  requirement  (otherwise  the
maximization requirement would make one obligatory and the other wrong). But if
they are equal in value, then the whole problem of supererogation actually consists in
this: how can both actions be equal in value (because both permitted) and still one of
them be, in some sense, 'better' than the other? 
Somehow a maximizing theory must endeavor both to have its cake 
and to eat it – that is, endeavor both to say that A is superior in value 
to B and yet to say that A and B are of the same value. (Zimmerman 
1993, p.375)
The only  solution  to  this,  Zimmerman  claims,  is  to  have  different  sets  of  values
measuring the two actions. For without that, one would be forced to say that the two
actions are both equal and unequal in value:
This can be achieved by, and only by, declaring that there is more 
than one set of values pertinent to the moral evaluation of an act. One 
set of values- call it the deontic set – must be said to be pertinent to 
the determination of right and wrong and obligation, the other – call it 
the non-deontic set – not. Where A is supererogatory but it is left to 
the agent's discretion whether to do B instead, a maximizing theory 
must declare A to be non-deontically superior to B but deontically 
equivalent to B. (Zimmerman 1993, p.375)
Zimmerman is proposing here only a hypothesis, namely that if supererogation
is able to cohabit  peacefully with the maximization requirement,  then what  would
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make this cohabitation possible would be the existence of at least two separate sets of
values measuring the value of supererogatory and non-supererogatory deeds:
If an act is to be good in a way that does not render it obligatory, its
goodness  must,  it  seems  (but  clearly  more  needs  to  be  said here),
reflect  a  value  that  its  deontic  status  does  not.  (Zimmerman  1993,
p.377)
To conclude, Zimmerman's way of solving the puzzle of supererogation in an
utilitarian context is to assume that equally permitted actions have equal moral value
and therefore we are obviously permitted to do one or the other. However, this answer
leads to a further problem, the problem of explaining how between actions equal in
deontic value, one could be superior in value to the other. 
His take on the problem of supererogation, I think, would be best expressed by
the question 'How can one explain that of two actions with the same value (because
they are equally permitted) one is considered more valuable than the other?'. This is a
quite different problem from the general problem of supererogation. 
2.8. Conclusions about Utilitarians, Consequentialists and the Problem of 
Supererogation
The  various  strategies  used  to  accommodate supererogation  to
consequentialism and utilitarianism are as many ways of understanding the problem
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of supererogation in a different manner. Sometimes, a different way of understanding
the problem brings along a different concept of supererogation, too. 
When the point of conflict  between consequentialism and supererogation is
believed to  be the maximizing/optimizing  requirement,  then,  usually,  satisficing is
proposed as a solution that would make room for supererogation.  The problem of
supererogation, in this instance, becomes 'how can a consequentialist be permitted to
satisfice (i.e. to not do the best)?' Even if one accepts that the justification given by
Slote  (1984)  or  Dreier  (2004)  is  a  reasonable  one,  the  concept  of  supererogation
allowed by satisficing has a narrower domain than the commonsensical one: some
actions  declared obligatory by the satisficing  theory will  still  be merely permitted
according to common sense. In Dreier's case, the answer requires a division of the
moral domain in at least two sets of values, such that supererogation would make
sense in a domain of beneficence, but not in one of justice. This tenet has already
added at least one extra determination to the rather general commonsensical concept
of supererogation: that it belongs to beneficence, but not to justice.
When the point of conflict  between consequentialism and supererogation is
believed to be the requirement to measure any outcome of an action according to an
impersonal  scale,  then  the  solution  is  to  allow  for  a  more  personal  approach  in
measuring the outcomes and, therefore, to allow that in some circumstances agents
are justified in not  measuring their  actions  and plans according to  the impersonal
scale.  In  this  way  an  agent-centered  prerogative  is  created  (Scheffler  1982).  The
problem of supererogation, in this instance, becomes 'how can a consequentialist be
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permitted sometimes to  ignore  the  impersonal  scale  and  not  do  the  best  action
available?
When  the  point  of  conflict  between  utilitarianism  and  supererogation  is
believed to  be,  not  maximization,  but  the uniqueness of  the value scale,  then  the
proposal is to have at least two moral sets of values (Zimmerman 1993). One of them
should justify why doing something supererogatory and not doing it  has the same
value and the other  should justify why doing something supererogatory should be
seen as “better”. In this case, the problem of supererogation becomes ''How can one
explain  the possibility that of  two actions  with the  same value  (because  they are
equally permitted) one is considered more valuable than the other?'
2.9. Hurka and Schubert on Extending Permissions
 
Hurka  and  Schubert  (2012)  develop  a  theory  that  is  not  utilitarian  or
consequentialist, but is similar to the ones presented in this chapter because it aims at
integrating  commonsensical  moral  intuitions  about  the  agent's  autonomy  into  a
theoretical framework. I believe their position is interesting because their project is
conceived in the same spirit (of giving the agent more latitude in moral decisions) as
Slote's  or  Scheffler's,  but  the  theoretical  means  are  quite  different:  they choose  a
frame of  prima facie duties and permissions (derived from W.D. Ross). They also
criticize  Scheffler's  solution  for  not  being  close  enough  to  the  commonsensical
intuition about what is permitted to a moral agent, even if their thesis is quite close to
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Scheffler's idea that the demands of the impersonal scale for measuring happiness can
be sometimes ignored in order to accommodate commonsensical moral intuitions. 
They  identify  two  kinds  of  agent-centered  permissions:  agent-favouring
permissions  and  agent-sacrificing permissions;  each corresponds to an intuition of
common  sense  morality.  Agent-favoring  permissions  allow  one  to  favor  oneself
within certain limits, even if this results in not obtaining the greater good:
(…) while you do nothing wrong if you give the five units to the 
other, you also do nothing wrong if you give the one unit to yourself. 
That's because you're permitted, at least up to a point, to prefer your 
own lesser to another's greater good, for example, your own lesser to 
her greater happiness. This agent-favouring permission underlies the 
common-sense idea that some acts are supererogatory, or beyond the 
call of duty. It would certainly be commendable of you to give the 
five units to the other person, but it's supererogatory rather than 
something you're morally required to do. And the reason it's 
supererogatory is that you're permitted to care somewhat more about 
yourself. (Hurka and Schubert 2012, p.2)
Additionally, they think that a second permission should be allowed: agent-sacrificing
permissions, or permissions to care less about yourself.”52 It is also a permission to
not do the action that would produce best results overall, but this time, when it is
disadvantageous for the agent. For example,  if the agent can give either two units of
happiness to herself or one unit to another, then it is permitted for her to give the one
unit to another even though the impersonally measured best result is not attained in
this way.  The authors are simply postulating the existence of such permissions and
they take them to be underivative:
52   Hurka and Schubert (2012, p.2).
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This account generates agent-favouring permissions by positing an 
independent and underivative permission to pursue your own good. 
More specifically, it holds alongside a prima facie duty, or duty other 
things equal, to promote everyone's happiness impartially, you have a 
prima facie permission to promote your own happiness. This 
permission has to be weighted against the impartial duty and in some 
cases will lose to it. (Hurka and Schubert 2012, p.5)
I will not discuss how justified this postulation is. The authors argue at length about
the justifiability  and the  advantages  of  such a  postulation.  Supererogation,  in  this
context, is seen as test, as one more proof that this is the kind of postulation needed in
order to be able to include and justify supererogation within the theory:
We therefore see no sound objections to positing an underivative 
permission to pursue your own good, and an account that does so may
have the further advantage of allowing a more complete account of 
supererogation. (Hurka and Schubert 2012, p. 8)
The authors claim that  there are  two main  sides distinguishable in the conceptual
realm of supererogation:
The concept of supererogation has two sides. On one side, a 
supererogatory act isn’t morally required; on the other side, it’s 
somehow better than its alternative, or “beyond” duty in a sense that 
connotes superiority. A complete account of the concept must capture 
this second side, explaining how supererogatory acts are better even 
though not strictly your duty. (Hurka and Schubert 2012, p. 8)
Therefore, the main task of a theorist who wants to account for supererogation is to
explain „how supererogatory acts  are  better  even though not strictly  your  duty.”53
They claim that the “better” of supererogation cannot be explained quantitatively, by
“more  units  of  happiness”:  supererogation  is  not  better  because  it  brings  a  better
53   Hurka and Schubert (2012, p.8).
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outcome in terms of happiness units; the “better” of supererogation has to be deontic
in nature, as supererogation is a deontic concept. 
The reasons behind this affirmation are unclear, but granting this, the authors
come up with an original explanation of why supererogatory action is better than the
alternatives.  From their  point  of  view,  supererogation  is  a  confrontation  between
prima facie permissions  (the  agent  is  permitted  to  favor  herself)  and  prima facie
duties (the requirements to promote other's happiness). Supposing that there are two
choices available to the agent, A and B where B is the supererogatory one, the authors
say that  what  explain  B's  superiority  is  the  fact  that  B is  not  only a  prima facie
permission (like A) but also a prima facie duty. We end up having a choice between
A and B because the prima facie duty to do B is defeated (when the  prima facie
permission is stronger than the duty), but this does not mean that it simply disappears;
instead, it leaves the “trace” of a defeated prima facie duty:
Whichever choice you make you exercise a prima facie permission, 
but if you give the five units to the other you also fulfill a prima facie 
duty, and this may explain that act's superiority. It is deontically 
higher ranked because while equally permitted they are also prima 
facie required. A key feature of prima facie duties is that they don't 
disappear when they're outweighed. They remain as part of the moral 
situation and can leave what Robert Nozick calls “moral traces”. (...) 
A third trace, we are now suggesting, may be to explain why 
supererogatory acts are superior: though no more permissible than 
their alternatives, they fulfill a prima facie duty that the alternatives 
don't and are therefore on balance better. The prima facie permission 
opposing them makes them not required, but the prima facie duty 
favouring them makes them deontically higher-ranked.” (Hurka and 
Schubert 2012, p.9)
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Therefore, while both A and B are permissible,  B is better  because it contains the
trace of a duty: the fulfillment of a prima facie duty. While the authors thus offer their
own solution to the problem of supererogation, they also admit that their account is
not without problems. The difficulty comes from the second kind of permission, the
agent-sacrificing permission. 
But consider the case where you can produce either two units of 
happiness for yourself or one for another person. Here each of your 
option is unsupported by a prima facie permission, but if there is a 
prima facie duty to promote happiness impartially, giving yourself the 
two units also fulfills that duty and should therefore be preferable in 
the same way that supererogation is: it has more prima facie factors on
its side. But this does not seem true: preferring your own greater 
happiness in this case doesn't seem better. The alternative of 
preferring the other's lesser happiness also does not seem better; your 
two options seem to be on a par. So our account of supererogation 
seems to have a counter-intuitive implication when extended to agent-
sacrifice. (Hurka and Schubert 2012, p.17)
If the same theory of the “trace” left by the defeated prima facie duty is applied in this
case, then the agent could equally choose between giving herself two units or giving
someone else one unit, but giving herself the two units should be “better” because it
fulfills a  prima facie duty. However, the authors notice that this is a rather counter-
intuitive result. For them, the two choices seem equally good: preferring your own
greater happiness does not seem to be much better  or much worse than preferring
other's lesser happiness. 
The authors resign themselves to this result, admitting that they do not have a
solution for this conundrum. 
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While I do not claim to have a way out of this predicament, I might have an
explanation. Sometimes, the duty to promote other's happiness, exactly because it is
impersonal, is not sensitive to the difference between self and other. My suspicion is
that  common sense morality  considers  the distinction  actions  benefiting  the self  /
actions benefiting others much more important morally than the division considered
crucial here, namely between what promotes the greater good and what does not. One
such observation was also made by Slote when he was speaking about the self-other
asymmetry, namely the idea that what one may do for oneself is seen differently by
the common moral intuition than what one may do for others. 
For let us see the situation of agent-favouring permission and agent-sacrificing
permission, side by side (with the examples used by Hurka and Schubert):
– agent-favouring permission – one has to choose either a) or b)
a) to self: 1 happiness unit – permitted under agent-favouring permission
b) to other: 5 happiness units – would lead by hypothesis to an impersonal better
result, and therefore it is a prima facie duty and a prima facie permission.
– agent-sacrificing permission – one has to choose either a') or b')
a') to self: 2 happiness units – would lead by hypothesis to an impersonal better
result, and therefore it is a prima facie duty and a prima facie permission.
b') to other: 1 happiness unit – permitted under agent-sacrificing permission
The authors  rightly conclude that  their  result  does  not  align  with common
moral intuitions: there is something strange about saying that giving yourself 2 units
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of happiness is morally better than giving the other 1 unit. The authors also think that
the two choices are not one better than the other, but they are morally equally good,
i.e. “on a par”. I think that common sense, while disapproving their result, might give
at least two alternative results: that the choices are equally good or that it would be
morally better for the agent to lose 2 units of happiness in order to give 1 unit to
another.   No matter  which  one  would  be  adopted,  I  believe  that  the  discrepancy
between the verdicts of common sense morality and the authors’ verdict is due to very
different  presuppositions  about  what  is  merely  permitted  and  at  the  same  time
admirable  or  meritorious  (i.e.  paradigm  cases  of  supererogation).  I  think  it  is
predictable that the authors’ moral verdicts will not match the verdicts of common
sense morality, given that the presuppositions  of the two are so different.  Let me
explain.
To recall,  meritoriousness or  “being morally better” was established by the
authors as the action resulting into the greater good: this is how the prima facie duties
were established. The results, being measured according to an impersonal scale, are
obviously  not sensitive to a change regarding  the person of the beneficiary of the
action (that is, if it is the self or the other). On the contrary, common sense morality
usually is sensitive to a change in person benefiting from the action, meaning that a
change in person might bring a change in verdict: it is usually quite different if I am
benefited by my action or someone else is; in both cases the action is allowed but the
second  one  is  far  more  likely  to  be  meritorious  or  morally  better.  For  example,
common sense morality is more likely to label the first as selfish and the second as
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altruistic. Therefore, the moral connotation of the action has changed depending on
the person benefited by the action (self or other).
In short, my diagnosis of the conundrum is that the authors do not take into
consideration what Michael  Slote (1984b) has called “the self-other asymmetry”;54
common sense morality,  on the other hand, obviously follows the precepts of this
asymmetry and gives its moral verdicts accordingly.
The asymmetry noticed by Slote seems to be nothing other than Hurka and
Schubert's agent-sacrificing permission:
(...) if I have a choice between conferring a great benefit on myself or 
a lesser benefit on someone else, and these are the only relevant 
factors in the situation, common-sense morality tells us that it is quite 
permissible to sacrifice one's own greater benefit to the lesser benefit 
of another. In the absence of some special relation or obligation to that
other, common sense might concede that it was irrational, stupid, or 
gratuitous to do so, but surely not that it was morally wrong. (Slote 
1984 b, p.180)
However, if the asymmetry is followed closely, one might notice that the difference
between what the agent does to herself/what the agent does to another becomes more
vivid in a formulation about doing harm rather than in a formulation about benefiting.
The agent may be equally allowed sometimes to benefit herself (this was the whole
sense  of  Scheffler's  agent-centered  prerogative  and  the  authors’ agent-favouring
permission) or benefit another, but this formulation of “benefits” obscures the losing
side of this action.  It might  be the case that the agent is equally allowed to harm
herself or to harm another (at least by omission) sometimes; let us say, by taking care
54 Slote (1984b, p.181):”Thus ordinary moral thinking seems to involve an asymmetry regarding what
an agent is permitted to do to himself and what he is permitted to do to others.” 
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of her own plans, the doctor does not go to treat patients in another country where
help is badly needed. But the contrast is much sharper now between what harm I am
allowed to do to myself and what harm I am allowed to inflict on others, because the
range of the first will be much wider than the range of the second. Slote seems to
agree with this, at least implicitly:
There is no fundamental moral reason why someone should not 
sacrifice himself to save five people who need organ transplants, and 
the side constraints built into ordinary morality concern only harm 
done to others in the name of good results. (Slote 1984b, p.183)
But what is more important in the self-other asymmetry is, I believe, that moral merit
or  excellency  is  also  asymmetrically  distributed,  according  to  common  sense
morality: commonsensical morality will accept  that sometimes the agent is permitted
to care more about her own happiness but that the agent is equally permitted to care
about other people's happiness or plans. But the fact that both actions are permitted
does not mean that they will be equally praised: caring about oneself is not so morally
admirable  as  caring  about  others.  The  difference  is  more  dramatic  in  case  of
sacrifices. Sometimes the agent is equally permitted to lose or to impose the loss on
someone else, but this does not mean that the moral merit is the same for the two
actions. For common sense morality it is one thing to lose your own life to save five
people but it is quite another thing to kill one person to save five. Even if both can be
justified by the circumstances, the distribution of moral merit is widely different. It is
important to notice that from the point of view of the impersonal utilitarian scale, the
outcome looks quite the same for the two situations. 
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Analogously, in the authors' two cases (1 unit of happiness for self  vs. 5 for
other  and  2  for  self  vs.  1  unit  for  other)  the  impersonal  scale  designates  it  as
meritorious in the first case to benefit others and in the second case to benefit myself.
From the point of view of the impersonal scale there is not much difference between
the two as they are both meritorious because they have the merit of promoting the
overall good, no matter who the beneficiary is. However, I believe that common sense
morality,  while  not  being  a  very  consolidated,  clear  or  coherent  body  of  moral
judgments, tends to be sensitive to who the beneficiary is because it tends to be rather
other-oriented.  Therefore  morally  excellent  action  tends  to  be  a)  something  that
primarily benefits another (even if it may benefit the agent, too); b) something that
involves a sacrifice on the part of the agent (it is not necessary for an action to involve
sacrifice to be morally excellent  but usually,  if  it  involves sacrifice benefiting the
other, it is considered a morally excellent action).
One might notice that in the first case, i.e. the agent-favouring permission (one
unit for self vs. 5 units for other), because it was about the agent being allowed to
favor  herself,  another  fact  was  obscured:  that  the  morally  excellent  action  (the
supererogatory) involved a (small) sacrifice on the part of the agent (losing one unit
of  happiness).  The commonsensical  moral  intuitions  were  running along with  the
authors' verdict in this case because the excellent action was a) other-oriented and b)
involved self-sacrifice. Once these two traits change in the next case, common sense
morality has a different verdict from the authors and the two ways of thinking become
visibly at odds. In the second case, i.e. the agent-sacrificing permission (2 units for
self vs. 1 unit for other), the intuitions of common sense do not correspond to the
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utilitarian calculus any more because what the authors think of as an excellent action
(giving two units of happiness to yourself and nothing to the other) is a) self-oriented,
(not other-oriented) and b) does not involve self-sacrifice but a loss imposed upon the
other. These two traits obviously go against what is usually appreciated in common
sense morality: self-sacrifice and being other-oriented, namely against the self-other
asymmetry concerning harm done – it is usually admirable to sacrifice yourself and it
is usually blameworthy to impose the same kind of loss on others). These intuitions of
common sense morality are the reason why I thought that a second verdict might be
possible: in certain circumstances common sense might decide that it is better (more
admirable) that the self loses 2 units of happiness in order to give 1 unit to another. 
This explanation is, of course, not not an unconditional endorsement of the
intuitions  behind common sense morality,  but  an explanation  for why the authors
reach an impasse. 
The discrepancy between the authors' moral evaluation and the common sense
moral  evaluation  is,  I  believe,  relevant  for  establishing  the  contours  of  the
supererogation problem for Hurka and Schubert. They start with a classical utilitarian
approach and try to modify this approach in order to accommodate commonsensical
intuitions about what is morally permitted. Therefore the problem, in their own words
is  how can one  explain  “permissions  not  to  do what  will  have  the  best  outcome
impartially  considered.”55 One  might  think  that  this  is  simply  their  view  of  the
problem of supererogation,  but things are a bit more complicated than that.  Their
answer to  the main  problem stated above is  that  agent-favouring permissions  and
55   Hurka and Schubert (2012, p.1).
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agent-sacrificing  permissions  are  basic  starting  points  with  numerous  advantages
(they are simply posited as underivative). One of the advantages of this postulation of
permissions  is  that  they  can  offer  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  supererogation;
therefore, the problem of supererogation is, one is lead to believe, something slightly
different. Now, the problem of supererogation for Hurka and Schubert is not centered
upon the question 'how and why do we have these  permissions not to do what will
have the best outcome impartially considered” because there can be no question about
permissions: these permissions are simply posited, by hypothesis.  The main question
is, therefore, once we have these permissions, how can we explain that one permitted
option is better than the other – that is the problem of supererogation in their view. In
short, taking into consideration the two aspects of supererogation, the permission to
do or not to do and the idea that it is better if one does act supererogatorily, the puzzle
comes not from the permission aspect, but from the „better” aspect.
Their answer to this problem of supererogation is, to remind you, the “traces”
left  by  defeated  prima  facie duties  –  that  is  what  confers  superiority  on actions
deemed supererogatory. 
However,  the  difficulty  encountered  by  this  answer  when  confronted  with
intuitions of common sense makes evident another differentiation: not only the weight
of the problem shifts, but the concept of supererogation obtained seems to be different
from the commonsensical  one.  Common sense morality,  might  prefer as marks  of
supererogation the presence of self-sacrifice and being other-oriented. As discussed
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above, these two ways of demarcating supererogation might coincide sometimes,but
there are also cases where they fall apart. 
Chapter Three: Reasons and Supererogation
3.0. Introduction
The previous  chapter  presented the consequentialist  and utilitarian  point of
view on supererogation and its problems. The problems raised by supererogation in a
consequentialist/utilitarian  setting  were  focused  especially  on  the  requirement  to
optimize/maximize  the  good.  I  have  discussed  how  the  commonsensical  way  of
understanding supererogation changed in several important respects. 
First,  as  maximization  was required,  there  was no threshold of  duty to  go
beyond (as utilitarianism is especially prone to affirming the good-ought tie-up). 
Second, there was little room left to talk about the agent's sacrifice in acting
supererogatorily. The sacrifice entered in the calculus of utilities but it was seen as
one loss compensated by the gain for many so it rarely mattered in establishing moral
requirements (not to mention the situation where, if a sacrifice was made that did not
bring maximization, its meritoriousness was usually lost for the utilitarian calculus).
Slote (1984) and Scheffler (1982) are the ones trying to introduce theoretical devices
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that would take into account the loss suffered by the agent when acting for the greater
good.
The problem of supererogation, in these circumstances, was mainly a problem
about  how  to  explain/justify  satisficing  (i.e.  abandoning  the  maximization
requirement and adopting the “good enough” as required). 
Commonsensical  supererogation  has  a  few  classical  traits:  the  moral
excellence of the deed, the threshold of duty that one has to go “beyond” and (not
necessarily, but typically) a sacrifice on the part of the agent. All these will emerge as
different when embedded in the theoretical landscape of reasons. Let me try to briefly
explain why – what changes are involved in speaking in terms of reasons.
The first chapter presented anti-supererogationist positions based on a Kantian
idea  of  duty.  Then,  the  second  chapter  analyzed  utilitarian  and  consequentialist
position about supererogation. These are the two classical ethical traditions that speak
in terms of what is morally right, duty and obligation. When asked 'what one ought to
(morally)  do',  the  classical  answers  are  “do  your  duty”  or  'maximize  the  good
(utility)'.  Let us suppose, skipping over various difficulties,  that an agent is in the
happy case where she has already identified what it would mean for her to do her duty
and to maximize utility: to keep a promise56 and, respectively,  to increase someone's
well-being.  The  problem  is  that,  in  complex  real  situations,  agents  often  times
consider that they should do both, and these things come into conflict. Let us suppose
that keeping a promise would bring a decrease in the well being of someone (or of
56 I am following closely here an argument made by W.D.Ross (1930). His aim was to arrive at the
concept of prima facie duty. I am using Ross because I think his position is an interesting intermediary
between speaking in terms of duty and speaking in terms of reasons. 
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many) whereas not keeping the promise would at least keep well-being at the same
level. 
The whole point of the example is to say that, most of the time, the agent has
complicated,  competing  obligations.  When  this  happens,  it  seems  reasonable  and
legitimate  to  have  nuanced  responses  of  the  kind  'I  will  keep my promise  if  the
consequences for others are not too harsh' or, alternatively, 'I am sorry but I will not
keep my promise because the consequences are too harmful'. These ways of reasoning
about (and responding to) moral common situations may suggest that classical ethical
terms, like “duty” may be inadequate or inefficient in rendering these thoughts. W.D.
Ross himself  (whom I am following closely in giving this argument)  changed the
classical  meaning of  the  term “duty”  when he proposed his  famous  “prima facie
duties”.57 The alternative name given by Ross to  prima facie duties is “conditional
duty”, which clearly departs from the Kantian orthodoxy of duties being categorical. 
The conditional form is not the only departure from the classical concept of
duty, a departure  obviously present in the kind of common moral reasoning like the
one exemplified above. Usually, duties are understood as a matter of all or nothing:
one can either do their duty or fail, there is no middle ground or degree. This classical
picture leaves no room for a confrontation of duties, or for a complicated situation
where, even though one did not fulfill their promise they omitted the act on moral
57 The  exact  meaning  of  a prima  facie  duty  is  controversial,  authors  proposing  two  main
interpretations: one where the prima facie duty is a tendency to make an action a duty, the other
where a prima facie duty is something that would be a duty if nothing else would intervene. Ross
(1930) gives the following definition: “I suggest 'prima facie duty' or 'conditional duty' as a brief
way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act
has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would
be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant.” (p.19)
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grounds  and  even  so  they  feel  sorry  about  not  keeping  their  promise.  This  is  a
situation where, even though it seems that one has not fulfilled one's promise and has
followed another (rival) 'duty', the duty of keeping a promise still holds some power
over the agent's action because the agent feels regret. Disobeying other duties might
carry even more weight by changing, not the action, but the  manner in which the
agent chooses to act.58 These are subtle influences of 'duties' that seem to still have
relevance  for  the  action  even  when  disobeyed.  These  nuances  and  the  idea  of
weighing among competing duties in order to be able to have a resolution between
rival claims, are difficult to express (to say the least) by using a classical notion of
duty.
The utilitarian frame is no less rigid in this respect: in the classical frame there
is no room for exceptions, extraordinary circumstances or  failing to maximize the
good  on  moral  grounds.  Regarding  the  utilitarian  frame,  Ross  has  the  following
illuminating critique:
In fact the theory of 'ideal utilitarianism' (…) seems to simplify unduly
our relations to our fellows. It says, in effect, that the only morally 
significant relation in which my neighbours stand to me is that of 
being possible beneficiaries by my action. They do stand in this 
relation to me, and this relation is morally significant. But they may 
also stand to me in the relation of promisee to promiser, of creditor to 
debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of 
fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and the like; and each of 
these relations is the foundation of a prima facie duty, which is more 
or less incumbent on me according to the circumstances of the case. 
(W. D. Ross 1930, p.19) 
58   For a discussion of examples see Dancy (1993), Chapter 7.
111
As Ross makes clear, a  prima facie duty may be more or less incumbent on
the agent depending on the circumstances, which is another trait that does not fit into
a picture of classical duty and obligation. 
To summarize, the complicated moral picture that one might want to be able
to describe involves, up to this point, the following:  moral obligations that may be in
conflict, obligations that may influence each other, obligations that may still influence
the action after not being followed, obligations which have their strength dependent
on circumstances, obligations that oblige only partially or that have a mere tendency
to  guide  action.59 These  are  all  situations  where reasons could  work60 as  a  more
appropriate theoretical tool. 
I  think  the  following  points  may  summarize  the  changes  involved  in
employing reasons in thinking about moral obligation and moral discourse:
a)  The full force of categorical duty is dispersed in less categorical deontic
forces that can come into conflict with each other or influence each other.
Reasons are deontic entities, that guide action or say what one ought to do.
But  the deontic  force of one reason is  not  the full  force of  duty in  the
classical  sense.  The  'ought'  carried  by  a  reason  can  be  weakened,  or
enhanced, or overridden by other reasons. 
59 Again, I am following Ross (1930, p.28): “Any act that we do contains various elements in virtue of
which it falls under various categories. In virtue of being the breaking of a promise, for instance, it
tends to be wrong; in virtue of being an instance of relieving distress it tends to be right. Tendency
to be one's duty may be called a parti-resultant attribute, i.e. one which belongs to an act in virtue of
some new component in its nature. Being one's duty is a toti-resultant attribute, one which belongs
to an act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less than this.“ 
60   Of course, reasons are employed in non-moral situations, too. But I will refer mainly to moral 
situations. 
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b)  A reason seen in this way,  is a “partial” “ought” or something one ought to
follow if there is no other reason against it. 
c)  The answer to the question 'what ought one to do (morally speaking)?' is
that the agent should follow the so-called balance of reasons, namely the
result  of  comparing  the  weights  of  various  reasons  relevant  to  a  given
moral situation.
3.1. Reasons and Supererogation
To recall, the usual concept of supererogation has several constant traits: the
moral excellence of the deed, the threshold of duty that one has to go “beyond” and
(not necessarily, but typically) the sacrifice on the part of the agent. Each of these will
suffer modifications within the frame of reasons. 
A) The morally excellent and better action
Supererogatory  action  is  action  that  is,  at  least  in  some  respects,  morally
better:  it  is a morally excellent  action.  This creates a first  problem: the good is  a
value,  and value  is  usually  thought  to  create  reasons for  action.  Raz (1975a),  for
example, states explicitly that one of his presuppositions is that if some action  x is
good, then there are reasons to do it. The same presupposition is taken to be common
sense by Dreier (2004). This is a problem for supererogatory action because reasons
are also thought to be deontic entities, and therefore, from having a reason to do x, it
also results that one ought to do x (if there are no other reasons against it). This seems
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to  be  a  classical  case  of  good-ought  tie-up,  a  frame  where  supererogatory  action
seems impossible  (because most  good action  is  not obligatory).  There are  several
possible ways out (to be discussed in the next sections). One possible way out is to
say that not all reasons are deontic entities (and therefore having a reason to  x does
not always imply that one ought to  x). Another possible way out is to say that, in
supererogatory cases, the sacrifice of the agent sometimes counts as a valid reason
against the obligation to do x (Dancy 1993).
B) Going beyond duty and the frame of reasons 
Obviously, one cannot speak in this context, about a threshold of duty beyond
which actions are not obligatory anymore. Usually it is thought that an agent ought to
do what the balance of reasons recommends. This is not, however, a mere substitution
of roles: one could speak about going beyond duty, but it does not make much sense
to speak about going beyond the balance of reasons. Most likely this happens because
the balance of reasons is meant to indicate what is appropriate to do in circumstance.
If a course of action is fitting, then doing 'more' than that seems nonsensical. I will
discuss  in  the  next  sections  Nagel's  example  (1986),  in  which  the  balance  of
impersonal reasons indicates the maximum that the agent can morally accomplish.
Supererogation is possible only because this maximum is not required and the agent is
allowed to go against the balance of reasons. 
C) The Agent's Sacrifice
The  theoretical  framework  of  reasons,  through  its  flexibility,  allows  for  a
proper theoretical treatment of the agent's sacrifice. In most cases discussed until now
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the  sacrifice  of  the  agent  in  supererogatory  action  was  taken  into  account  as  a
prudential (i.e. not moral)  worry that the agent might  have. The frame of reasons
allows  for  opposing,  conflicting,  lesser  obligations  such  that  the  conflict  is  not
necessarily seen to be one between duty and inclinations (or the greater good versus
personal interest) – even if a version of this opposition is discussed in Nagel (1986).
The agent may have agent- relative reasons, which can pull their own weight in a
conflict of reasons. There is, therefore, a possibility that the personal reasons of the
agent be endowed with deontic force, i.e. with moral dignity. 
To see exactly how each of these traits may change the configuration of the
problem  of  supererogation  I  will  discuss  three  authors  and  their  versions  of  the
problem of supererogation: Dancy (1993), Nagel (1986) and Raz (1975a,b). Dancy's
theory is an example of how the problem of supererogation may be solved when the
agent acting supererogatorily respects the balance of reasons. Nagel is an example of
solving a version of the problem of supererogation by going against the balance of
reasons. Raz has a more peculiar position, because his solution to his version of the
problem  of  supererogation  involves  respecting  a  relationship  established  between
reasons (of different types), but this relationship cannot be properly described as a
'balance' of reasons. 
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           3.2. The Problem of Supererogation and its General Form in Dancy's 
Moral Reasons 
Supererogation  is  rarely  discussed  as  a  topic  in  its  own  right.61 More
commonly supererogation is discussed because it presents a difficulty for a certain
moral theory. I believe that the most interesting treatments of supererogation and its
problems come embedded in a  larger  attempt  at  establishing  a  larger  point  about
moral  action.  One  consequence  of  this  state  of  affairs  is  that  the  problem  of
supererogation  (how  can  one  explain  very  good  deeds  being  deemed  morally
optional)  will  be  transformed  into  various  different  problems  due  to  the  various
purposes of each theoretical enterprise. The problem of supererogation, as common
sense presents it, will be transformed into another difficulty, usually the difficulty that
compelled the author to take supererogation into consideration. Another consequence
of this state of affairs is that “the” problem of supererogation may be transformed into
several problems within one and the same theoretical approach depending upon how
general one's point of view is: it  can reflect the larger purpose of the author or a
narrower preoccupation. For example, it can ask a question about the relation between
the deontic and evaluative domains, or a question about how to integrate the cost of
an action for the agent into the overall balance of reasons. 
In Dancy's  Moral Reasons, the general declared aim is to find a “theory of
motivation that will re-establish the possibility that moral reasons are both cognitive
and able to motivate in their own right.”62 In elaborating a cognitivist and particularist
61 Notable exceptions: Heyd (1982) and Mellema (1991).
62   Dancy (1993, p.x)
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theory of reasons for action, Dancy uses the metaphor of the “shape” of a situation
(i.e.  what  we  perceive  in  a  situation  as  relevant  for  action),  and  this  is  where
supererogation and its problems becomes relevant. Dancy maintains that in assessing
any situation as agents we take into consideration certain features of the situation,
features  that  appear  to  us  as  relevant  or  important  for  our  actions.  He  calls  the
configuration formed by these features salience or shape. This is because the relevant
features of a situation do not form a mere list: their order and their interconnections
matter.  They can enhance or weaken one another's importance,  or they can cancel
each other or come into conflict and remain in tension, for example. 
Supererogation is discussed at this point because it poses a problem for the
metaphor of shape. One situation is supposed to present us with only one kind of
shape. The shape is identified by Dancy with the thin properties presented by that
situation: the salient features are supposed to point to what is right or wrong, good or
bad.
When I first considered the notion of a thin property, I ended by 
identifying a thin property with the shape in which the thicker 
properties of the case presented themselves. But now we see that there 
are two different sorts of thin properties, the evaluative and the 
deontic, that the same situation can generate one of each sort (by both 
calling for a certain action and permitting one not to do it), and that the
two can vary apparently independently. This places pressure on the 
notion of shape, because I seem now to be committed to holding that 
one situation can have more than one sort of shape at the same time. 
(Dancy 1993, p.128)
The question of how / if the good and the right (i.e. the evaluative and the deontic)
connect  or  diverge is  a question  of considerable  proportions.  Rawls,  for  example,
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considers it to be the problem of any ethical theory.63 Supererogation is relevant for
only one aspect of this complex problem. For, if one accepts that there are such things
as supererogatory actions (de facto or merely  de jure),64 then one also accepts that
some morally good actions are not obligatory. A symmetry between domains might
seem, after all,  an intuitively attractive idea: that what is bad is forbidden, what is
indifferent is permitted and what is good is obligatory.  Even if one does not adopt
sharp  distinctions  and  prefers  to  see  things  as  a  matter  of  degree,  it  still  seems
intuitive that the worse an action is, the more likely it is to be under an interdiction
and,  symmetrically,  the  better  an  action  is,  the  more  likely  it  is  to  be  deemed
obligatory. Supererogation calls into doubt the symmetrical assumption: that the better
something is, the more likely it is to be deemed morally obligatory. Moreover, it is the
point where we seem to accept that some morally excellent deeds are not and cannot
be obligatory. 
      In describing the commonsensical view of supererogation,  Dreier (2004) and
Hurka and Schubert (2012) distinguish two sides: the optional side (the permission to
act  or  not  in  a  supererogatory  manner)  and  the  “going  beyond  duty”  side  (that
supererogatory deeds  are  better  moral  deeds).  If  these two sides  are  seen as  each
representing one domain, namely the deontic domain and the evaluative domain, then
the commonsensical problem of supererogation (how can one be permitted not to do
63 In A Theory of Justice: “ The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good ; the
concept of a morally worthy person is, I believe, derived from them. The structure of an ethical
theory is, then, largely determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions. Now it
seems that the simplest way of relating them is taken by teleological theories: the good  is defined
independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good.”
(Rawls 1971, p.24)
64 What I mean by de jure is that position according to which the idea of supererogation is coherent,
but there are no actual supererogatory deeds. 
118
some morally excellent deeds) is transformed into a problem of connecting the two
domains: how can an increase in goodness not be followed by an obligation to act?
And if the two domains do not increase in step with one another, then what exactly is
the relation between them? This is the more general context in which Dancy raises the
problem of supererogation:
Such acts characteristically enjoy a very high degree of value, probably
more value than any other act available to the agent. But in thinking of 
them as supererogatory, we are thinking of them as actions which is not
wrong of the agent not to do. The puzzle about supererogation is how 
there can be such acts. (Dancy 1993, p.127)
Dancy is clear about the fact that the commonsensical view of the problem  is
changed so as to  accommodate the specific theoretical context, by choosing a notion
of  'ought' that is more general than the one of 'duty' and by framing the problem as a
problem regarding the relation between the evaluative and deontic domains:
As I have expressed it so far, the concept of supererogation involves a 
contrast between duty and value, suggesting to us that duty can give 
out where value persists and grows. But in fact this is too narrow a 
perspective on the problem. We should not focus too directly on the 
notion of duty, since there may be actions which one ought to do but 
which can not exactly be said to be one's duty. In saying that the agent
is not wrong not to do such action, we are leaving behind the notion of
duty and working with a more general contrast between an action 
which ought to be done and one which has value. This is a contrast 
between the deontic and the evaluative properties of an action. (Dancy
1993, p.127)
At this general stage,  Dancy has at least three formulations of the problem. They look
quite similar and therefore I think they can be considered to be different formulations
of the same general problem:
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a) In terms of duty compared to value: How can one explain that “duty can
give out where value persists and grows”?65 
b)  In  terms  of  evaluative  properties  compared  to  deontic  properties  of  a
situation: How can one explain that “as value rises, the change in degree of
evaluative  property”  is  not  “attended  by a  change  in  degree  of  deontic
property”?62
c) In terms of “ought” following the good: How can one explain that “the
more good one's action would do”, it is not the case that “the more one
ought to choose it in preference to others”?62
Regarding the latter formulation, notice that supporting the idea that  “ought”
always  follows the good is  the usual way of arguing for an anti-supererogationist
position. An anti-supererogationist will usually be committed to the so called “good-
ought tie-up”,66 namely the claim that when something is morally good or excellent, it
should be placed by a moral theory under an obligation, under an “ought”. Therefore a
classical way of affirming the existence or possibility of supererogation is to deny that
there is such a requirement, of a “good-ought tie-up”.
These three formulations, even though different, having different degrees of
generality, for example, are, nevertheless, quite similar. I believe that a more radical
transformation of the problem takes place when making steps towards an answer.
65 Dancy (1993, p.127).
66   Heyd (2002/2016).
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3.3. Agent-neutral and Agent-relative Reasons
In search for a solution to the problem of supererogation Dancy appeals to
reasons.67  His entire   book (1993) is dedicated to the development  of a theory of
reasons for action, so there is no surprise that the solution to the conundrum will be
thought in terms of reasons. 
There  are  two  main  characteristics  usually  attributed  to  reasons,  that  are
important  here.  First,  they  have  “deontic  force”,  which  is  a  metaphorical  way of
saying  that  they are  thought  to  direct  action  in  a  rather  imperative  manner  (as  if
carrying an “ought” of varying intensity); in this sense, when  one has (decisive or
overall) reasons for a certain action, then this is what what one should do. To quote
Dancy (2004,  p.91),  “some reasons are  obviously in the  business  of more  or  less
telling  us  what  to  do”.   In  “Enticing  Reasons”,  Dancy calls  this  kind  of  reasons
“peremptory”  in their  style  of favoring action.68 Illuminating considerations  in this
respect can be found in Little (2013, p.112):
On a certain classical picture, reasons, by their very nature, are 
deontic. If one faces a reason in favour of an action, then one would be
wrong not to follow its lead, absent sufficient counter-veiling 
justification. Depending on the type of reason, the wrong in question 
might be the wrong of immorality, or imprudence, or just the generic 
wrong of practical reason (what I will refer to in this chapter as 
'irrationality' or 'impermissibility'). (…) Still, to understand something 
as a practical reason necessarily brings with it a kind of deontic 
67 Each time I speak about reasons, I usually refer to moral reasons because the general topic of the
discussion  here  regards  almost  exclusively  moral  reasons.  This  way  of  speaking  should  be
distinguished from another claim, namely that Jonathan Dancy makes a sharp distinction between
moral reasons and other kinds of reasons. His claim in Moral Reasons  (Chapter 3) is that moral
and non-moral reasons are different not in content but in style.  
68 Dancy (2004) argues that there are reasons that have a different style of favoring action, namely the
“enticing” reasons.
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vulnerability: one who faces such a reason now stands in need of 
adequate justification to do other than it directs, on pain of going 
wrong.
Indeed, for many the idea is virtually definitional of a practical reason.
It is found, inter alia, in the view that it is wrong not to act on the 
'balance of reasons', though it is not limited to a particular view of 
weightings. (...) Reasons for actions are normative entities inherently 
on their way toward being all things considered deontic oughts. Call 
this the deontic view of reasons. 
To this first characteristic of reasons, of being “by their very nature” or by definition,
deontic, a second one can be added that is also important. 
The second important  characteristic  is  that  reasons are  generated by value.
Important  for Dancy in his  discussion of supererogation are  two kinds of values69
generating two kinds of reasons: agent-neutral value generating agent-neutral reasons
and agent-relative value generating agent-relative reasons. 
The contrast is not between the moral reasons for action, which all 
derive from considerations of value, and what we can get the weak-
minded to do. It is between one sort of reason deriving from what we 
might call objective or agent-neutral value, and another which focuses 
on the agent-relative, but which still concerns value, and moral value, 
for all that. (Dancy 1993, p.139)
The distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is relevant in
discussing  supererogation for reasons that I will explain below. The distinction itself
is  borrowed  from  Nagel  (1986),  who  distinguishes  between  three  categories  of
reasons:  one  that  is  purely  subjective  and  two  that  have  different  degrees  of
objectivity. The ones that are deemed to be objective acquire this status due to their
capacity to pass an “objectification test”. They are sub-divided into agent-relative and
69 In Chapter 12 of his (1993), Dancy elaborates this claim and maintains that he speaks rather about
different kinds of valuing than different kinds of values. 
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agent-neutral  reasons.  How  one  establishes  objectivity  is  a  rather  complicated
problem and Dancy discusses various conditions for objectivity and what exactly that
might  mean  in  a  dedicated  chapter  in  his  book.  I  think  it  is  enough,  for  present
purposes, to say, roughly, that a reason has some degree of objectivity if it could be
recognized as a valid reason by someone else than the agent. One can distinguish
intuitively between reasons that are purely subjective (i.e. reasons that are reasons
only for the agent and are not expected to have any validity or to be recognizable as
reasons for anyone else – like the reason why I would choose chocolate ice cream
over vanilla) and reasons that have some degree of objectivity. The highest degree of
objectivity  is  present  in  agent-neutral  reasons70 (recognizable  as  such  from
perspectives very different from the agent's); agent-relative reasons, such as  “because
he is my friend” or “because she is my sister” are not reasons with the same standing
for any agent (therefore they have less objectivity), but any agent can recognize them
as valid reasons for someone standing in those relations to others. 
 Dancy's characterization of the distinction between agent-relative and agent-
neutral reasons is the following:
Nagel holds that there are three sorts of reasons for action. The first are
stubbornly subjective reasons, such as those which are in play when 
we are choosing from a menu in a restaurant. Here we have no desire 
that our reasons should somehow receive objective validation, and 
those reasons, depending as they do on our own peculiarities (our 
taste), cannot be recognized from a viewpoint at any great distance 
from our own. But there are two classes of objective reasons. The first 
are agent-relative reasons, of which we will be hearing a great deal; the
second are agent-neutral reasons. Both of these are recognizable at 
some distance from here, as we shave peculiarities from our 
70 Nagel (1986), for example, takes the avoidance of pain to be an agent-neutral, highly objective
reason, obvious to any agent as a reason. Of course, that does not mean it is considered a reason
impossible to defeat (an “absolute” reason for Raz (1975a)).
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perspective in the move towards objectivity. The agent-relative ones 
are less objective, of course, though they can be recognized, and in 
some sense endorsed, from more objective points of view. (Dancy 
1993, p.146)
I have claimed that this distinction, between agent-neutral and agent-relative
reasons is important when trying to explain supererogation. In order to understand its
importance, let us suppose for the moment that we can do without it, that there is no
distinction being made between kinds of reasons depending on their relation to the
agent. What would that picture look like for supererogation?
Once moral reasons (with their deontic quality) have been introduced, there is
no  general  threshold  of  obligation  beyond  which  deeds  become  supererogatory.
Instead, the agent is supposed to decide if something should be done or not in each
particular case by taking into account a “balance of reasons”, i.e. by evaluating how
considerations counting for and against doing the act relate and influence each other.
On the  one  hand,  this  makes  the  evaluation  more  flexible  and capable  of
degrees: instead of establishing if something is a duty or not (simpliciter) one can
establish  various  degrees  for  various  situations  of  being  morally  more  or  less
compelling. On the other hand, the problem of supererogation seems to have become
more stringent in this new setting: if value generates reasons, then presumably high
value or more value generates more reasons. And reasons are usually understood as
deontic in nature,  as carrying an “ought”.  Therefore,  wherever there is value,  and
value  generates  reasons,  there  is  an  “ought”.  In  this  way,  one is  back at  the  old
intuition that the ought should follow the good, that the highly valuable deed should
be obligatory; in other words, one arrives at the good-ought tie-up. 
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The question is, therefore, how can supererogation be made possible in this
setting? If each time  something is morally good there is also an obligation to bring it
about, then it seems that there is no place for a situation where one could rightly say
that something is good but nevertheless no one could be obligated to bring it about (as
we would plausibly say in the case of the hero giving his life to save others). The
problem of supererogation has thereby morphed thereby into the problem “(...) how to
cope with the intuition that increased value generates increased reason to act”.71
As I see it, there are two main strategies available. First, one could deny that
all reasons are “oughty”, that they are all deontic by definition or by their “nature”.
Maybe  the  reasons  counting  in  favor  of  (what  we  usually  consider  to  be)
supererogatory actions  are  some other  kind of reasons,  a kind that  does not  have
various degrees of deontic force implicit in their employment. The problem with the
deontic nature of reasons is not that they always impose a full-scale obligation; rather,
it is that they seem to impose some kind of justification or a countervailing force if
one  is  not  following  them.  If  someone  has  a  valid  reason to  do  something,  then
simply not doing it is not necessarily wrong, but it does seems to leave the onlooker
puzzled,  in need of a certain justification why that  reason was not followed even
when it  was  recognized.  Supererogation  seems to allow exactly  this:  to  not  do a
morally excellent deed without further need for excuse or justification. To repeat, a
first  possible  strategy  is  to  deny  that  the  value  of  supererogatory  acts  generates
deontic reasons. 
A  second  possible  strategy is  to  accept   that  all  reasons  involved  in
71   Dancy (1993, p. 141).
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supererogation are deontic, but to deny that they all pull in the same direction (i.e.
they might be in opposition). Namely, it is to say that even though the good implied
in the supererogatory deed generates a requirement, there are also reasons opposing
this requirement and this is why, sometimes the agent is allowed to ignore the first
requirement  (i.e.  to  act  supererogatorily)  because  on  the  balance  of  reasons,  the
opposing reasons sometimes might win. In other words, the strategy is to accept “the
claim that if there is a reason in favor of doing something and no reason against, one
ought to do it”72 and to go on to say that there is sometimes  reason against doing
something supererogatory, namely the reasons generated by the agent's sacrifice, i.e.
agent-relative reasons. Dancy will consider the first strategy, but reject it in the end.
He   will  use  the  second  strategy  when  providing  an  answer  to  the  problem  of
supererogation.
3.4. The Two Strategies for Responding to the Problem of Supererogation
In order to understand the first strategy,  one should first ask :what kind of
reasons could there be such that the agent would be permitted not to act upon them
without further ado (because the reasons are non-deontic)? Two prominent examples
are Kagan (1989), who considers briefly the idea of “non-insistent” reasons only to
dismiss it, and Horgan and Timmons (2010) who propose and adopt “moral merit-
conferring” reasons in order to solve their version of the problem of supererogation. 
72   Dancy (2004, p. 110).
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Kagan (1989, p.379)73 characterizes non-insistent reasons as reasons which
(...) would have genuine weight, and might well be able to outweigh 
various other reasons. But they themselves would not be insistent, in 
that from the rational perspective it would be perfectly acceptable to 
neglect them. Presumably, by the very nature of the case, such non-
insistent reasons could never ground a requirement. But, in contrast to 
the previous suggestion, this would be due to the intrinsic nature of the
reasons, rather than merely verbal gerrymandering with the notion of 
‘moral requirement’. 
However  he  concludes  that  non-insistent  reasons  do  not  make  sense  and  that  all
reasons are insistent even if they can be opposed and outweighed:
The insistent nature of reasons comes out even more clearly when they
are considered in isolation. (...) There would be no rational 
justification for neglecting the sole reason: the reason is insistent. Yet 
why should the reason be any less insistent when it is opposed by 
countervailing reasons? It may be outweighed, to be sure, but it is 
difficult to see what could suddenly make it non-insistent. (Kagan 
1989, p.381)
Horgan and Timmons (2010), on the other hand, want to deny that “If there
are morally best reasons that favor performing an action that one is in a position to
perform, then one is at least prima facie morally required to perform that action, and
one is perhaps all-in required to perform that action.”74 They do that by denying that
reasons for actions may have only one kind of role to play, the requiring role. And
they propose the "moral merit conferring" role for reasons:
(…) we propose what we call a nonrequiring, “moral merit-conferring”
role that a moral reason can play and that makes sense of the very idea 
of supererogatory acts: acts that are completely morally optional, but 
73 Kagan (1989, p.379) analyses a possible case of non-insistent reasons (like reasons to pick one
particular meal rather than another in a restaurant) but nevertheless rejects the possibility of such
reasons:“I do not know what reasons of this kind would be like”.
74    Horgan and Timmons (2010, p.36).
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good and morally meritorious to perform. (Horgan and Timmons 2010,
p.50)
The strategy, as I understand it, is to deny that "the only way in which a moral reason
can favor an action is by tending to require that action."75
Dancy (2004) himself proposes his own kind of non-deontic reasons, namely
reasons that “entice” rather than require; the latter are “peremptory”76 in style:
(…) I consider the possibility of a general distinction between two 
sorts of reasons: those that entice and those that are, as I will later say, 
more 'peremptory' in style. The main idea here is that some reasons are
obviously in the business of more or less telling us what to do (…) 
Other reasons, however, are more to do with making an option 
attractive rather than demanded, required or right. At its most basic, 
the distinction I am after is between those reasons that say 'Come on, 
I'd be nice', and those that say something of a more forceful sort such 
as 'You'd better do this'. (Dancy 2004, p.91)
But  even  though  the  proposal  withstands  criticism,  Dancy  does  not  think  that
supererogation can be explained by the existence of enticing reasons because “The
whole  story  of  supererogation  given  above  makes  no  essential  appeal  to  non-
peremptory reasons.”77 This is because none of the reasons involved in supererogation
have usually to do with “the fun, the amusing, the attractive”, like enticers typically
do. 
Therefore,  Dancy's  solution  will  be  based  on  accepting  the  peremptory
character of reasons involved in supererogatory action.  His way way out from the
75    Horgan and Timmons (2010, p. 62).
76 In his (2004) article, Dancy also uses the term “non-insistent reason”, but , I think, quite differently
from Kagan.  For Dancy peremptory reasons can be non-insistent  in the sense that  they can be
discounted  by the agent.  By contrast,  for  Kagan,  had there  been   such things  as  non-insistent
reasons, they would be non-insistent by their very “nature”.
77    Dancy (2004, p.114).
128
good-ought tie-up is given by the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative
reasons, i.e. what I have called a second possible strategy. 
3. 5. Dancy's Solution to the Problem of Supererogation
This  second  strategy involves  accepting  that  the  reasons  favoring
supererogatory action are peremptory, but states that the agent might have  her own
reasons, namely agent-relative reasons with moral standing, that can count as reasons
against doing the supererogatory deed. This strategy uses, a clause embedded in the
conditional that establishes the “oughtiness” of reasons, namely in “the claim that if
there is a reason in favor of doing something and no reason against, one ought to do
it”. It is the “no reason against” clause that is at issue here. This strategy claims that
there might be moral reasons (i.e. agent-relative reasons stemming from the sacrifice
of the agent) going against the objective reasons favoring a certain supererogatory
deed.
What this would mean, if we could get the story to run, is that increase 
in neutral value need not necessarily lead to increased reason to act or 
make it more wrong to fail to act. For increased neutral value can be 
counterbalanced by increased cost to the agent, i.e. by a decrease in 
agent-relative value. (Dancy 1993, p.138)
In other words, Dancy accepts that the good produced by a supererogatory
action gives the agent reasons to act supererogatorily.  However, he argues that the
picture is much more complex, namely, more complex than the picture of an agent
confronted with a difficult course of action required by moral reasons. Dancy argues
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that the objectively good result of a moral deed, i.e. its objective value, is not the only
component of  the  generated  reason  and  its  deontic  force.  There  are  two  other
components needed in order for a reason to be formed: a special relationship between
the agent and the situation (e.g. opportunity – for some good deeds should be done but
not necessarily by this agent, here and now) and the sacrifice of the agent. Therefore,
the picture gains complexity:
(…) there is also a systematic relation between the deontic and the 
evaluative, which we expressed by saying that the deontic properties 
are resultant properties, and they result from a combination of:
- neutral value
- special relation
- sacrifice involved, generating agent-relative value (Dancy 1993, p.141)
Consider the example78 of a doctor who can volunteer to go to another country
to help fight against a dangerous epidemic. This kind of volunteering is obviously
valuable; it is good for everyone else and it also involves some considerable risks for
the agent. Measured objectively, from an impersonal point of view, the risk for one
person (the doctor) seems to be a small price to pay for  the good that might be done
for many. The value generated for all by this gesture would seem to point to strong
agent-neutral  reasons in favor, which also means that - all  things considered - we
judge that the doctor should offer her help. Dancy stresses that the cost for the agent is
already taken into account in this impersonal, value neutral picture. His proposal is to
add  to  the  neutral  value  picture  the  same  cost,  but  seen  in  a  different  manner
(assuming that the special  relation is already in place).  Namely,  to see the agent's
78 I am borrowing this example from Scheffler (1982).
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sacrifice,  not  from  a  neutral,  impersonal  perspective,  but  from  the  personal
perspective  of  the  agent,  as  a  risk  for  her.  This  agent-relative  decrease  in  value
generates agent-relative reasons favoring the opposing course of action, and by this,
reasons  capable  of  overturning  the  initial  verdict,  of  a  moral  obligation  to  help.
Should the risks for the doctor's life or health be considerable, then this new picture
provides a theoretical explanation for why the doctor would be within her moral rights
not to go. This does not mean that agent-relative reasons will always be able to justify
not making a sacrifice; it only means that they are sometimes able to do this:
Now I want to say that the deontic results from the combination of 
three elements , value, special relationship and sacrifice involved for 
the agent. These three contribute in their different ways to the creation 
of reasons. The value that the act would create probably generates 
strong reasons in favour of doing it, for any person who stands in the 
requisite special relationship. But the cost that person will have to pay,
which is already counted once during the calculation of value, counts 
in a different way when the prospective agent comes to consider what 
to do. So there is on one side the value derived from the difference it 
will make to the world that this action was done, which we can now 
call neutral value. But there is something else to be considered on the 
other side, and since it seems best to consider this something else as 
centered on something of value to the agent, we should think of this 
something else as value too, but as agent-relative value. (Dancy 1993, 
p.138)
Therefore,  Dancy's  solution to the problem “(...)  How very great value can fail  to
create a requirement to act where there is opportunity”79 is to allow agent-relative
reasons  to  have  a  moral  weight  able  to  sometimes  surpass  (depending  on  the
demandingness of the sacrifice) the weight of agent-neutral reasons. The “great value”
is neutral value, the value impersonally considered; it does not automatically create a
requirement because, in order to do so, one should take two other factors into account
79 Dancy (1993, p.131).
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(according to Dancy): a special relation to the agent (if the agent has an opportunity to
act,  for  example)  and  the  decrease  in  agent-relative  value  created  by  the  agent's
sacrifice. 
This  is  the  justification  for  our  commonsensical  intuition  that  one  is  not
required to perform some morally excellent acts: because the sacrifice for the agent
might count as a moral reason against the action. 
So I want to say that the cost to the agent creates reasons for the agent 
that are distinct from its contribution (presumably negative) to the sum
of neutral value. And these reasons are ones that we can all recognize 
and appreciate. This is what enables us to recognize that it is morally 
acceptable for the agent not to go by the balance of neutral value 
alone. We should not confuse this with some sort of special pleading 
on the part of the agent. (Dancy 1993, p.139)
There are two important comments to be made at this point. The first regards
the moral value of agent-relative reasons. The second regards a further complication
created by this answer. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  Dancy attributes  moral value  to  agent-relative
reasons.  This is a departure from the usual view. Usually, the demandingness of the
sacrifice involved in acting supererogatorily is seen a a possible reason against doing
the  action,  but  only  as  a  prudential reason against  the  action,  i.e.  without  moral
standing against other moral reasons. In other words, it is thought that the partiality
and even selfishness of the agent is the one speaking against acting supererogatorily
(while supererogatory action is understood as being for the common good). And this
is why agent-relative reasons are usually dismissed as being “tainted” by partiality,
and incapable  of  being  veritable  bearers  of  normativity.  One might,  for  example,
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recall  Kagan's  stern  position  in  this  respect,  namely  that  even  when the  sacrifice
demanded by morality is quite large,80 the difficulty of the sacrifice does not represent
a valid moral excuse (never mind a valid reason):
Morality requires that you perform—of those acts not otherwise 
forbidden—that act which can be reasonably expected to lead to the 
best consequences overall. Few of us believe this claim; none of us act 
in accordance with it. Consider just how radically demanding it is. It 
bids us to act not with an eye to merely furthering our own projects 
and interests, or those of some individuals we may favor—but with 
regard for the interests of all individuals, the world as a whole, overall 
good. It demands that I ask how I can make my greatest possible 
contribution, all things considered—even though this may impose 
considerable hardship on me—and it forbids me to do anything less. If 
the claim is correct, most of my actions are immoral, for almost 
nothing that I do makes optimal use of my time and resources; if I am 
honest with myself I will recognize that I constantly fail to do as much 
good as I am able. (Kagan 1989, p.1)
By contrast, Dancy considers that the “shrinking hero” is not guilty of moral
failure, and that the agent's partial reasons may very well count as moral reasons:
The cost to the self is shown to be a moral reason by the fact that we, 
as outsiders, take it that the shrinking hero is within his moral rights to 
hold back. The contrast is not between the moral reasons for action, 
which all derive from considerations of value, and what we can get the 
weak-minded to do. It is between one sort of reason deriving from 
what we might call objective or agent-neutral value, and another which
focuses on agent-relative, but which still concerns value, and moral 
value for all that. (Dancy 1993, p.139)
80 Nevertheless,  Kagan (1989, pp.7-8) notes that this position does not commit him to saying that
extreme sacrifices are required: “The moderate might be tempted to object that an agent can go
overboard on sacrifices—exhausting and impoverishing herself—ultimately destroying her ability
to make continual contributions to the overall good (however this is ultimately understood). In this
way the extremist's position might bethought to be self‐defeating: were it only more moderate in its
demands, agents would—in the long run—be able to do the world more good. Such an objection,
however, would rest on a misunderstanding of the extremist, who does not demand sacrifices for
their own sake—but only insofar as they are the cost of producing the greatest possible good. The
extremist  would be the first  to urge that  mindlessly driving oneself  to exhaustion or recklessly
dispensing  one's  goods  can  be  counterproductive.  Far  from  being  required,  such  behavior  is
forbidden.“
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My second  comment  regarding  Dancy's  solution  is  that  his  answer  to  the
problem promptly creates another problem, one that he fully acknowledges. For let us
suppose that the risks involved in a doctor's volunteering abroad are so great that the
balance  of  reasons  comes  in  favor  of  not  going  abroad  and  therefore  not  acting
supererogatorily. Now the doctor is morally withing her rights not to go; however, in
this case it would also seem that it is wrong to go, because it would be against the
balance of reasons:
What about the other side of the coin, which is the agent's right to 
ignore the cost to self and make the sacrifice? The standard problem 
here is that if we succeed in justifying the agent's failure to do the 
heroic act, we can no longer approve his choosing to be a hero. (Dancy
1993, p.140)
Dancy's response to this problem is that the agent (and the agent alone) has a moral
right  to  discount  the reasons going against  her  sacrifice,  because it  is  an obvious
ethical truth that one can discount the cost because it is oneself who incurs it:
Others, of course, do not have the right to discount the cost to the 
agent, whichever way of valuing we are talking about. (…) If anyone 
doubts this account and asks why the agent has the right to discount 
(not to ignore) the cost to self, it is hard to know what one could appeal
to in an answer which is basic enough to offer an advance on what we 
have already. The only thing that I can think of to say is that the agent 
has this right because it is he that is going to have to pay the cost. (…) 
But without begging the question in favour of consequentialist ways of 
looking at things, no theory should be taken to be in difficulties on this 
point unless it itself serves to invalidate the apparently obvious ethical 
truth that I am appealing to here. (Dancy 1993, p.215)
I  will  discuss  in  the  next  section  how this  position  affects  the problem of
supererogation.
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3.6. Conclusion: Dancy about Supererogation 
Dancy's  preoccupation  with  supererogation  started  with  the  discrepancy
between two moral intuitions. On the one hand, it seems intuitive that the deontic and
the evaluative domains should have a kind of symmetry, in the sense that the positive
extreme of moral goodness should be associated with the positive extreme of moral
obligation:
Normally we would think that, as value rises, the change in degree of 
evaluative property is attended by a change in degree of deontic 
property; the more good one's action would do, the more one ought to 
choose it in preference to others. (Dancy 1993, p.127)
On the other hand, it also seems intuitive that in cases of supererogation a very good
action  is  and  should  be  left  optional,  i.e.  non-obligatory.  At  this  first  stage,  the
problem was formulated in very general terms, namely in terms of deontic  versus
evaluative:  how  can  one  explain  that  “as  value  rises,  the  change  in  degree  of
evaluative property: is not “attended by a change in degree of deontic property.”81
The  answer  to  this  problem  required  some  theoretical  elaboration  and
therefore led to a second, less general view on the problem of supererogation. Once
reasons are introduced, the image of the deontic domain becomes more complex and
can account  for  various  forces  pulling  in  different  directions.  Supererogation  was
explained by appeal to two kinds of reasons, the agent-neutral (favoring the action
due  to  the  objective  goodness  to  be  obtained)  and  the  agent-relative  (favoring
81 Dancy (1993, p.127).
135
refraining from action due to the sacrifice on the part of the agent). I believe that, the
progress towards Dancy's solution can be described step by step as follows:
      a)   If a supererogatory action is good, then it has value.
b) If the supererogatory action is good for all, impersonally, then it has neutral
value.
c) If  it  has  neutral  value,  then  there  are  agent-neutral  reasons to  perform the
supererogatory action.
d) All reasons are deontic entities; they carry normative force.
e) Therefore, if there are agent-neutral reasons to do the supererogatory action
and  no reasons  against  it,  then  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  obligation  to  act
supererogatorily.
In order to avoid this problematic conclusion, two strategies were explored: to
reject d), namely that all reasons are “oughty” or to accept d) and to deny that there
could be no moral reasons against doing something supererogatory. To repeat, Dancy
rejects the first strategy and adopts the second. 
These considerations, about agent neutral and agent-relative value allow the
formulation of a slightly different and more specific problem of supererogation. If the
good brought about by the supererogatory act is considered to be of neutral value,
and that value generates agent-neutral reasons, then the problem of supererogation is
'how  can  one  explain  that  the  agent  is  allowed  not  to  follow  the  agent-neutral
reasons?'  
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Dancy's response is that agent-relative reasons, stemming from the sacrifice
incumbent on the agent, may provide the necessary justification for the “shrinking
hero”  because  agent-relative  reasons  may  have  moral  standing  (and  may  be
discounted by the agent in case she decides to be a hero after all).
In the case of supererogation, what is to justify the reluctant hero in 
hanging back is the cost to him of sacrificing himself for the greater 
good. (…) Neutrally calculated, the cost is the same whoever is to pay 
it, and so there is a moral calculation which is blind to the question 
who is to pay. (…) The individuality of the agent has not come into the
matter at all yet; which person the agent is bears no direct moral 
relevance to the neutral calculation. But that the cost is to be his cost 
makes a great difference to him, and here the identity of the payer 
makes a difference as well as his nature. The cost is counted twice, 
though not in the same way both times; perhaps it would be better to 
say that it has double relevance. (Dancy 1993, p.213)
Therefore,  one  may  distinguish  at  least  two  slightly  different  problems  of
supererogation,  depending on how general  the discussion is  taken to  be.  The first
problem is 'how to explain that the increased goodness of a deed is not matched by an
increase in  deontic  value (i.e.  by the imposition  of an obligation)'.  The second is
formulated in terms of reasons: how can one explain that the agent may legitimately
choose not to follow agent-neutral reasons.
3.7. Thomas Nagel and the Coexistence of Personal and Impersonal 
Standpoints
Even though various problems connected to supererogation seem to pop up in
very  different  theoretical  environments,  the  most  fertile  terrain  for  supererogation
trouble remains, I believe, the discussion about personal and impersonal aspects of
137
morality.  The  reason  for  this  state  of  affairs  is  not  obvious:  nothing  in  the  very
concept  of  supererogation  seems  to  be  directly  connected  with  the
personal/impersonal  distinction  in  ethics.  However,  the  morally  good  deed
presupposed  by supererogation,  together  with  the  permission  to  omit  it,  typically
bring to light a discussion about  options  and about when/if moral requirements are
involved. And the discussion of options for the agent, especially the option to forego a
good deed, tends to reopen  the issue of impersonal demands of morality versus the
personal side of allowing the agent to opt out from some impersonal demands.  In
terms of reasons, the agent-neutral and the agent-relative reasons will represent the
battlefield of impersonal versus personal ethical standpoints. 
Nagel's main theme in The View from Nowhere seems to have this tension at
its core, between personal and impersonal standpoints. Nagel takes his task to be a
conciliatory one:
(…) to describe a kind of reconciliation between the objective 
standpoint and the inner perspective of agency which reduces the 
radical detachment produced by initial contemplation of ourselves as 
creatures in the world. (Nagel 1986, p.126)
But what is the objective standpoint and why is it important in ethics? Nagel believes
it is a sign of our humanity to be able to able to “step back from our motive” (p.127)
and take a larger perspective, beyond our narrow interest. The subjective perspective
is given, we start from it, and by successive reflective steps we can acquire a more
objective one, as it were by climbing step by step to arrive at the next 'meta' level: 
To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or 
world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a new 
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conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its 
object. (Nagel 1986, p.4)
As one climbs the ladder of objectivity it should become clearer and clearer that the
self is part of a “world of which itself is not the center”, that its previously thought
centrality makes room for a less flattering position. The objectivity and subjectivity of
a point of view are, in this way, matters of degree. The succession of steps towards
objectivity82 is supposed to get rid of the peculiarities and the particularity of one's
point of view, such that it gradually becomes possible to take someone else's view
and, at the limit, no-one-in-particular's view – it is the view from nowhere:
Though I shall for convenience often speak of two standpoints, the 
subjective and the objective, and though the various places in which 
this opposition is found have much more in common, the distinction 
between more subjective and more objective views is really a matter 
of degree, and it covers a wide spectrum. A view or form of thought is
more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics  of the 
individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character of 
the particular type of creature he is. (Nagel 1986, p.5) 
When this  advancement  towards objectivity takes place with respect to action and
values (as opposed to theory and truth), what it produces is a new set of values, not a
new set of beliefs:
In theoretical reasoning objectivity is advanced when we form a new 
conception of reality that includes ourselves as components. This 
involves an alteration or at least an extension of our beliefs. In the 
sphere of values or practical reasoning, the problem is different. As in 
the theoretical case, we must take up a new, comprehensive viewpoint 
after stepping back and including our former perspective in what is to 
be understood. But here the new viewpoint will be not a new set of 
beliefs, but a new or extended set of values. (Nagel 1986, p.138)
82 Dancy (1993)  detects  an  ambiguity  in  Nagel's  description  of  the  “objectification”  process  and
distinguishes two meanings for Nagel's claims. Only one of the two possible interpretations will be
deemed fit for the field of ethics and its objectivity. 
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Of course, it is not possible to have a completely objective position, one that
pays  tribute  to  no  perspective,  the  perfect  view  from  nowhere.  The  process  of
gradually becoming more detached from one's own perspective (and therefore more
objective)  is  “not  a  completable  task”  (p.129).  This  detachment,  of  the  agent,  is
supposed to bring about the realization that one is just an individual among others,
with  moral standing equal to that of others:“The standpoint from which one sees
oneself  as  just  an  individual  among  others,  viewing  one's  interests  and  concerns
entirely from outside” (p.134).
All this manifests itself in the formation of impersonal values, and the 
modification of conduct and motivation in accordance with them. It 
imposes serious constraints. Values are judgments from a standpoint 
external to ourselves about how to be and how to live. Because they 
are accepted from an impersonal standpoint, they apply not only to the 
point of view of the particular person I happen to be, but generally. 
They tell me how I should live because they tell me how anyone 
should live. (Nagel 1986, p.135)
Climbing  the  ladder  of  objectivity  creates  impersonal  values,  and  it  shows  how
impersonal values are even possible. As Nagel (1986, p.138) puts it, “If we can make
judgments about how we should live even after stepping outside of ourselves, they
will provide the material  for moral  theory.”  However, Nagel admits that there are
several  ways in which things can go wrong in the process:
a) First, in taking a more and more objective standpoint, values as such might
appear illusory: “Values can seem really to disappear when we step outside
of our skins, so that it strikes us as a philosophical perception that they are
illusory” (p.141).
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b) A second, related problem, is the problem of establishing the possibility of
objective  values,  namely  to  “decide  in  what  way,  if  at  all,  the  idea  of
objectivity can be applied to practical questions, questions of what to do or
want”  (p.138).  This  seems  for  Nagel  to  be  the  essential  task  regarding
ethics: ethics has to be “saved” from the threat of subjectivity. What is at
stake  here  is  the  possibility of  an  objective  system of  ethics,  based  on
objective  values:  “I  want  now  to  defend  the  objectivity  of  ethics  by
showing how that standpoint alters and constrains our motives” (p.138)
c) A third problem may come from the other end of the process, namely from
subjectivity. Instead of acquiring distance from one's own point of view and
acknowledging other perspectives as equally important, the importance of
one's own perspective can be aggrandized and exaggerated: “I acknowledge
the  dangers  of  false  objectification,  which  elevates  personal  tastes  and
prejudices into cosmic values” (p.143).
d) The forth kind of problem regards the clash between the objective and the
subjective  point  of  view.  Nagel  admits  that,  from  a  sufficiently  large
'distance',  personal  issues  that  we  care  about  will  not  look  important
anymore. In a way that was the whole point of the objectification process,
to put things into perspective: some of our concerns will look smaller and
some will disappear this way. However, not only the unimportant concerns
may disappear; the important ones may be diminished, too:
It may be that from a standpoint sufficiently external to that of 
ordinary human life, not only chicken salad and salami but much of 
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what is important to human beings  - their hopes, projects, ambitions, 
and very survival – cannot be seen positively to matter. (Nagel 1986, 
p.131)
 Nagel indicates remedies for each of the four kinds of problems. However, I
will  only  discuss  the  last  kind  of  problem  (the  fourth)  because  this  is  where
supererogation will enter into the picture. 
Nagel's remedy for the fourth kind of problem lies in trying to keep a fine
balance  between  the  personal  and  the  impersonal  standpoint.  Our  deeply  human
concerns, which are also deeply personal (so they find themselves at odds with the
impersonal  perspective)  are  kept  in  the  picture  by  what  Nagel  calls  “objective
toleration”. The main idea is that the objective point of view can recognize personal
reasons as legitimate reasons to have, as long as they have limited claims:
(…) a strategy of objective tolerance  as opposed to objective 
affirmation – is to find grounds for acting within my personal 
perspective that will not be rejected from a larger point of view: 
grounds which the objective self can tolerate because of their limited 
pretensions to objectivity. (Nagel 1986, p.130)
The strategy of objective tolerance is, as I see it, Nagel's way of making peace
(or of running together the two kinds of values in a manner  that does not require
choosing  between  the  two)  between  the  two  sides,  namely  the  personal  and  the
impersonal standpoint. 
Some grounds for actions, claims Nagel, will not be positively endorsed when
seen in an objective light, because they are not and cannot be anyone else's ground for
action. However, they can be tolerated from the objective point of view because it is
true, objectively true, that they are subjective grounds for action. In the same way as a
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truth  can  be  told  about  a  lie,  something  objectively  impartial  can  be  said  about
partiality – this seems to be Nagel's point. But this is not the whole point because this
can be said about grounds for action that  cannot  withstand objective scrutiny and
therefore  cannot  be  objectively  tolerated.  An  inappropriate  impulse  of  anger,  for
example, can be identified on reflection, as the subjective ground for a former action,
but it will not be a “subjectively legitimate ground for action” and it cannot be the
object  of  toleration.  Toleration  of  some  subjective  grounds  for  action  is  needed
because otherwise (if those grounds would be eliminated by objective detachment)
some actions  would become incomprehensible.  Some actions  (and values)  can  be
understood only when inhabiting a subjective perspective, Nagel claims, and this why
the objective point of view cannot eliminate them, on pain of making important parts
of our human agency incomprehensible.83 
From the objective point of view my preference for chocolate  over vanilla
does not make much sense, it cannot be seen as a general ground for action (not even
for my own action in general; it only makes sense for-me-when-choosing-ice-cream,
i.e. in very particular circumstances). But it is rational to tolerate it (and therefore
include it among my subjective reasons) from a  detached point of view, if I do not
claim  it to have a higher significance than one particular quirk of taste. The problem
becomes more complicated when the object of objective toleration is not taste in food,
but “hopes, projects, ambitions”. They pass the test of objectification, according to
Nagel,  because  the  actions  justified  by  hopes,  projects,  ambitions  “will  be  fully
83 This reminds one of the saying that you have to walk in someone's shoes to really understand them.
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comprehensible  only from a particular  perspective  within  the world”  (p.140),  and
therefore they will be deemed “subjectively legitimate grounds for action” (p.131).
 One consequence of the objective toleration  strategy is  that  agent-relative
values and agent-relative reasons are seen as legitimate grounds for  moral action.
Nagel makes room for the personal side of ethics, namely for agent-relative values
and agent-relative reasons:
A second respect in which reasons vary is in their relativity to the 
agent, the person for whom they are reasons. The distinction between 
reasons that are relative to the agent and reasons that are not is an 
extremely important one. If a reason can be given a general form 
which does not include an essential reference to the person who has it, 
it is an agent-neutral reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to
do or want something that it would reduce the amount of wretchedness
in the world, then that is a neutral reason. If on the other hand the 
general form of a reason does include an essential reference to the 
person who has it, it is an agent-relative reason. (Nagel 1986, pp.152-
3)
He  believes  that  what  people  have  reasons  to  do is  based  not  only  on
impersonal values but also on agent-relative values: “ethics is not based solely on
impersonal values (…) We can no more assume that all values are impersonal than all
reality is physical” (p.163). 
A  consequence  of  Nagel's  attempt  to  have  a  peaceful  compromise  is  his
argument that the three most common types of agent-relative reasons can be seen as
objective reasons (they are less objective that the impersonal ones but more objective
than the purely subjective ones) even though they are, indeed, relative to the agent.
Their  status as objective  reasons guarantees  that  they are legitimate reasons to be
taken into account alongside with the agent-neutral reasons:
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a) reasons of  autonomy – “stem from desires,  projects,  commitments,  and
personal ties of the individual agent, all of which give him reasons to act in
the pursuit of ends that are his own” (p.165); 
b)  reasons of  deontology (somehow misleadingly named so) – “stem from
claims of other persons not to be maltreated” (p.165);
c) reasons of obligation – that are actually reasons of special obligations one
has towards parents, children, spouses.
Another  aspect  of  his  peaceful  attitude  and  compromise  between  sides  is
Nagel's view that from the impersonal point of view itself, the personal point of view
has some justification, its own rational place. As a consequence the impersonal claims
are not limited simply by the force of the personal claims, but they suffer a kind of
limitation from within: 
But I believe an answer can be sought from the impartial standpoint of 
morality, which will give to everyone a dispensation for a certain 
degree of partiality – in recognition of the fact that it is only one aspect
of the human perspective. Like reason, the moral standpoint should try 
to recognize and explain its own limits. (Nagel 1986, p.202)
All  these  elements  –  the  objective  toleration  strategy,  recognizing  the
objectivity of agent-relative reasons, the objective standpoint limiting itself and giving
dispensations  for  degrees  of  partiality  –  are  elements  meant  to  ensure  a  peaceful
cohabitation  between  parts.  This  picture,  of  a  compromise  between  impartial  and
partial standpoints, is one which is meant to be close to actual ethical decisions made
by agents. 
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However, Nagel is quite aware that the peace cannot last, and that the conflict
can be only partially prevented by these moves.84 The conflict becomes particularly
acute in his discussion of how the impartial/impersonal  standpoint may drastically
affect the achievement of a good life for the agent. Nagel claims that “It is clear that a
strongly impersonal morality, with any significant requirements of impartiality,  can
pose a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable”
(p.190). And this is because impersonal morality may be at times very demanding,
claiming resources that the agent might otherwise prefer to dedicate to his own plans.
Nagel believes this is an every day occurrence in our moral lives: any purchase of
clothing, wine, theater tickets, vacations, gifts, books (his examples) may be said to
be at fault from the point of view of an impersonal morality because the money used
to buy them could bring, for example, famine relief in other parts of the world. And
this  is  the  domain  of  beneficence,  where  supererogation  enters  the  discussion
naturally.
3.8. Nagel  on Supererogation
When considering the demands of impersonal morality against the  personal
sphere of the agent one is placed before a dialectical arena of grand proportions. The
main  question  is  how  the  agent's  resources  should  be  allocated:  exclusively  in
84 Nagel (1986, p.185) writes: “This is a true philosophical dilemma; it arises out of our nature, which
includes different points of view on the world. (…) I believe the human duality of perspective is too
deep for us reasonably to hope to overcome it. A fully agent-neutral morality is not a plausible
human goal.”
146
accordance with the public, impersonal good, meant to benefit everyone, or according
to a more nuanced way of seeing things, that would allow the agent to sometimes go
against the impersonal way of seeing the good. Two main ways of going against the
impersonal good are usually taken into account: what has been called “options” and
“constraints”.  Options  are  similar  to  Nagel's  reasons of  autonomy and reasons of
special obligation- they are permissions granted to the agent to not act in accordance
with  the  general  good,  when  important  personal  plans  or  other  important  human
relations  would  be  at  disadvantage.  Constraints  are  similar  to  Nagel's  reasons  of
deontology – in that they forbid the agent to harm someone even if an impersonal
good would be obtained this way. Positions like Slote's (1984) and Scheffler's (1982)
want to keep the image of morality as based on a calculation of impersonal good, but
they also want to design a system closer to commonsense morality,  that would not
accept extreme sacrifices for the common good to be a matter of moral obligation.
Therefore,  they  introduce  various  kinds  of  options  for  the  agent,  such  that,  for
example extreme sacrifices would not be demanded anymore. Voices like Williams
(1981), Wolf (1979) or Railton (1984), while they differ among themselves, would
rally  against  the  idea  that  the  demands  of  impersonal  morality  have  an  a  priori
prevalence when compared with personal standpoints. They consider the demands of
impersonal morality as alienating for the moral agent. 
In this grand battle over how far the demands of impersonal morality can go,
supererogation is a small but central  point. Those demands of impersonal morality
that are deemed to be exaggerated, too demanding, are usually what common sense
morality describes as “supererogatory” (because they involve an action with a morally
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excellent result involving a serious sacrifice on the part of the agent). In a way, the
whole dispute is about the possibility of supererogation. 
My main task in this section is to establish where is Nagel situated in this
ample dispute. This is not an easy thing to do because Nagel is trying to walk a fine
line between personal and impersonal standpoints in order to leave the two in what he
considers to be their natural state: in tension. His path to this result is quite sinuous,
but I will  try to describe it  step by step. First,  he would seem to have a standard
moderate  position  by  accepting  both  standpoints,  personal  and  impersonal,  as
legitimate  moral  consideration.  But  he  cannot  maintain  this  position  because  his
whole enterprise, from the start, is a search for the impersonal viewpoint, a search for
“the view from nowhere” as a guarantee of unbiased truth and objectivity. Therefore,
in the end, he returns to his preference to the objective standpoint and this where
things start to look inhospitable for supererogation. I will detail these steps in what
follows.
 To repeat, the first step is to accept the credentials of the personal standpoint.
Nagel seems to be one of the authors who would agree that the agent is justified
sometimes  in  going  against  the  recommendations  of  the  impersonal  good.  He
explicitly rejects the stricter line of argument, the one saying that the difficulty of the
task imposed by impersonal morality does not justify reducing those requirements:
One might take the severe line that moral requirements result from a 
correct assessment of the weight of good and evil, impersonally 
revealed, that it is our job to bring our motives into the line with this, 
and that if we cannot do it because of personal weakness, this shows 
not that the requirements are excessive but that we are bad (…).
I do not believe this because even though morality has to emerge from 
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an impersonal standpoint, that standpoint must take into account the 
kind of complex beings for whom it is being devised. The impersonal 
is only one aspect of their nature, not the whole of it. What is 
reasonable to ask of them, and what is impersonally expected of them, 
should reflect this. (Nagel 1986, p.202)
From Kagan's (1989) critical point of view, for example, Nagel counts as a
Moderate, namely someone who admits in his theory both options and constraints as
exceptions from the requirements of the impersonal good and who would be, in this
way, closer to commonsense morality. The usual reason  given by a moderate is that
the sacrifice required from the agent amounts to something far too demanding to be
reasonable:
Many acts which would lead to the best results overall nonetheless are 
not required of us by ordinary morality, typically because the sacrifice 
would be too great to demand it of us. I am not required to devote my 
free time to fighting political oppression, nor must I give up my 
luxuries to support cancer research. On this view morality permits me 
to favor those things I most care about—whether my own welfare, the 
welfare of others, or any projects to which I am committed. (Kagan 
1989, p.3)
From Nagel's (1986, p.202) claim that "it is unreasonable to expect people in
general to sacrifice themselves and those to whom they have close personal ties to the
general good", one might get the impression that indeed, according to Nagel, agent-
relative reasons stemming from the personal side would have to sometimes defeat the
agent-neutral  reasons  that  an  agent  might  have  to  follow  the  impersonal  good.
However, Nagel's position is more complicated than that. He wants to be able to claim
some kind of  universal  superiority  of  the  impersonal  point  of  view,  so  he is  not
willing  to  let  the  impersonal  standpoint  be  defeated  by  reasons  stemming  from
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concerns about the well -being of the agent, even if he admits that the demands of the
impersonal morality may drastically reduce well-being:
The moral life overrides the good life. (…) The idea is not that 
morality will necessarily conflict with the good life but that it can, 
and when it does it provides us with sufficient reason to sacrifice our 
own good. (Nagel 1986, p.196)
Nagel does not deny that sometimes the moral life (i.e. the impersonal standpoint)
may be quite demanding, but he insists that even if the impartial morality is not the
best choice regarding the agent's well-being, it is, nevertheless, the best choice within
the rational domain.
My position resembles that of Wolf. She discusses the relation between
the moral point of view and the point of view of individual perfection, 
and calls into question “the assumption that it is always better to be 
morally better”. (…) Where I part from her, as I explain below, is in 
my hope that there is some way of preserving the priority of moral 
requirements – if not of moral considerations generally – in 
determining how is it rational to live, though not how it is good to live.
(Nagel 1986, p.197, fn.6)
Nagel does not claim that the rational superiority of impersonal morality is
indubitable. It is for him something closer to a hope or an aspiration: “I am inclined
strongly to hope, and less strongly to believe, that the correct morality will always
have the preponderance of reasons on its side, even though it needn't coincide with
the good life” (Nagel 1986, p.199). This aspiration makes sense because the whole
discussion about ethics started with the intention of defending the  possibility of an
objective ethics. Objectivity, therefore, has to be the more valuable side of the two. 
However, Nagel clearly feels the pull of the other side, fearing that, in these
theoretical circumstances, some moral decisions would be rightly labeled irrational
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for the agent to make. If the moral life always overrides the good life, this means that
it should be so even in very extreme situations, when choosing to be moral comes at
very high personal price.  Nevertheless, choosing the impersonal moral choice has to
be rational, indeed the best rational choice according to Nagel:
I have claimed that requirements of morality can conflict with the good
life, and that this is not a legitimate ground for rejecting a morality. On
the other hand, my own view is that the correctness of a morality is put
in doubt if it would sometimes be irrational to accede to its demands 
(though the idea of such morality is not incoherent) . There is pressure 
from the moral standpoint itself to adjust those demands so that they 
converge with the condition of full human rationality, though not the 
condition of a good life. (Nagel 1986, pp.204-5)
Therefore, what Nagel wants to be able to say is that:
A) The requirements of impersonal morality may conflict with the good life by
demanding considerable sacrifices from the agent.85
B) It is always rational to choose the action indicated by impersonal morality
over the indications of the good life.
The next section will detail the consequences of these tenets for supererogation. 
85 For example, Nagel (1986, p.197) claims: “While doing the right thing is part of living well it is not
the whole of it, nor even the dominant part: because the impersonal standpoint that acknowledges
the claims of morality is only one aspect of a normal individual among others. And there are times
when doing  the  right  thing  may cost  more  in  terms  of  other  aspects  of  the  good  life  than  it
contributes to the good life in its own right.“
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3.9. Nagel, Rationality and the Limitations of Human Nature
Once he has established that the impersonal viewpoint has to win in matters of
morality (to repeat, after walking a fine line between the two, Nagel ultimately takes
sides in this way), Nagel's main worry is to tackle the problem of the demandingness
of the moral impersonal viewpoint. In other words, it is going to be very costly for the
well-being of the agent to be morally required to obey the impersonal demands of
morality. In some cases, Nagel, worries, it is going to be so costly for the agent, that
the moral action may be deemed irrational. And this, he cannot allow. His way out is
to  make  the  very costly  moral  actions (i.e.  what  we usually call  'supererogatory')
optional, in  a  rather  complicated  manner,  namely by a “compromise  between out
lower and higher selves”. 
In order to have both A) and B) , i.e. in order to say both that morality is
demanding  and that it  is nevertheless always rational to choose the morally better
option, Nagel has to be able to claim that choosing the impersonal morality over the
good life is unlikely to be seen as irrational.86 In other words, Nagel has to find a way
to  prevent the situation where the sacrifice demanded by impersonal morality will be
so drastic that it cannot be rational for the agent to have  an obligation to obey the
demand. The strategy that offers a way out of this dilemma, thinks Nagel, turns some
requirements  into  mere  options,  this  being  a  “modification  to  accommodate  the
normal limitations of human nature”. 
It is an attempt to make the best of an unsatisfactory situation. Insofar 
86 It is not clear to me if Nagel takes into account a possible difference between  unreasonable and
irrational. He does not mention such a distinction explicitly in The View from Nowhere. 
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as it reduces the requirements of impersonal morality, this will reflect 
an attitude of tolerance and realism about human nature, rather than 
the conviction that to act on a more demanding requirement would be 
irrational or wrong. The idea is that certain demands on the ordinary 
individual – to overcome his own needs, commitments, and 
attachments in favor of impersonal claims that he can also recognize – 
are unreasonable in a way that can be impersonally acknowledged. 
(Nagel 1986, p.203)
The reduction, therefore, consists in weakening some impersonal requirements
to make the action optional. However, this does not mean that making the demanded
sacrifice  (i.e.  following the  impersonal  recommendation)  would  be  irrational.  The
fault  of 'irrationality'  seems to reside,  for Nagel,  not in  the task  per se,  but in its
deontic  status,  in  being  required.  Of  course,  when  an  extraordinary  good  deed
involving sacrifice is merely optional, not required, then this is a clear cut instance of
supererogation. Supererogation is not only a fitting example for Nagel, but also the
proof  that  common sense already has  such provisions  and modifications  in  place,
because they are the natural way to proceed:
But this does not mean that it would be irrational for someone who can 
do so to accept demands, or rather to impose them on himself. So this 
aspect of impersonal morality may throw light on the puzzling subject 
of supererogation. Supererogatory virtue is shown by acts of 
exceptional sacrifice for the benefits of others. Such acts are 
praiseworthy and not regarded as irrational, but they are not thought to 
be either morally or rationally required. What is it about them that 
makes them good, indeed exceptionally good, and provides a reason for
doing them, without at the same time providing a reason against not 
doing them that would make such a failure rationally unjustified and 
bad? (Nagel 1986, p.203)
Nagel's  formulation  in  the  above  quote   looks  quite  similar  to  the
commonsensical formulation of the problem of supererogation. But, I will argue, it is
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a deceptive similarity. Here Nagel seems to put  the usual worry about supererogation
in  terms  of  reasons:  “What  is  it  about  them  that  makes  them  good,  indeed
exceptionally good, and provides a reason for doing them, without at the same time
providing a reason against not doing them that would make such a failure rationally
unjustified and bad?” One might  notice that there are  two related questions being
asked here:
a) what makes supererogatory actions good and provides reason for them; and
b) what makes supererogatory actions the kind of good actions that can be
omitted, without the omission being rationally unjustified or bad.
My point is this: the generic form of the problem of supererogation (i.e. its
commonsensical, imprecise formulation) worries about the second question, namely
about b) – because it worries about the omission of a good act not being imputable.
The question of how one can explain that an excellent moral deed is not obligatory, is
actually,  a  question about  what  consequences  are  appropriate  (if  any)  in  case the
agent chooses to omit the action. That is because, usually, obligation is understood as
something that cannot be ignored without consequences.  
By contrast, Nagel's main worry is the first question, namely point a) 'what
makes  supererogatory  actions  good  and  provides  reason  for  them';  only  then,  as
secondary, is point b)  taken into discussion. I believe this is so because Nagel's main
worry at  this  point  is  the  irrationality of  some highly moral  good deeds (that  are
being required by the impersonal point of view). He claimed that impersonal morality
can have  a  high  cost  and,  at  the  same  time,  that  it  is  always  rational  to  choose
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morality. He is concerned with defending the latter claim here. His point is to show
that  common sense does not  consider  supererogatory acts  irrational.  According to
common sense, acting supererogatorily is optional, but one may go on and be a hero
and that will be laudable, not irrational. Nagel believes this illustrates his thesis that
doing what the impersonal standpoint indicates as good, is usually considered rational
(and laudable),87 even in extreme cases. The paragraph mentioning supererogation as
an example begins by saying “But this does not mean that it would be irrational for
someone who can do so to accept demands, or rather to impose them on himself.”88
Therefore, I think that Nagel's version of the problem of supererogation is,
actually, 'how can one explain that following impersonal morality by doing something
with high moral value that involves serious sacrifice (and thereby hurting the well-
being of the agent) is most of the time considered to be rational – as one can see in
the common employment of the concept of supererogation?' 
3.9.1. Nagel's Answer to the Problem of Supererogation
His  answer  to  this  problem  is  a  bit  convoluted.  I  think  Nagel  takes  the
commonsensical  status  of  supererogation  as  a  premise.  He  seems  to  claim  that
because one usually takes supererogatory action to be rational, this means that the
action  was  not  irrational  or  in  other  words,  not  done  in  spite  of  reasons  to  the
contrary. This means that, according to Nagel, heroic (for example) action is not done
87 See Hampton (1993) about sacrifices that are nor rational or moral. 
88   Nagel (1986, p.203).
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by contradicting a balance of reasons inclining towards the personal side (on the side
of agent's well-being). In other words, if we take heroic action to be reasonable it is
because it conforms to reasons, namely agent-neutral reasons given by the impartial
morality. Let me explain this in more detail. 
According to Nagel, there are three possible situations in a confrontation of
opposing reasons:  the   reasons  against  the  action  are  decisive  (and therefore  the
action is irrational) or the reasons for the action are decisive (and therefore the action
is rationally required) or neither kinds of reasons are decisive and, in this case, the
action is neither irrational or required:
Where a number of different and opposing reasons bear on a decision, 
there are three possible outcomes with regard to the rationality of the 
alternatives. Either the reasons against may be decisive enough so that
the act would be irrational; or the reasons for may be decisive enough 
so that the act is rationally required; or there may be enough reasons 
both for and against so that although the act is not rationally required, 
it would not be irrational either (…). (Nagel 1986, p.200)
One  might  think,  following  his  characterization  of  supererogation,  that
supererogation will be placed by Nagel in the third, non-decisive case, because acting
supererogatorily is neither irrational nor required. However, according to Nagel, this
is (surprisingly) incorrect. He argues that this is not the case because the two sides
(personal and impersonal) do not have, in the case of supererogation,  relatively equal
weight. And they do not have equal weight  because one obviously has reason on its
side:  “After  all,  someone  who  does  not  make  these  sacrifices  is  failing  to  do
something  that  he  does  have  a  morally  estimable  reason  to  do.  Morality  is  not
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indifferent  between his doing it and his not doing it”.89 Supererogation cannot be a
case in which the  balance of reasons inclines towards the personal side, either. If it
were so, then abstaining from the heroic act would be required and doing the heroic
act would be irrational. But we usually do not take heroic acts to be irrational or, for
that matter, believe the omission of the act to be required. Therefore, the absence of
the requirement to behave heroically cannot be attributed to the personal side winning
the battle of reasons. That is to say, if there is no requirement to act supererogatorily,
this is not because  the reasons for acting supererogatorily were defeated by opposing
reasons.
There  remains  just  one  other  possibility  (out  of  three  listed  above):  that
supererogation is a case of reasons inclining towards the heroic action. How can one
explain, then, that the heroic action is not required? Nagel considers that this is not a
matter  of  reasons defeating  other  reasons,  but  a  matter  of  objective  tolerance,  a
tolerance  that  makes  us  concede that  extraordinary  moral  acts  involving sacrifice
cannot be required from agents,  even if  they are what impartial  reasons require.90
Therefore, the heroic action is rational in spite of being harmful to the good life of the
agent because: first, it is in accordance with the balance of reasons; and second, the
requirements  presented  by  these  reasons  have  been  modified  and  reduced  to
accommodate  “the  normal  limitations  of  human  nature”  thereby  resulting  in  the
optional status of the heroic action:
(...) supererogatory virtue is adherence to the claims of impersonal 
morality prior to their modification to accommodate the normal 
89 Nagel (1986, p.204).
90 I'm afraid that I agree with Dancy's criticism (1993) that this position sounds almost as saying that
there are “requirements that do not require”.
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limitations of human nature. This modification takes the form of a 
relaxation of these requirements through tolerance, as it were, rather 
than the discovery of new moral reasons that outweigh the original 
impersonal ones. If they had been outweighed, then there would be 
reasons against the type of sacrifice that displays supererogatory virtue:
it would be wrong. As things are, it is merely not required. And those 
who undertake it nonetheless are praiseworthy for submitting 
themselves to the true strength of reasons that they could not 
reasonably be required to follow strictly, given the mixed character of 
human motives. (Nagel 1986, p.204)        
There are two comments that I think are important for understanding Nagel's
attitude  towards  supererogation.  First,  that  the  problem  of  supererogation  is,  not
surprisingly,  split  into  two  successive  problems. The  first  problem  (and  most
important  for  Nagel)  is  how  can  one  explain  that  doing  a  heroic  action  is  not
irrational (heroic action, for example, may endanger the well-being or even the life of
the agent; being required to perform such a sacrifice may be regarded, therefore as
irrational).  The second problem stems from the solution given to  the first:  if  one
accepts that heroic action is not irrational because it aligns with reasons given by the
impersonal side, then how can one explain that heroic action is not required. Only
this, latter problem closely resembles the commonsensical version of the problem of
supererogation. The former problem is nowhere on the radar of the commonsensical
view and this is why I think it can be considered a different (even though related)
problem of supererogation.
My second comment is that I do not think Nagel's appeal to supererogation
works as intended. He seems to regard supererogation as a vindication of his point by
commonsense  morality,  namely  that  usually  we  do  not  regard  doing  the
supererogatory action as irrational (even though it is difficult and not required). This
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much  is  true.  However,  I  think  he  might  have  used  a  different  concept  of
supererogation   (different  from the  commonsensical  one,  that  is).  It  is  true  that,
according  to  common  sense,  supererogatory  action  is  not  irrational,  and  it  is  not
required.  However,  Nagel's  way of  presenting  supererogation  as  “not  required”  is
quite peculiar. For Nagel, heroic action is not required just because of the “weakness
of human nature”. It sounds as though one actually should behave supererogatory but
is  allowed  not  to,  not  as  a  legitimate  permission,  but  as  an  excuse.91 In  the
commonsensical  picture  one  does  not  need  to  be  excused for  not  acting
supererogatorily.92 Nagel does not speak consistently in this  manner.  Sometimes it
sounds as if objective toleration is a legitimate limitation of the requirements imposed
by the impersonal standpoint. Moreover, Nagel sometimes claims that the impersonal
standpoint limits itself and recognizes the legitimacy of the personal side's claims. If
the  impersonal  standpoint  recognizes  the  claims  of  the  personal  standpoint  as
legitimate, then nothing in this picture implies (yet) the inferiority of the standpoint
being  recognized  as  legitimate  (on  the  contrary,  it  would  seem an  acceptance  of
equality regarding importance or at least,  legitimacy).  However, Nagel employs,  at
times, expressions that leave no doubt about the fact that he considers the claims of
the impersonal point of view as more desirable  and superior to the other point of
view. The personal point of view is being accepted into the picture as a compromise
91 A point was made to me in conversation at the Virginia Philosophical Association (Oct. 2015) that
how Nagel sees our “human weakness” looks less like an excuse, and more like general amnesty
92 My interpretation of Nagel's point of view is, again, not far from Dancy's (1993). It seems to me
that  "normal  limitations of  human nature"  have  the  role  of  an  excuse  in  front  of  what  would
otherwise be legitimate demands of impersonal morality. Even if we "strike a bargain between our
higher and lower selves in arriving at an acceptable morality", as Nagel wants, the "lower self" is
the one concerning the personal side, the one we should be embarrassed about. It is a compromise,
not the way things should be. But this is not what supererogation is about. Intuitively, in clear cases
of supererogation no excuse is needed if someone decides not to act supererogatorily, because the
omission is not wrong. 
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because it represents our “weaker” side of humanity, our “lower self”, in contrast with
the purity of impartiality: 
We must so to speak strike a bargain between our higher and lower 
selves in arriving at an acceptable morality. In this way the gap 
between moral and more comprehensively rational requirements can 
be narrowed. It means that there is an impersonal sanction for striking 
the balance between personal and impersonal reasons in a certain way. 
(Nagel 1986, p.202)
In other words, heroic action is not required because humans are weak, not
because it should not be required. And this line of thought is made even clearer by
Nagel's claim that moral progress consists in accepting more and more impersonal
claims, by compromising less with the personal side.  Of course, this way of ranking
the personal and the impersonal is understandable because Nagel's project is being
designed from the start as a defense of the objectivity of ethics. Nevertheless, I think
his argument based on the commonsensical view of supererogation fails because his
is not the commonsensical view of supererogation. 
3.10. Conclusion: Nagel on Supererogation and Its Problems
The main idea in The View From Nowhere is the confrontation between the
personal perspective and the neutral  perspective.  Thomas Nagel is,  without doubt,
aware of  the standoff  between what  he calls  "personal  and impersonal  claims"  in
moral  activity.  As  I  said  before,  he  does  not  even  accept  that  this  thesis,  of  the
confrontation between the two, is only a possible frame of thinking. For Nagel, this is
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just the reality of the lived moral life, a problem that confronts us no matter what we
believe. His solution to this problem is a kind of compromise between “the objective
and the subjective standpoint”, namely the method of “objective toleration” because
“it is unreasonable to expect people in general to sacrifice themselves and those to
whom they have close personal ties to the general good”.93 For Nagel, the two sides
do not  necessarily  exclude  each other:  one can see the  justification  for  “personal
claims”  even  if  one  takes  the  impersonal  point  of  view.  Therefore  from  the
impersonal point of view itself, the personal point of view has some justification, its
own  rational  place.  As  a  consequence,  for  Nagel,  the  impersonal  claims  are  not
limited simply by the force of the personal claims, but they suffer a kind of limitation
from within: “Like reason, the moral standpoint should try to recognize and explain
its own limits”.94 Supererogatory action is, for Nagel, a manifestation of the objective,
impersonal standpoint whenever this standpoint is not limited by tolerance for human
weakness.
The main point in invoking supererogation is to show that moral action (even
the one implying heavy sacrifice) is not irrational. Therefore Nagel's version of the
problem of supererogation is to ask  how one can justify that supererogatory action
involving harm to the agent is not deemed irrational. His answer to this problem
immediately  gives  rise  to  another  problem (hence  my  claim  that  the  problem of
supererogation  is  actually  split  into  two  different  problems): if  heroic  action  is
rational because it obeys impartial reasons, then how can one explain the fact that it
93 Nagel (1986, p.202).
94   Nagel (1986, p.203).
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is  optional? The  answer  to  this  second  question  is  to  weaken  requirements  by
objective toleration in order to accommodate “human weakness”. 
One may notice that Nagel's solution to his problem of supererogation falls
outside the balance of reasons: heroic action is not required  not  because there are
reasons against it, defeating the reasons that would require it; but because objective
toleration  intervenes  as a strategy from outside the balance  of reasons and makes
heroic action merely optional (to accommodate the demands of the personal side).
3.11. Raz and Supererogation
In Practical Reasons and Norms, Joseph Raz set himself an ambitious aim: “a
logical theory of practical conflict”.95 Supererogation is not obviously connected to
this task. Nevertheless, once one is reminded that the problem of supererogation can
be seen as a conflict between what the agent has reason to do and what the agent is
permitted not to do, presenting supererogation as a particular case of conflict between
reasons makes sense. Previous positions about the problem of supererogation could
also be seen in terms of conflict: between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons
(Dancy 1993) or between personal and impersonal standpoints (Nagel 1986).
Raz has one of the clearest formulations of the problem of supererogation in
terms of reasons:
One important characteristic of supererogatory acts (…) is that their 
performance is praiseworthy while their omission is not blameworthy. 
But this creates a problem. If doing a supererogatory act is 
95   Raz (1975b, p.36).
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praiseworthy there must be reason for doing it, and the reasons must 
outweigh any conflicting reasons for not doing it. But if there are 
conclusive reasons for performing the act then not to perform it is to 
act against the balance of reasons. If reason requires that the act be 
done then surely one ought to do it, and the “ought” is based on all the 
reasons which apply to the case; it is a conclusive ought. But this 
entails that failing to perform the act is failing to do what one ought 
(conclusively) to do, so why isn't it blameworthy not to perform a 
supererogatory act? (Raz 1975a, p.164)
My  first  comment  regarding  his  manner  of  framing  the  problem  of
supererogation is that the supererogatory action is called “praiseworthy” instead of
“good”.  This  changes  some nuances,  but  it  does  not  change  the  connection  with
reasons: being praiseworthy guarantees  having reason for doing the action,  in the
same way being morally good usually guarantees having reasons for doing it.96 My
second comment is that the general commonsensical question “How can one explain
the  permission  to  omit  something  morally  good?”  is  replaced  with  the  more
theoretically  laden  question  “why  isn't  it  blameworthy  not  to  perform  a
supererogatory  act?”.  Also,  all  reference  to  “duty”  or  going  beyond  a  certain
threshold is missing, as the normative force of “what one ought to do” is represented
simply by having reasons for doing. 
Before analyzing Raz's solution to the problem, I think one of his remarks is
interesting to note. Raz takes into account the possibility of an anti-supererogationist
reply,  namely to say that not doing the prescribed praiseworthy action is, actually,
blameworthy.  In  other  words,  he  ponders  the  kind  of  answer  that  challenges  the
question: there is no explanation for the agent's being allowed to omit the good deed
96 Raz (1975a,  p.166) explicitly admits that  he is  working under the following assumption: “The
fundamental assumption on which my argument is based is that if p is valuable then everyone who
can do so has a reason to do whatever will make the occurrence of p more likely.”
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because the agent is not, actually, allowed to omit the good deed. Raz's reply is, I
think, quite illuminating for the kind of problem he is taking himself to pursue. This
is because his answer shows that he does not take himself to be involved in a problem
regarding the existence of supererogatory action, but its logical possibility:
One way out of the problem is to concede that it is blameworthy not to
perform such acts and to maintain that there are no supererogatory 
acts. This answer may be correct, but even if correct it fails to solve 
the problem. Even if those who believe that there are supererogatory 
acts are mistaken, they are not incoherent. Those who criticize their 
views are exposing a moral mistake, not a logical inconsistency. How, 
therefore, is supererogation to be explained? (Raz 1975a, p.164)
Therefore,  I  think  Raz  takes  very  seriously  the  first  part  of  his  question  about
supererogation, namely the part that asks 'how can one explain (...)'. What he means
by that phrase turns out to be something like 'can both claims about supererogation
(i.e. that one can be both praiseworthy for doing and not blameworthy for not doing
the same good action) be made in a theoretically coherent picture?' rather than 'is it
true that one can be both praiseworthy for doing and not blameworthy for not doing
the same good action?'. By contrast, Nagel took himself to solve a problem about the
reality97 of our ethical lives when he was trying to solve his version of the problem of
supererogation. This is not to say that Nagel was a fully convinced supererogationist.
That would be a bit simplistic. Of course, Nagel takes himself to have a theory that is
supported by the existence of what he calls “supererogation”. However, I have argued
that  the  supererogation  he believes  in  is  quite  different  from the  one invoked by
common sense. 
97 Nagel  did not express doubt about the existence of supererogation, i.e. he took it to be a well-
established  thesis  of   common  sense  that  there  are  deeds  that  one  can  rightfully  call
“supererogatory”. 
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The way Raz thinks the two claims about supererogation (i.e. praiseworthiness
for  action,  and lack  of  blameworthiness  for  non-action)  could  be  both coherently
entertained (i.e. his solution to his problem of supererogation) is also a step towards
making a more general point in his theory about conflict of reasons. The reason why
he is interested in supererogation is because it shows that his theory of second-order
reasons is useful, namely it is useful in solving the problem of supererogation. Let me
explain  how second-order  reasons  and  supererogation  are  connected  for  Raz.  He
thinks  reasons  can  come  into  conflict  in  more  than  one  way.  The  usual  way of
thinking about conflicting reasons is in terms of opposing weights:
According to our intuitive conception of practical conflicts such 
conflicts are to be resolved by assessing the relative strength or weight
of the conflicting reasons and determining what ought to be done on 
the balance of reasons. To put it another way, one ought always to do 
whatever one has a conclusive reason for doing. Or, which is another 
way of saying the same, one ought always to act on the balance of 
reasons. (Raz 1975b, p.36)
However,  he  thinks  there  is  at  least  one  other  way in  which  reasons  may  be  in
conflict. This is because, Raz thinks, one can have not only  reasons for or  reasons
against doing a certain action, but also reasons about other reasons (to take them into
account or not). The latter  are second-order reasons and the former are first-order
reasons: “A second-order reason is any reason to act for a reason or to refrain from
acting for a reason.”98 In tackling supererogation, one will be interested only in the
second kind of second-order reasons, namely in reasons to refrain from acting for a
reason, named by Raz  exclusionary reasons: “An exclusionary reason is a second-
98    Raz (1975b, p. 39).
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order  reason  to  refrain  from  acting  for  some  reason.”99 Raz  gives  the  following
example of exclusionary reason: let us suppose that an agent is has to make a decision
about  an  investment.  However,  there  is  a  narrow  window  of  opportunity  and  a
decision has to be made in a couple of hours. The agent is tired, emotionally drained,
after a hard day. Even though she can take into consideration reasons for and reasons
against,  she does not trust her judgment right now. Raz claims that what happens
when the agent says that she cannot trust herself to make a correct judgment in the
circumstances,  is,  actually,  that  the  agent  gives  reasons  for  disregarding  other
reasons:“She claims to have a reason for not acting on the balance of reasons.”100 
The notion of an exclusionary reason is not straightforwardly helpful for the
problem of supererogation. Supererogation, by allowing the agent to omit the action,
seems to entitle  the agent not to act  on the balance of reasons (which balance of
reasons is in favor of the action, because it is a praiseworthy action). However, if the
reason why the  praiseworthy action  was  omitted  will  be seen  as  an  exclusionary
reason, then the agent would be required to omit the action101 (i.e. it would be wrong
to  do  the  action).  What  is  needed,  then,  is  not  an  exclusionary  reason,  but  an
exclusionary permission:
How can one be permitted to refrain from action which is required by 
reason? The solution is to be found in the notion of an exclusionary 
permission. The permission to refrain from performing a 
supererogatory act is an exclusionary permission, a permission not to 
act on certain reasons. An act is a supererogatory act only if it is an act
99   Raz (1975b, p.39).
100   Raz (1975b, p.38).
101 Raz (1975b, p.40) has a principle according to which the second-order reasons always win if they
are about first-order reasons that are conclusive: “Such conflicts are resolved not by the strength of
the competing reasons  but  by a general  principle of  practical  reasoning which  determines  that
exclusionary reasons always prevail, when in conflict with first-order reasons.” 
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which on the balance of reasons one ought to do and yet one is 
permitted not to act on the balance of reasons. (Raz 1975a, p.165)
An exclusionary permission102 is also a second-order entity taking first-order
reasons as its objects. An exclusionary permission cannot require the agent to omit an
action (in the way an exclusionary reason does), it can merely give permission to omit
the action:
Exclusionary permissions differ from exclusionary reasons in that they
do not entail that one ought to disregard the excluded reasons. They 
merely entitle one to do so. I act against reason if I do not disregard 
reasons excluded by an exclusionary reason, whereas I am not acting 
against reason when I act on reasons which I am merely permitted to 
disregard. (Raz 1975b, p.90)
An  example  of  exclusionary  permission  (other  than  supererogatory  action)  is,
according to Raz, your giving someone permission to harm you.103 As there are first-
order reasons against  harming,  the exclusionary permission allows an agent  to  go
against those reasons, but it cannot require the agent to do so. 
Raz  addresses  the  worry  that  exclusionary  permissions  might  have  a
paradoxical appearance, but he thinks there is no paradox as long as we keep in mind
that there are different levels to be taken into consideration:
That reason entitles one to act against the balance of reasons may be 
thought paradoxical. The appearance of paradox disappears if it is 
102 Raz (1975b,  p.90) discusses  other  two kinds of  permissions and  the  difference  between them:
“There is yet a third way of justifying permissions. I am permitted to perform an act despite the fact
that  there  are  conclusive  reasons  for  not  performing  it  if  I  may  disregard  those  reasons.  A
permission of this kind differs from a weak permission which is based on the absence of conclusive
reasons for not performing the act.  It  also differs  from a permission based on an exclusionary
reason in that I do not have a reason requiring that I shall disregard conflicting reasons. I merely
may do so. I shall call such permissions exclusionary permissions.” 
103 Raz does not discuss if the supererogation case there is a difference between giving yourself an
exclusionary permission and giving someone else an exclusionary permission. I think it would be an
interesting discussion. 
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realized that to assert that an exclusionary permission is valid is not to 
assert that unreasonableness is reasonable, it is to assert that reasons of 
one level entitle disregarding reasons of another level. (Raz 1975a, 
p.167)
How,  then,  is  the  idea  of  an  exclusionary  permission  going  to  solve  the
problem of supererogation as seen by Raz? To recall, a solution had to be able to put
together coherently both the praiseworthiness of doing the heroic act and the lack of
blame for not doing the heroic act. It is clear how exclusionary permission explains
the  lack  of  blame  in  case  of  inaction:  the  agent  is  entitled  by  this  second-order
permission104 to go against the balance of first-order reasons. However, Raz claims,
the reason to act heroically is not overridden by the exclusionary permission. This is
because  the  relation  between  first-order  reasons  and  second-order  exclusionary
entities is a conflict, but a different kind of conflict than the one in which the sides
were weighed to see which one wins.105 Therefore,  the first-order reasons are not
overridden by the weight of another reason, and so they still produce their effects by
making the action praiseworthy (even if it is not required anymore):
It follows that the view we are examining presupposes that there are at 
least two ways in which reasons can be compared and conflicts 
between them resolved. If they belong to the same level they can be 
compared in point of strength. The stronger reason should prevail, the 
weaker should give way. But reasons may belong to different and 
independent levels of considerations (whether because they derive 
from different ultimate values or on other grounds). In this case their 
strength cannot be compared, but the different levels may still be 
104 Raz  (1975b,  p.94):  “Since  exclusionary  permissions  are  required  to  explain  the  nature  of
supererogation  there  can be  no doubt  of  their  importance  to  practical  reasoning.  (...)  They are
second-order permissions in the sense in which exclusionary reasons are second order  reasons.
They are permissions not to act on reasons, whereas exclusionary reasons are reasons for not acting
on reasons. “ 
105 Raz (1975b,  p.40) gives  the  following principle P1.  “The introduction of  exclusionary reasons
entails that there are two ways in which reasons can be defeated. They can be overridden by strictly
conflicting reasons or excluded by exclusionary reasons.”
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related to each other and one way in which they can be related is 
explicated by the use of the idea of exclusionary permissions. This 
means that the existence of reasons of one level entitles one not to act 
on reasons  belonging to the other level. But the reasons of the other 
level are not overridden. (Raz 1975a, p.168)
Up  to  this  point,  Raz's  proposal  seems  to  make  some  logical  room  for
supererogation,  by  showing  that  there  are  some  theoretical  devices  capable  of
explaining  how  one  might  answer  the  problem  of  supererogation.  He  also  has
obtained,  by  discussing  supererogation,  a  nice  illustration  for  a  technical  device
within his theory, namely for a theory of types of reasons and permissions. However,
saying that one might have a second-order permission to not take into account some
first-order reasons for an action  is  a rather  technical  and general  description.  Raz
wants to convince his readers that his type theory is not just an ad hoc device, but is
actually presupposed by various manners of reasoning about conflicting reasons. The
way to do that is to show that solutions that have been commonly proposed to the
problem  of  supererogation  presuppose  something  very  similar  to  exclusionary
permissions. Supererogation, claims Raz quoting Bernard Williams (1973), is usually
seen as a conflict between two kinds of values: the value of human autonomy and the
value of human welfare. The usual solution is to say that the agent “is required to
promote human welfare to the extent that this does not seriously interfere with the
pursuit of his own fundamental goals” (Raz 1975a, p.167). The thought expressed by
'to  the  extent  that  this  does  not  seriously  interfere  with  the  pursuit  of  his  own
fundamental  goals'  is  the  one  that,  according  to  Raz,  “presupposes  that  some
exclusionary permissions are valid”. Raz believes that our intuition that the two kinds
of values in conflict are incommensurable is vindicated by the idea that  the strength
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of the two kinds of values (human welfare and autonomy of  the agent) cannot be
compared and therefore they cannot be placed in a balance of first-order reasons,
competing against each other. However, they can be compared in another way, one
that allows the agent to admit that following the reasons given by human welfare is
praiseworthy, even if in certain circumstances it is not required:
On this view human welfare and the agent's personal goals, though 
they cannot be compared as to their strength, can be compared in some
other way which entitles us to say that whereas, in specified 
circumstances, the pursuit of one's personal goals is permissible and 
legitimate the promotion of human  welfare is praiseworthy. (Raz 
1975a, p.168)
3.12. Raz's Solution to the Problem of Supererogation
A first instance of Raz's problem of supererogation appears to be quite similar
to the commonsensical version: “How can one be permitted to refrain from an action
which  is  required  by  reason?”  However,  it  emerges  later  that  Raz  intended  the
problem to be more about “how can one explain  that theorists may coherently claim
that the agent can be permitted (...).” than about “how can one actually be permitted
(...)”. This is because one might deny that there are such moral permissions, and Raz
would argue that simply assuming or even arguing for this position has not answered
his question. 
Nevertheless,  his  considerations  about  a  different  kind of  conflict  between
first-order reasons and second-order reasons may transform the initial problem. The
problem of supererogation in this context becomes 'how can one explain that first-
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order  reasons  may  keep  their  relevance  (i.e.  may  not  be  overridden)  while  not
establishing a requirement for action?' Raz's answer was to propose the concept of
exclusionary permission. 
I think it is also interesting to notice that Raz, on many occasions, uses the
phrase  “going against the balance of reasons” when he speaks about exclusionary
permissions  and exclusionary reasons. Properly speaking, what he describes is going
against the balance of first-order reasons. The solution he finds is still taking reasons-
standing-in-a-relation into account,  even if it  cannot be called a new “balance” of
reasons. I believe that the  construction of a relation between first-order and second-
order reasons cannot properly be called a “balance” of reasons because the metaphor
seems inappropriate  this  time.  Between first and second order reasons there is  no
measuring of strength and therefore no work to be done by an imaginary balance. 
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Chapter Four: Supererogation, Obligation and Virtue 
The  previous  chapters  have  offered  a  view  into  the  diversity  of  problems  usually
disguised by the common label  “the problem of  supererogation”.  Laying out  the differences
between  various  problems  of  supererogation  reveals  that  they  are  not  only  about  moral
obligation,  namely  about  explaining  the  non-obligatory  status  of  certain  good  deeds.  The
problems  of  supererogation  are  varied  because  they  reveal  conflicts:  for  example,  between
supererogation and the obligation to obtain maximally good results (Slote) or supererogation and
the impersonal aspect of morality (Scheffler) or, again, supererogation and the exclusively agent-
neutral aspect of morality (Dancy). 
This enumeration does not exhaust all the aspects discussed in the previous chapters, but
it nevertheless shows a remarkable variety of standpoints from which supererogation is thought
to be problematic for a moral theory. However, my claim is that this variety does not amount to
mere randomness, i.e. I believe that the aspects raised by the various problems of supererogation
are, most of them, related to each other. To be more specific, I believe that most aspects being
disturbed by supererogation (such as aiming at impersonal good, being obligatory, being agent-
neutral and impartial), may be said to form a certain traditional view about morality in general.
The problems of supererogation appear when several traits characteristic to supererogation come
into conflict with several traits of this particular view about morality.  These traits are not all
independent,  they  have  conceptual  links  allowing  them to  form a  certain  general  view.  For
example, if morality is thought to be centered upon obligations, and obligations are thought to be
established by means of general rules, and these general rules are taken to resemble laws, then
this may very well result in an impersonal character of moral rules ( following the model of the
law). 
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This is why I have claimed, in the beginning, that the problems of supererogation are
different, but related problems, or a “family” of problems. 
In short, the main point to be established in this chapter is that taking into account the
difference between various problems of supererogation may say something about a common way
of seeing morality, and may further lead to understanding why supererogation seems unwelcome
in so many traditional moral frames and for so many theories. My answer is that supererogation
is  difficult  to  accommodate  in  many  moral  theories  especially  because  those  theories  share
specific presuppositions about what morality should look like. In the next section I am concerned
with the details of my thesis and the possible objections to it.  
4.1 The Main Points and Possible Objections
The core of my claim is  that  by taking into account  the differences  between various
problems of supererogation, one will also be made aware of different aspects of one specific
view about morality. This is a tenet that most likely needs to be detailed. 
The  remarkable  proliferation  of  problems  of  supererogation  comes,  I  believe,  from
various aspects of supererogation coming into conflict with some other aspects of a general view
about morality.  The view about morality I am only alluding to here (it will be described and
discussed in more detail in the next sections) is one that has been described and criticized before,
for instance by Peter Railton:
Morality may be conceived of as in essence selfless, impartial, impersonal. To 
act morally is to subordinate the self and all contingencies concerning the self's 
relations with others or the world to a set of imperatives binding on us solely as 
rational beings. We should be moral in this view, because it is ideally rational. 
(Railton 1984, p.165)
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What  Railton  does  not  say  in  this  quote  is  that  what  is  most  likely  (even  if  not  logically
necessary) to be associated with selflessness, impartiality and impersonality is a law-like aspect
of moral rules. This is why I will sometimes call this view the 'legalistic view of morality' or
'morality  of  law'.  Usually,  these  traits  of  morality,  seen  in  a  legalistic  manner,  are  tacitly
presupposed, as this is a quite common view relying on a venerable philosophical tradition (as I
will  argue  in  the  next  sections).  The  problems  raised  by  supererogation  help  bring  these
presuppositions to the surface because the problems are, actually, manners of questioning these
presuppositions, one by one, from various angles. What the problems of supererogation bring to
one's attention are oppositions, incompatibilities between traits presupposed by supererogation
and traits  presupposed by a  legalistic  view of  morality.  The difference  between the  various
problems of supererogation come, in this view, from the differences between the different traits
in conflict. However, as these traits are not unrelated, but form a coherent larger narrative, the
problems also bear some resemblance to each other, forming what I have called a 'family'  of
problems. This is why, I think, they are different, but related problems. 
Before delving into the details of each opposition and their connections, there are two
objections that can be made to my claim from the start. The first is that it is implausible to say
that such a specific, “parochial”106 problem like supererogation can shed light on entire general
conceptions  about  morality.  After  all,  what  could  second  order  permissions  (Raz)  have  in
common with maximization and satisficing (Scheffler)  or with an obligation to follow moral
ideals (Pybus)? No easy-to-find answer seems to be within reach. 
In spite of these considerations of heterogeneous interests, the second objection might be
that the connection between supererogation and general theoretical frames is obvious: of course
the problems of supererogation have something to say about morality in general – the problems
differ depending upon the general theoretical frame in which they are formulated. The problem
of supererogation in a utilitarian setting will be different from the problems of supererogation in
106 Heyd (2015). 
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any other  theoretical  setting and it  will  bring forth some particular  traits  of  that  frame (e.g.
maximization and its importance for the identity of the frame). 
To  answer  the  first  objection  one  should  point  out  how  the  particular  concern  of
supererogation is, indeed, relevant to a general way of seeing morality as a legalistic morality.
This is a task to be undertaken in most of the sections to follow. What I can say already is that
the crux of the problem of supererogation is obligation (or lack thereof); when supererogation is
pitted against a view of morality that takes obligation to be its central theme, then it is plausible
to say that the attempt to integrate supererogation will have broad, general repercussions for the
theoretical frame. 
My answer to the second objection is that one way of differentiating between problems of
supererogation  (according to  their  being  formulated  in  utilitarian  or  duty-based frameworks)
does not  preclude  other  ways  of  differentiating  between those problems,  namely it  does  not
preclude a connection of those problems with other kinds of theoretical frameworks, ones that
are not so visible and obvious. It is, indeed, quite obvious that problems of supererogation differ
as theoretical frameworks are changed: I have pointed out not only how these frameworks shape
supererogation differently, but also how the problem of supererogation, once formulated in terms
of  a  framework,  leads  to  changes  withing  the  framework  (e.g.  giving  up  maximization  for
satisficing).  Therefore,  it  is true that it  is somewhat obvious that considering the problem of
supererogation may lead to considerations about entire theoretical frameworks.  However, the
theoretical framework brought to light by considering the various problems of supererogation is
a different one, one that is harder to discern because its presuppositions are more general, tacit
and not often discussed. Therefore, my tenet is about a different kind of generality or, maybe, a
higher degree of generality. The view that morality is and should be legalistic may be supported
in a utilitarian, deontological or reason-based frame, alike. Therefore, the relevant difference for
my thesis is not the classical, well-known difference between these frames, but another one. I
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have stated briefly that the general view about morality that I consider to be the origin of many
conflicts involving supererogation is one in which moral rules resemble laws in several ways
(peremptory in style and presupposing sanctions in case of disobedience, for example). I have
called this way of seeing morality, 'morality of law'107 and I intend to show that a morality of law
of  any  persuasion  (utilitarian  or  deontological)  is,  usually,  an  unfriendly  environment  for
supererogation. One question that might be raised is what would be the alternative to this way of
viewing morality. In short, one alternative way of seeing morality (to be presented at the end of
this chapter) is what I have called, following MacIntyre, 'morality of virtue'. My position is that a
certain  view,  that  can  be  said  to  belong  to  virtue  theory,  might  be  a  more  welcoming
environment for supererogation. In the last section I will defend this idea, that virtue ethics is
better suited to explain supererogation,  against recent counter-arguments by Heyd (2015).
4.2. Problems of  Supererogation and  What they May Bring to Light
In this  section  I  will  try to  show how one may move from specific  questions  about
supererogation to some general trait(s) presupposed by a certain picture of morality. I will start
by recapitulating the journey through various problems to supererogation. After analyzing and
commenting on them, I will argue that, not all, but a solid majority share a certain general view
about morality.
The general form of the problem of supererogation is 'How can one explain that some
type of action is morally good but not obligatory?'. Schematically this is 'How can one explain
that something that is A, is not also B?' The presupposition here is that, normally or intuitively, A
should have been B. In other words, A and B belong together usually but strangely enough, when
it comes to supererogatory action, they are  not united. Therefore, supererogation prevents some
107  I am following MacIntyre here, with some reservations to be discussed. 
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association of traits of moral actions that, one assumes, is an association expected for other kinds
of moral actions. From analyzing the table below one might extract these traits, i.e. the A and the
B that usually are seen to go together.    
Table1
How can one explain that
some morally good deeds
are not obligatory?
Urmson (1958) How can one explain that
some saintly and heroic deeds
are  neither  merely  permitted  nor
obligatory?
Pybus (1982) How can one explain that
heroic and saintly actions 
are something we ought to aspire to
(even  if  the  action  cannot  be
demanded)?
Slote (2004) How can one explain that
maximization of the good
is  merely  morally  permitted  (non-
obligatory)?
Dreier (2004) How can one explain that
choosing  the  lesser  option,  i.e.
satisficing  (in  both  moral  and
prudential domains)
is not irrational?
Scheffler (1994) How can one explain that,
in  some  circumstances,  ignoring  the
demands of an impersonal scale of the
good  (i.e.  establishing  an  agent-
centered prerogative)
is  morally  permitted  (non-
obligatory)?
Zimmerman
(1993)
How can one explain that, 
of  two  equally  permitted  moral
actions,
one  (the  supererogatory)  is  better
than the other?
Dancy (1993) a) How can one explain that,
as  the  value  rises,  the  change  in
degree of evaluative property (i.e. the
good)
b) How can one explain that
choosing not to follow agent- neutral
reasons (and following agent-relative
reasons)
is not attended by a change in degree
of  deontic  property  (i.e.  the
obligation)?
is sometimes morally legitimate, i.e.
permitted?
Nagel (1986) How  can  one  explain  that  morally
excellent action   involving harm for
the agent 
is  not  irrational,  i.e.  there  are  no
decisive reasons against it?
Raz (1975) How can one explain that 
some  first  order  reasons  may  keep
their relevance
while not establishing for the agent a
requirement to act upon them?
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The questions themselves are quite heterogeneous, but if one takes into consideration the
answers  and  the  discussions  surrounding  the  problems,  then  a  few  themes  emerge:  moral
obligation, its deontic force, and impersonal morality.
First,  the majority  of  questions  are  about  moral  obligation  or lack thereof  in case of
supererogation. One of Urmson's concerns is to argue in five steps that some saintly and heroic
deeds cannot be deemed obligatory because this would mean that all  heroic behavior can be
demanded or  “exacted  like a  debt”.  Pybus is  arguing against  his  position  by saying that  all
excellent  moral  deeds  should  be  considered  morally  obligatory.  However,  according  to  her,
moral obligation should not be conceived in a 'legalistic' manner or as something to be 'extracted
like a debt';  rather,  moral  obligation  should be considered a  moral  ideal  towards  which one
should aspire.
Secondly, the utilitarian preoccupation with supererogation seems to revolve especially
around  the  requirement  of  maximization  (and  understandably  so).  Usually,  authors  of
consequentialist or utilitarian persuasion are willing to accept that optimization or maximization
can be made non-obligatory (in order to  accommodate  commonsensical  moral  intuitions  and
supererogation).  To  recall,  this  would  allow  the  harmonious  integration  of  the  concept  of
supererogation because it would make it possible to say, within the system, that excellent moral
deeds (the ones with the best outcome and involving great sacrifices from the agent) are not
obligatory.  The requirement to maximize or to optimize would make these actions obligatory,
which is a counter-intuitive result of consequentialist and utilitarian theories. 
 Zimmerman  (1993),  in  his  search  to  accommodate  both  maximization  and
supererogation, is an exception and a rare case. Dreier, Slote and Scheffler, on the other hand,
accept that maximization (or optimization) can be made non obligatory, but in different manners.
Slote (2004) argues straightforwardly in favor of accepting moral satisficing (doing less than the
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best) as a rational choice and a good theoretical alternative to maximizing. However, Scheffler
(1994) takes a another route to the same theoretical outcome (the desired theoretical outcome is
the ability to integrate supererogation in a consequentialist system). He claims that one should be
willing to allow for an agent-centered prerogative, a prerogative which allows the agent to ignore
the impersonal scale measuring which deed will have the optimal effect. 
More specifically, I believe that a plausible agent-centered prerogative would 
allow each agent to assign a certain proportionately greater weight to his own 
interest than to the interests of other people. It would then allow the agent to 
promote the non-optimal outcome of his choosing (…). (Scheffler 1982, p.20)
In other words, the agent is permitted, in certain circumstances, to ignore the impersonal
demands of morality  and to follow, instead, personal preferences or plans. This will result in
being allowed to fail to optimize sometimes, but only because a personal way of assessment is
being employed instead of following the impersonal one. 
This is an example of a clash between an impersonal trait of morality and supererogation.
It is not obvious why there should be a conflict between the concept of supererogation and the
utilitarian/consequentialist  way  of  measuring  moral  good  impersonally.  What,  then,  gives
morality its impersonal trait in this context? Having an impersonal scale measuring the goodness
of the outcome of an action, means that the measurement takes into account no specific point of
view, no personal or partial perspective. It is not, therefore favorable or unfavorable to anyone,
and it aims at something that can be considered good by as many as possible:  an objective,
overall  good  –  the  'greater  good'.  The  presupposition  in  this  enterprise  is  that  something
impersonally evaluated  is  objectively  good,  i.e.  it  is  good for  everyone,108 overall.  A further
presupposition  (which will  be discussed in  the next  section)  is  that  the action  with the best
outcome for all is rationally and morally required: there are simply no considerations against it.
One could have dismissed  the obligation  to  act  if  the obligatory status of that  act  had been
108 Of course,  one has  to  count  the  sacrifice  of  the  agent  among the disadvantages,  but  when the  outcome is
sufficiently good, the sacrifice of one does not surpass the good obtained by many. 
179
obtained from a subjective evaluation, from a certain personal point of view or  would involve
partiality.  From these rather banal considerations, a certain picture of morality starts to emerge:
morality and its obligations (which are central to it) rest on rational, objective, impersonal and
impartial considerations. Moreover, concerns about the sacrifice demanded from the agent are
not prominent, even if they have been included in the measurement of the resulting objective
good. Especially in a consequentialist/utilitarian frame, what is deemed to be objectively and
impersonally best, is also obligatory. 
In this context, it is clear that extraordinary good moral acts, producing optimal results
for all, are deemed obligatory,  against the main tenet of supererogationism that extraordinary
good  deeds  cannot  be  required  –  this  is  where  the  conflict  between  supererogation  and
impersonal evaluations of the good intervenes. The implication from objectively best to 'ought to
be done' is at the core of the conflict. 
Another  trait  of  morality  that  can  be  extracted  from  the  table  of  problems  of
supererogation  is  demandingness.  This  view,  that  morality  is  difficult  to  achieve,  and  its
obligations are demanding, brings to light the worry about the  moral agent's burden. Among
consequentialists, Scheffler is particularly interested in this problem.
Not  giving  enough  weight  to  the  agent's  losses,  according  to  Scheffler,  has  larger
implications for the relation between a system of morality and the agent acting morally. These
implications go beyond the difficulties presented by the case of supererogation. In other words,
not  being  able  to  accommodate  intuitions  about  supererogation  is  just  one  of  the  problems
created  by the impersonal  way of measuring  the good.  Scheffler  (1982) proposes his  agent-
centered prerogative as a response to a famous critique by Bernard Williams, and not necessarily
as a solution to the problem of supererogation (even if it  turns out to be that, too). Williams
claimed that making morality impersonal (for both the utilitarian and Kantian viewpoints) leads
to an alienation of the moral agents from their own life projects. As the objective, impersonal
180
good is considered not only good for everyone but also obligatory, the result is that the agent is
required to evaluate  all  personal projects by reference to the impersonal scale measuring the
capacity to increase the overall goodness or happiness (in the case of utilitarianism). This means
that the agent will be morally allowed to put into practice only those projects that align with the
general good – which will leave very little room for the personal side of one's life. This is a
different objection from the objection that the maximization requirement demands sacrifices that
would involve serious harm for the agent and therefore the demand is unreasonable (i.e. the
demandingness objection).  Scheffler's agent-centered prerogative is intended as a response to
both objections, though. 
 I will not discuss here how much success Scheffler has in responding to these objections.
What is relevant here is the image of morality one can extract from this kind of response to this
problem of supererogation: morality emerges as obligation-centered (the main problem is what is
obligatory and what is not),  rational, impersonal, impartial and quite  difficult for an ordinary
agent  to  comply  with  (see  the  demandingness  objection  and  Williams'  objection  regarding
alienation from one's own plans).
There  is  one  other  coordinate  to  be  added  to  this  image  resulting  from the  overall
evaluation of the table above. It is something not entirely new, as it regards the nature of moral
obligation. But it useful because it adds to the above picture of morality some details about how
obligation is supposed to work. 
A third trait of morality that can be extracted from the overall picture of problems of
supererogation regards reasons and agent-neutrality.
Dreier (2004), in his analysis of satisficing, states that a) if some action X is deemed
objectively better than any other action available, then this amounts to having reason to choose
X; and b) once we have reason to do X, failing to do X needs some explanation or justification
on pain of irrationality.  This tenet, that one cannot simply fail to follow an objective reason
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without some explanation or without having an opposing reason is one widely shared in reason-
based theories. The underlying presupposition for this tenet is that reasons, even if they do not
amount to full-scale obligations or 'oughts', have, nevertheless, something called 'deontic force'. I
think Little (2013, p.112) explains it best:
On a certain classical picture, reasons, by their very nature, are deontic. If one 
faces a reason in favour of an action, then one would be wrong not to follow its 
lead, absent sufficient counter-veiling justification. Depending on the type of 
reason, the wrong in question might be the wrong of immorality, or imprudence, 
or just the generic wrong of practical reason (what I will refer to in this chapter as
'irrationality' or 'impermissibility'). (…)  Reasons for actions are normative 
entities inherently on their way toward being all things considered deontic oughts.
Call this the deontic view of reasons.
This view of reasons – as deontic forces that have to be first countered by other equal
'forces' in order for one to be allowed to ignore them with no consequences – explains the way in
which Raz frames his version of the problem of supererogation: 
If doing a supererogatory act is praiseworthy, there must be reasons for doing it, 
and the reasons must outweigh any conflicting reasons for not doing it. But if 
there are conclusive reasons for performing the act then not to perform it is to act 
against the balance of reasons. If reason requires that the act be done then surely 
one ought to do it, and the “ought” is based on all the reasons which apply to the 
case;  (Raz 1975a, p.164)
This is another version of the connection discussed earlier between good and obligation,
where obligation is  replaced by the deontic  force of reasons.  The problem is that,  once it  is
established that there is a conclusive reason for doing something, then it is hard to see how its
omission can be justified. Nagel (1986) does not disagree with this position, but he chooses to
focus  his  version  of  the  problem on  another  aspect.  For  him  it  is  important  to  defend  the
rationality of moral action, namely to find theoretical means for supporting the thesis that the
agent who acted morally and suffered great losses as a result, still acted rationally – even if the
well-being of the agent was greatly affected. Nagel is also a very good example for the thesis that
morality should be as objective, impersonal and impartial as possible: this is his great quest in
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establishing a “view from nowhere” in ethics,  even if he accepts that this demand has to be
mitigated by obvious human limitations. 
From the positions surveyed here, only Dancy (2004) is willing to go against the dogma
of the deontic view of reasons and to admit that there might be other kinds of reasons, that are
less “peremptory” in style. However, according to Dancy, this other kind of reasons (enticing
reasons) cannot be used to give a solution to the problem of supererogation. His way of solving
the problem will consist in allowing agent-relative reasons to have moral weight, one that can be
opposed to agent-neutral reasons counting in favor of heroic action. It is worth underlying that
allowing agent-relative reasons to have moral weight means that the agent's viewpoint is taken
into account in a different way. Usually, the loss of the agent was counted as a prudential reason
to not do a risky but beneficial action, not as a moral reason. Dancy allows the cost calculated
“for me” (as opposed to “anyone”) to count as a moral consideration in establishing the balance
of reasons. I think that his solution goes against a longstanding tradition for which only agent-
neutral  reasons  can  have  moral  weight  –  which  is  another  way of  saying  that,  traditionally,
morality should avoid any particular point of view or consideration, i.e. it should be impersonal
and impartial. 
To  conclude,  most  of  the  problems  of  supererogation  discussed  have  an  underlying
presupposition about some traits that should be conjoined, but in the case of supererogation they
are not. The general form of the questions listed is 'How can one explain that something that is A
is not also B?' – how can one explain that some saintly, heroic, morally excellent deeds are not
also obligatory, rational, impartially demanded? Of course, A stands here for a description of the
supererogatory act, i.e. of a highly moral act. However, acts of the type A are also supposed to be
included in the larger class of morally good acts and, as a consequence, they should also be B, i.e.
whatever trait morally good acts have associated with them generally. 
The most common tacit reasoning behind these question seems to be that morally good
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deeds are usually obligatory, so it is surprising that supererogatory acts, which are morally good,
cannot be deemed obligatory. For example, saintly or heroic deeds are morally good deeds and
therefore they should be considered obligatory (they cannot be wrong or merely permitted as they
are not indifferent to morality), where “obligation” is taken to have a “legalistic” meaning, as
something that can be demanded.109 
Summarizing the analysis undertaken in this section, these are the traits that are supposed
to be in close association (but fail to be in the case of supererogation):
a) being a morally excellent act  and being an obligatory act in a strong, legalistic sense.
b) being assessed as morally best act in an impersonal, impartial and objective manner (i.e.
being good for all, or the greater good) and being an obligatory act ; this will be also a
difficult or demanding act for the agent (as the greater good usually implies  sacrifices
from the agent). 
c) being an action favored by moral/agent-neutral reasons and being something one ought to
do unless there are other moral reasons going against the action favored in the first place.
The question is now if all these traits may form a coherent image of morality. Up until
this point one seems to be met with the following narrative: if something is deemed to be morally
good in an impersonal, impartial, objective manner (i.e. good in general, for many), then that
should also be deemed obligatory even if it means to impose demanding (sometimes harmful)
obligation upon individual moral agents. The worry had by the agent regarding his own losses
does not have moral  standing,  but only prudential  value,  and so it  is  not deemed,  from this
perspective, to be a good enough reason for not imposing these obligations. 
It is evident that there is a presupposed connection between being morally good and being
obligatory or, at least, between being morally good and having a deontic force “pushing” in the
direction of that good. This is a version of the 'good-ought tie-up' that was discussed in the first
109 Of course, Urmson does not agree with this presupposition, as he is arguing against it. But the fact that he argues
at length against it shows that it is not something to be dismissed lightly. 
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chapter. But the hypothesis that everything that is morally good has to be obligatory or at least
prima facie obligatory,  is  not a  very intuitive  hypothesis.  Where does this  supposition come
from, of the connection between good and obligation, and what is the connection between this
'good-ought tie-up' and all  the other  traits (being rational, objective, impersonal or impartial)?
4.3. Why Does the Good Have to be Followed by an Ought?
My hypothesis is that one source for the claim that any morally good deed should stand
under an 'ought' is a commonsensical moral intuition. One other source is theoretical, and comes
from a venerable tradition of theorizing about morality and its role in society. This section is
dedicated to making explicit the first source, namely the intuition behind the claim (it will be
followed by a section explaining the theoretical source, too). 
That commonsensical moral intuition would be a source for this claim seems unlikely
because the claim appears counter-intuitive. But it appears counter-intuitive, I believe, because in
this  particular  formulation  (all  morally  good  deeds  should  be  obligatory)  makes  evident  an
unintended consequence of the initial intuition, an intuition that would be much more appealing
in another formulation.
The  problem of  supererogation  itself,  I  believe,  starts  from equally  strong  intuitions
pulling in different directions. On the one hand, it seems obvious that agents may go beyond duty
in their  moral  endeavor:  the doctor who rushes into a plagued city or the soldier  sacrificing
himself  so  that  his  fellow  soldiers  may  live  (to  use  Urmson's  famous  examples)110 are
commonsensical obvious cases of agents going beyond duty.
110   In J.O. Urmson, “Saints and Heroes” .
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On the other hand, it  might  seem that,  in general,  anyone who can help,  should help
others in a difficult situation. If this 'should' is translated into moral obligation, then each time
one helps, one is simply fulfilling a moral obligation, something that is not, morally speaking,
optional.  I think this is the basic intuition behind the good-ought tie-up, namely that one has a
moral obligation to help others in need because this is what constitutes moral good – one might
say that this is what morality is about. The corollary of this thought is that one cannot invoke the
inconveniences or the losses suffered by oneself in order to opt out of moral obligation: this is
how morality works, by foregoing one's own interests to altruistically care about other people's
interest.  If morality would make altruistic deeds merely permitted, then it would seem to be a
declaration of indifference towards its own core: doing good to others, being altruistic – this
cannot  be  merely  permitted  as  if  it  were  indifferent  for  the  moral  agent  and  for  the  moral
judgment  whether  one  acts  altruistically  or  not.  Unfortunately,  if  one  takes  'should'  and
'obligation' in the sense discussed by Urmson, as meaning something that can be extracted “like a
debt”, then this high-minded intuition about morality clashes with the other one, about 'going
beyond the call  of duty'.  Of course,  this  is  not a necessary move.  The moral  intuition  I  am
discussing here has a vague enough form to be interpreted very differently. Nothing prevents a
case-by-case  interpretation  instead  of  a  rule  of  sweeping  generality.  Specifically,  the  moral
intuition could be interpreted as saying that one should help someone in need whenever they
have good reason to judge they are able to help and the need is, indeed, a serious one – which is
a case-by case judgment depending on the agent. This is an interpretation that does not clash
with the other intuition, about going beyond duty. However, this intuition can be interpreted in
either two ways – as a sweeping obligation or as one that arises only in particular situation.
 There are several conditions that need to be met by an interpretation in order to obtain
the  conflict  between  supererogation  and  the  good-ought  tie-up.  First,  it  would  have  to  be
interpreted as a universal rule, without exceptions:  each instance of altruistic behavior should
count  as  obligatory.  Moreover,  it  should  not  depend  upon the  agent  to  decide  about
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circumstances, ability to help, need to help, what counts as altruistic an so on. All these should
be established impersonally and impartially such that no suspicion can be raised that someone
might just find excuses not to act morally. In the same spirit, of impartiality and impersonality,
the interpretation should not distinguish between obligations one might impose on oneself and
obligations one might impose on others (similar to Slote's “self-other asymmetry”).111 In stating
the intuition above, the statement is ambiguous between 'one should help' as something said by
an agent to herself and 'one should help' as an expectation of everyone from everyone. 
There might be other interpretations and other contributions needed to arrive at the good-
ought tie-up, i.e. at the point of conflict. But I think that the shortest way to the conflict is to
interpret “should” or “ought” in the sense of legalistic obligation (the universality of the rule, the
impersonal and impartial aspect would follow automatically in this case). If one considers that
the doctor had a moral obligation to help the plagued city and the soldier had a moral obligation
to rescue the others, then the doctor and the soldier are not going “beyond and above duty”, they
are merely fulfilling their duties; which might be equally difficult and meritorious, but would not
be supererogatory. 
The conflict between these two commonsensical moral intuitions becomes visible at this
point: if each genuine need of help generates a moral obligation to help, then there is no action
which could be properly called supererogatory (because any good deed is, roughly speaking, a
kind of duty and therefore there is no 'going beyond duty'). Alternatively, if supererogation is
possible,  then some morally excellent  deeds are  above and beyond duty,  i.e.  they cannot  be
required. However, if their value is so great for us (and there is, I believe, little need to explain
why a society might need kindness, generosity and other forms of going "beyond one's duty")
then why are they not deemed obligatory?
111   See Slote, M. (1984a) “Morality and Self-Other Asymmetry”,  Journal of Philosophy 81, pp. 179-192. 
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I  think  that  the  problem  of  supererogation  reunites  both  parts  of  this  dilemma,  by
accepting that there is supererogatory action while at the same time acknowledging the pull of
the other  side.  In asking 'how can one explain  that  some morally excellent  deeds cannot  be
morally required?', the problem presupposes the existence of supererogation while giving some
credence to the opinion that if something is morally good then one should (as a matter of moral
obligation) follow the good. What the problem of supererogation does is to ask for a justification
for  denying that  every  morally  good  deed  falls  under  an  obligation.  Posing  the  problem,
therefore, also means that one should not take for granted that some morally good deeds do not
fall under an obligation. The problem contains, therefore, the claim that one needs to justify the
permission offered by supererogation, to offer theoretical grounds for it.
There are attempts  to dissolve the problem of supererogation by making a distinction
between  the  “should”  or  “ought”  of  obligation  and  the  “should”  or  “ought”  of
recommendation.112 No matter how plausible one finds David Heyd's theorizing in this respect, I
believe the problem persists  under another  formulation,  namely:  how could one explain that
some morally excellent deeds are merely recommended, not required?
This is how, I think, the commonsensical formulation of the problem of supererogation
appeals to both moral intuitions. That one ought to help whenever this is possible, is an intuition
I have identified as one of the sources of the good-ought tie-up. Admittedly, the intuition alone,
in its commonsensical formulation, is not enough to arrive at the good-ought tie-up. For this, I
have claimed,  'ought' should be interpreted in a certain legalistic manner. But what would be the
reasons in favor of such an interpretation? 
I  think  a  second  source  of  the  good-ought  tie-up  is  needed  to  account  for  this
interpretation, namely a theory of what morality should look like. The next section is dedicated
112 For distinguishing between different meanings of “should” in the context of this problem, see David Heyd's
article on supererogation in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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to finding out the reasons and the presuppositions behind the choice of a strong sense, a legalistic
sense for moral obligation. 
4.4. Law-like Moral Obligation
The question 'how can one explain that some morally excellent deeds are not required?'
presupposes some degree of puzzlement  or at  least  of skepticism about the idea that  not all
morally good deeds can be required. In other words, the puzzle seems to derive from joining
excellent moral deeds with the permission to forgo them. If the permission is puzzling, then the
presupposition seems to be that the non-puzzling state would be the one in which we are  not
allowed  to  omit  any  morally  excellent  deeds.  Therefore,  the  obligation  to  act  in  a  morally
excellent manner would be the expected state. 
Of course, this is not a plausible psychological or moral reality: to be required or morally
obligated to give one's life to save others, or to risk one's health to cure other people seems an
unreasonable demand. After all, the most intuitive answer to the question 'how can one explain
that we are not obligated to do some morally excellent actions?' is that some of these actions
involve great sacrifices from the agent. 
This answer is not, in itself, a solution of the puzzle. First, because the question can be re-
iterated in search for a theoretical approach (i.e. 'how can one theoretically ground  the intuition
that great sacrifices cannot be demanded?') and second, because it is not always the case that
good deeds that cannot be demanded involve great sacrifices.113 For example, a small token of
appreciation cannot be demanded but it is not very costly for the agent – how could one explain
that  these  are  not  to  be  demanded,  as  the  heavy burden imposed  on the  agent  cannot  be  a
justification here.
113 For a lengthy discussion of cases where supererogatory action does not involve much sacrifice from the agent,
see Horgan and Timmons (2010).
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Theoretically justified or not, it is a strong moral intuition (the one that mainly supports
the plausibility of supererogation as a viable concept) that at least some morally excellent and
admirable  actions  cannot  and  should not  be  demanded  from  anyone.  This  is  why  act-
consequentialist  theories  like  Scheffler's  (1994)  and  Slote's  (1984)  take  into  account
supererogation when they want to reconcile their theories with commonsensical moral intuitions.
Therefore,  if  one agrees that  this  is  a strong moral  intuition  (that  some good actions
cannot be required), then the question is: how can one arrive at the impression that the opposite
might be  justified as well? In other words, how does one get to the idea that all morally good
deeds should be required?114
My answer to this question connects the  demandingness of legalistic morality with its
obligatory aspect. It is, indeed, counter-intuitive to see as obligatory every good deed - it would
be too difficult to fulfill this obligation, and this conception of morality would be too demanding.
My hypothesis about how one could reach the idea that any good action should stay under an
“ought” is the following: it is exactly because the claims of morality are seen as demanding and
difficult to comply with, that they all have to be made obligatory. The worry hidden here is that if
some good deeds would not be seen as obligatory, i.e. as standing under an “ought”, then no one
would do those good deeds,115 and they would not be taken seriously (or maybe they would be
seen as a matter of indifference).  
This hypothesis, that moral good has to stay under an 'ought' in order to be translated into
action betrays a supposed reluctance on the part of the moral agent to follow the good. This, in
114 One may  find  a  partial  explanation  in  John  Rawls,  A Theory  of  Justice,  namely  an  explanations  for  why
utilitarian theories might arrive at this idea. His theory is that utilitarian-inclined theories will extrapolate from
what is rational for one individual to what is rational for a group and so the losses suffered by an agent in
maximizing the good are similar to the losses that any one agent is willing to suffer for a long term gain: “We
may impose a sacrifice on ourselves now for the sake of a greater advantage later. A person quite properly acts,
at least when others are not affected, to achieve his own greatest good, to advance his rational ends as far as
possible. Now why should not a society act on precisely the same principle applied to a group and therefore
regard that which is rational for one man as right for an association of men?” (Rawls, 1971, p.23)
115 Gregory Mellema (1991) in Beyond the Call of Duty describes the historical dispute between the  Protestant and
the Catholic Church regarding supererogation, where the protestant  position was that if the teachings of the
Gospel are mere “counsels”,  not obligations,  then nobody would be under an obligation to follow them, so
nobody would take them seriously.
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its turn, is a plausible supposition if one sees the  moral good and the personal good as being
usually at odds with each other. In other words, the picture makes sense if one accepts that, in
general, being moral involves (smaller or larger) sacrifices from the agent. Usually (even if not
every time)  the higher  the moral  value,  the  larger  the  sacrifice  (and therefore  an explicable
reluctance on the part of the agent). This is what I call  the  zero-sum hypothesis between the
moral and the personal domain, namely the idea that whatever resources the individual spends
on his or her personal/ private side of life are somehow "lost" for society, generally speaking
(one may allow exceptions); and the other way around: whatever I do for the common good or
for others will come at a cost, will be a loss or will consist in neglecting my own interest. 
Even if  today these  considerations  seem obvious  (as  any example  about  donating  to
charity tends to illustrate) this has not always been the case. The next section is a brief historical
detour for finding an alternative view.
4.5. Looking back: Virtue, Law and Morality
I will start from one astute observation made by MacIntyre about an important change in
a venerable and important philosophical frame, namely how morality of law comes to replace the
morality of virtue. 
MacIntyre  describes  in  After  Virtue (especially  Chapter  13)  how  gradually,  over
centuries, a certain picture of society and morality changes in Western Europe: it used to be the
case that to follow the good meant to attend to one's virtues (moral and intellectual). This activity
was not in opposition or contrast with attending to one's city or society or public affairs. And this
was the morality of virtue. 
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However, this harmonious coexistence between what is good for the individual and what
is good for the city was made possible by a common, shared conception of the good, according
to MacIntyre. Slowly, as the belief in a common good disintegrates, the harmony disappears. As
a result, attending to one's improvement as a person does not follow the same direction as the
public good (the goods have become divergent) and so attending to one's improvement becomes
a private affair unless it is explicitly and on purpose subsumed to the public good (i.e. virtues of
loyalty, patience, charity, chivalry –  all deemed important in the new picture). 
There would be no genuine shared common good; the only goods would be the 
goods of individuals. And the pursuit of any private good [including virtues], 
being often and necessarily in these circumstances liable to clash with the goods 
of others, would appear to be at odds with the requirements of the moral law. 
Hence if I adhere to the law, I will have to suppress the private self. (MacIntyre 
1981, p.170)
The morality of virtue is replaced with the following moral view: to follow the good  is to
serve not one's private purposes (as cultivating virtues comes to be seen), but the public order,
the law.116 As a consequence, the public sphere and the private sphere are seen, by hypothesis, in
opposition; virtue, if not an instrument for obeying the law, is relegated to the less important
domain of private affairs (and so are the arts, games and sciences, notes MacIntyre). 
The individual good pursued outside a frame in which the majority agreed about what the
good is, was very likely to bring about conflict: someone's good would obtain at the expense of
someone else's good. As a consequence, the law comes to be understood as placing a limit on
individual enterprises, and thus defending society from collapse or violent disintegration. The
law becomes in this way the new "common good", but a negative one this time, namely it only
stops and prevents, it does not lead towards anything else: "The point of the law cannot be the
achievement of some good beyond the law, for there now appears to be no such good."
116 MacIntyre tends to see this change of framework as regrettable. I do not share this attitude, as I believe both
frames  have  their  own  advantages  and  disadvantages.  This  discussion  is  interesting  and  complicated  and
unfortunately cannot be undertaken here.
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This way of thinking, according to MacIntyre, reaches its full bloom in the 17th and 18th
century, when morality is seen as the instrument par excellence for curbing what was thought to
be natural human selfishness. Broadly speaking, morality117 and law are altruistic, they take into
account the others, showing equal concern for their interests; on the other hand, the private self
led by passions, is more than often guilty of selfishness, a tendency that must be restrained if
society is to endure.
It was in the 17th and 18th centuries that morality came to be generally understood 
as offering a solution to the problem posed by human egoism and that the content
of morality came largely to be equated with altruism. For it was in that same 
period that men came to be thought of as in some dangerous measure egoistic by 
nature; and it is only once we think of mankind as by nature dangerously egoistic 
that altruism becomes at once socially necessary and yet apparently impossible 
and, if and when it occurs, inexplicable.118 (MacIntyre 1981, p.229)
One may notice that what MacIntyre says about altruism in this quotation holds, roughly
speaking, also about supererogation: if man is thought to be egoistic by nature119, then doing
good deeds and going the extra  mile  are  going to  be rare  and badly needed.  Also,  the rare
occurrence of supererogatory deeds will be considered strange and inexplicable as it would go
against the supposed natural egoism of the agent. For example, in Nagel's case there is a worry
that supererogatory behavior, even if highly moral, might be seen as irrational because it clearly
goes against  the agent's  well-being.  For supererogation to  become strange in this  conceptual
landscape, it is not even necessary to assume that “egoistic by nature” has negative connotations
117 A similar  opposition, between the common good of morality and the private good of the self,  seems to be
underlying sometimes contemporary moral discourse, namely an opposition between personal (or private) aims
and  impersonal  demands  of  the  society.  Of  course  there  are  qualifications  to  be  added  to  this  loose
characterization:  we are  not  speaking  about  whatever  someone  wants,  but  about  something  that  one  could
reasonably want for oneself (there is a touch of impersonality here). Nevertheless, one may notice that a moral
agent in general is, in contemporary philosophical discourse, more than often seen as having to choose between
what he or she reasonably wants as a private pursuit and the demands of the society: what is good for all (or only
for the rest?) is seen as conflicting with what is good for oneself. It is in this direction, I believe, that Bernard
Williams  (in  “Persons,  character  and  morality”)  was  speaking  of  impersonal  demands  of  morality  versus
personal project (“There can come a point at which is is quite unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of
the impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents,  something which is a condition of his having any
interest in being around in that world at all”, p.14).
118  My italics.
119 For  a  very  helpful  picture  of  how conceptions  about  human nature  can  influence  ethical  theories  see  Paul
Woodruff's (1991) “Virtue Ethics and the Appeal to Human Nature”. 
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(even if MacIntyre seems to assume that it  does); it  can mean only that people are naturally
mutually disinterested,120 that they are not interested in each other's goals. 
Obviously  MacIntyre  places  this  framework  change  in  a  certain  historical  time,  and
claims that morality of law and morality of virtue were two ways of seeing morality actually
adopted by the public or by certain philosophers. For the purposes of this essay I do not need
these presuppositions: it could be that his historical claims are not accurate. The idea followed
here is just the idea of a conceptually viable and plausible distinction between these two ways of
seeing morality. 
4.6. Morality, Obligation and Supererogation
In short, MacIntyre's idea that I use is that our overall conception of morality changes as
our conception about the good changes. Where does his theory about morality of law  versus
morality of virtue lead regarding supererogation and its problems?
When the common good of  society is  seen as  distinguishable  from,  but  nevertheless
aligned with the personal good, morality is also seen as aligned with the agent's interest. In other
words, morality is not something that might endanger her/his well-being. By contrast, when the
common good of society is  seen as diverging from the personal  good, the overall  image of
morality changes. Morality, being on the side of the common good, will also be on the side of
reason,  of  impartiality,  of  the  public  domain  and  its  laws.  It  will  also  be  other-oriented,
impersonal (as a condition of impartiality) and rule-based. Because morality is seen as being at
odds with personal interest, its rules will be also seen as difficult to follow, as they go against the
supposed natural egoism of individuals. Because of its difficulty and perceived demandingness,
morality will also be thought as a matter of obligation. As it is not likely that agents will usually
120 Rawls makes this distinction in A Theory of Justice where he assumes explicitly that individuals behind the veil
of ignorance are rational and egoists in this sense, of mutual disinterest.
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act against their own interest, morality is thought to provide the needed external impetus towards
doing the right thing, namely its cohort of obligations. 
The resulting picture is one of two opposing camps: on the one hand, morality is on the
side of reason, law, public domain and obligation; on the other hand, in the opposing camp are
passions or emotions,121 freedoms, self-interest, private domain and permissions. Morality seen
this way is impersonal, impartial (like the law) and other-oriented (i.e. directed towards the good
of others or the common good, selfless). It is also based on obligations because its demands are
seen as  harsh and so they  need to  be  somehow enforced  (even if  this  is  not  identical  with
enforcing by law, it does resemble the law in its imperative or peremptory character).
This is  not a new way of seeing morality,  but a very old one,  which has been often
supported  but  also  criticized.  Bernard  Williams  (1976)  famously  argued that  the  impersonal
approach of both Kantianism and Utilitarianism regarding morality ignores the importance of a
personal perspective or a life plan for the agent. Peter Railton (1984) also argues that morality
viewed  as  selfless,  impartial  and  impersonal  can  alienate  the  agent  “from  one's  personal
commitments,  from one's  feelings  or  sentiments,  from other  people,  or  even  from morality
itself”:122
Morality may be conceived of as in essence selfless, impartial, impersonal. To act 
morally is to subordinate the self and all contingencies concerning the self's 
relations with others or the world to a set of imperatives binding on us solely as 
rational beings. We should be moral in this view, because it is ideally rational. 
However, morality thus conceived seems bound to appear as alien in daily life.
(Railton 1984, p.165) 
Railton  notices  (and disapproves)  not  only the  image  of  morality  as  impersonal  and
selfless,  but  also  the  philosophical  presupposition  that  moral  agents  are,  by default,  egoists.
Consequently,  the concern for oneself is supposed to be automatic and thereby does not need
121 For  example,  Martha  Nussbaum in “Emotions  as  Judgments  of  Value”  offers  an  explanation  for  regarding
emotions as suspect and inadequate for moral judgment. She criticizes two traditions in this respect: first, the one
claiming  that  emotions  have  nothing  to  do  with  judgment  (they  are  “blind”  forces)  and  second,  that  “the
judgments with which emotions are connected are all false”, p. 206.
122  Railton (1984, p.134).
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explanation, while the concern for another is an odd kind of beast and it needs an investigation:
Distracted by the picture of a hypothetical, presocial individual, philosophers have
found it very easy to assume, wrongly, that in the actual world concern for oneself
and one's goals is quite automatic, needing no outside support, while a direct 
concern for others is inevitably problematic, needing some further rationale. 
(Railton 1984, p.168)
Therefore,  the  legalistic  view  of  morality  or  “morality  of  law”  is  not  something
unfamiliar or unnoticed. The novelty of my observations consists mainly in connecting this view
with  difficulties  regarding supererogation.  However,  the  familiarity  of  the  legalistic  view of
morality can sometimes obscure the peculiarity of some of its claims. Indeed, its theses are so
widely shared,  its reign so uncontested, that morality of law can pass sometimes for  morality
tout court. Williams himself, when criticizing this view about morality (in his “Morality,  the
Peculiar  Institution”,  1997),  takes  himself  to  speak  about  morality –  without  any  other
qualifications – not about a certain view of morality, that might have alternatives. 
That morality of law has presuppositions that are still widely shared as presuppositions of
morality in general – will be the main point of the next section. In this section I want to point out
the connection between morality of law and supererogation. To remind, morality of law cares to
distinguish between two main domains: the one concerning the general good, where reason, law,
morality  and  obligation  reside;  and  the  other  one,  concerning  private  good,  where  passion,
freedom,  self-interest  and  permissions  are  at  home.  Once  this  distinction  has  been  made,
supererogation will be a problematic concept. This is because, since it professes not belong to the
domain of obligation, the division would have to relegate it to the other domain, namely to the
private good, together with the rest of permissions. But that is also the domain of the self-interest
and  private  good  and  supererogatory  deeds  are  rarely  working  in  the  interest  of  the  agent.
Additionally,  once  it  is  relegated  to  the  private  good  domain,  supererogation  seems  to  be
excluded from the morality  (by following the division itself).  It  would seem,  therefore,  that
supererogation cannot belong properly to any of the two domains. The core of this problematic
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status,  I  believe,  is  that  morality  of  law sees  obligation and  morality as  inseparable,  while
supererogation  presupposes  their  separability.  This  is  also  the  core  of  the  problem  of
supererogation: being puzzled about morally good deeds that are not obligatory is actually being
puzzled about morality functioning without the compelling force of obligations. And this is a
puzzle only when the presupposition is that the core of morality is, actually, obligation. In other
words,  it  is  puzzling  that  some  morally  excellent  deeds  are  not  obligatory  simply  because,
generally speaking, what is morally good is also seen as obligatory (or as something one should
do). 
This presupposition is  not usually made explicit  probably because there are  powerful
moral intuitions going against it. However, it can be expressed in ways in which it appears more
plausible;  saying,  for  example,  “one  should always  choose  to  do the  morally  best  available
action”  is  not  likely  to  be  met  with  the  same  skepticism  as  “all  morally  good  deeds  are
obligatory”. No matter how one chooses to explain this difference,123 my main point about this
presupposition of 'ought' following the good, is that the suppositions behind this idea are also
powerful  and originating  in a venerable  tradition.  These suppositions  are,  first,  that  morality
makes some difficult demands, that are difficult because they usually go against personal interest
(what I have called the zero-sum game between the moral and the personal domain); second, that
the cost imposed by these difficult demands of morality will most likely not be freely undertaken
(as humans are by hypothesis egoists). Therefore, obligation is needed in order to make sure that
morality  will  not  be abandoned in favor  of  pursuing one's  personal  interest.  The opposition
between morality and personal interest makes sense, in its turn, under the hypothesis that the
public good and the private good of the agent diverge. 
It becomes clear, in this way, that the problem of supererogation has deep conceptual
roots in a certain view about morality in general. This is not to say, however, that the whole
123 One might choose to distinguish between various meanings of “should” or “obligation” in order to explain this
difference. Alternatively, one could argue that “one should always choose” is ambiguous between what someone
might ask from themselves and what someone might ask from someone else. 
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picture  is  a  matter  of  the  past,  a  historical  peculiarity.  I  believe  that  the  presuppositions
underlying  the problem of supererogation can be very often found in contemporary writings
about morality or supererogation, as I hope to show in the next section.
4.7. Thomas Nagel, Susan Wolf124 and a Common Presupposition
That  all  good  deeds  are  morally  required  is  an  unfriendly  supposition  regarding
supererogation.  One might  expect to find this supposition in theories of consequentialist  and
utilitarian persuasion or in explicit anti-supererogationist positions like Pybus (1982) and New
(1974). And this would be a fulfilled expectation. Nevertheless, the suppositions discussed in the
previous section are common enough to be found in contemporary texts that can be considered
supererogation-friendly.
I have chosen Thomas Nagel and Susan Wolf125 because they both want to allow for the
existence of supererogation and, therefore, one would not expect to find in their theories various
supererogation-unfriendly hypotheses (that make supererogation problematic). Moreover, I want
to show that the presuppositions behind the idea that all good deeds are morally obligatory are so
widely spread, so common and taken to be so basic, that they can be found even in theories that
are rival theories. Nagel and Wolf differ widely in their attitudes towards the domain of morality.
Nagel believes that the domain of moral requirements should be expanded to comprise actions
that were formerly considered optional (for example, giving to charity). By contrast, Wolf thinks
that expanding the demands of morality might not be wise, as it would be detrimental to the well-
being of the agent. 
124 Neither Nagel nor Wolf treat supererogation as their main topic in the writings I am referring to. Supererogation
is presented in each case as a relevant example that makes a certain point about a certain general theory they
propose. However, the problems raised by their approach are underlined precisely by the case of supererogation. 
125 My points on Nagel are not entirely new. The observation that supererogation does not exactly fit within his
general framework has been already made by Jonathan Dancy in Moral Reasons.
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My aim is to show that, even though they seem to be at odds, Wolf and Nagel still share
at least one important presupposition about the zero-sum game between morality and personal
interest;  and this  presupposition  makes  supererogation  difficult  to  accommodate  within their
theories despite their best intentions regarding the acceptance of supererogation.
Nagel's  aim  is  a  kind  of  compromise  between  "the  objective  and  the  subjective
standpoint", namely that there should be a threshold for moral obligation (even though it is hard
to  say  exactly  where)  because  "it  is  unreasonable  to  expect  people  in  general  to  sacrifice
themselves and those to whom they have close personal ties to the general good”.126 For Nagel,
the two sides do not exclude each other in terms of understanding: we can see the justification
for  "personal  claims"  even  if  we  take  the  impersonal  point  of  view.  Therefore,  from  the
impersonal point of view itself, the personal point of view has some justification, its own rational
place. 
In spite  of this  attempt  at  reconciliation,  supererogation  proves to be a  difficult  step.
Supererogatory  action  is,  for  Nagel,  a  manifestation  of  the  objective,  impersonal  standpoint
whenever this standpoint is not limited by tolerance for human weakness:
(...) supererogatory virtue is adherence to the claims of impersonal morality prior
to their modification to accommodate the normal limitations of human nature.127 
This modification takes the form of a relaxation of these requirements through 
tolerance, as it were, rather than the discovery of new moral reasons that outweigh
the original impersonal ones. If they had been outweighed, then there would be 
reasons against the type of sacrifice that displays supererogatory virtue: it would 
be wrong. As things are, it is merely not required. And those who undertake it 
nonetheless are praiseworthy for submitting themselves to the true strength of 
reasons that they could not reasonably be required to follow strictly, given the 
mixed character of human motives. (Nagel 1986, p.204)
I believe this is a very clear statement of the opposition discussed: one has to make room for the
personal  viewpoint  through  toleration because  otherwise  the  impersonal  claims  of  morality
126   Nagel (1986, p.202).
127   My italics.
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would drastically restrict the sphere of one's personal standpoint; we are excused from not acting
in a supererogatory manner as the impersonal morality would have demanded.
And yet, according to Nagel, not even toleration and relaxation of demands can make the
zero-sum relation disappear:
The result for the relation between morality and the good life is that some of the 
starker conflicts will be softened by these reductions of moral demands due to 
tolerance. But the conflict will certainly not disappear, and that brings us back to 
the original problem of whether, in such cases, morality will always have the net 
balance of reasons on its side, as against the good life. I believe that the self-
limiting modifications of impersonal morality that let in supererogation make this 
more likely, though they do not guarantee it. (Nagel 1986, p.204)
 Even if  we "strike  a  bargain  between our  higher  and lower selves  in  arriving at  an
acceptable morality”,128 as Nagel wants, this would be a compromise, not the proper way things
should be. 
On  the  opposing  side,  one  energetic  protest  against  the  idea  that  morality  takes
precedence  over  all  personal  considerations  comes  from Susan  Wolf  (1982).  She  is  clearly
against the idea that we need permissions in order not to act in a supererogatory manner.
As  she  appears  to  oppose  Nagel,  one  might  think  that  her  position  is  not  a  good
illustration of the frame of mind that makes supererogation hard to explain. But I believe Susan
Wolf still supports the idea that we have to make a difficult choice between the personal and the
moral side of our life; it is just that she sides with the personal in trying to restrict the claims of
the impersonal, altruistic domain (a domain that she, like Nagel, considers to be identical with
the moral domain). 
She provides several arguments according to which our image of a fulfilled happy life is
quite far from those of a hero or a saint. The lives of heroes and moral saints, she claims, are
impoverished lives from the point of view of well-being. Two cases are proposed to prove her
128   Nagel (1986, p.202).
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point: the case of the Loving Saint and the case of the Rational Saint. They both spend their time
helping  others,  in  altruistic  endeavors,  thereby  accepting  many  sacrifices  themselves.  The
difference comes from their attitudes: the Loving Saint is the one joyously sacrificing his time
and resources, while for the Rational Saint the feeling of joy is not as present (even though the
rational justification always is). Wolf's purpose in presenting these two types of moral saints is to
convince us that the life of a moral saint is an impoverished life, no matter whether we look at
the Loving or at the Rational Saint. Their life would be one in which they have sacrificed so
much that there is no place for themselves anymore: for hobbies, friends, humor and so on. Her
conclusion is that the life of a moral saint is not a desirable one:
In pointing out the regrettable features and the necessary absence of some 
desirable features in a moral saint, I have not meant to condemn the moral saint or
the person who aspires to become one. Rather, I have meant to insist that the ideal
of moral sainthood should not be held as a standard against which any other ideal 
must be judged or justified, and that the posture we take in response to the 
recognition that our lives are not as morally good as they might be need not be 
defensive. (Wolf 1982, pp.94-95)
Therefore, according to Wolf, we should not maintain that the moral ideal is the ideal to
be followed completely and at any cost, because this leads to a mutilation of personal fulfillment.
No matter  if  one  agrees  or  not  with  this  recommendation,  I  think  that  the important
assumption here is that one has to choose between the personal, non-moral, self-fulfilling life and
the impersonal, self-eviscerated, moral life. But the supposition that morality sides mostly with
the public/impersonal aspects of our lives and has no major role to claim in personal or private
endeavors was the same zero-sum supposition that made supererogation difficult to explain.129 
129 One possible objection to my interpretation is that Susan Wolf is not trying to give an account of supererogation
in her article, therefore the difficulty does not arise for her. However, Wolf's central image is the moral saint,
which is the paradigm case for supererogation.
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4.8. Supererogation and the Theory of Virtue 
To recall,  the  purpose  of  this  research  is  not  to  offer  a  solution  to  'the'  problem of
supererogation,  since  there  is  no  single  problem of  supererogation.  However,  based  on  the
previous chapters, I think I can venture some hypotheses about theoretical environments that
would be favorable to supererogation, i.e. in which it would be more difficult for problems of
supererogation to appear.  I have already argued that certain theoretical  environments  are not
welcoming for supererogation, they have difficulties in integrating the intuitions behind it in a
theory about morality. For the remaining sections I would like to just point towards what could
be regarded as a more welcoming theoretical environment for supererogation. 
The considerations presented in the following sections are more akin to directions for
future research rather than a fully developed position. However, I thought it might be important
to sketch a way out from the entanglement of problems of supererogation. 
I will start with a short reminder about what was it that made supererogation difficult to
integrate,  and  then  I  will  have  some  suggestions  about  how the  obstacles  can  be  removed.
MacIntyre's labels, namely 'morality of law' and 'morality of virtue', will prove to be quite useful
in suggesting the new direction, even if my conception overlaps only partially with his. 
To recall, the morality of law was constituted by a complex view about humans, society
and moral behavior. A short, rather unsophisticated version of the picture, can be given in the
following steps:
1. One's own good diverges from the good of others.
2. Morality130 (“of law”) is essentially other-oriented and impartial, it is about doing good
for others, and about preventing one from always acting in favor of one's own interest. 
130 I will here call “morality” what MacIntyre called “morality of law” (as opposed to “morality of virtue”) because
the hypothesis of divergent goods already places one in a context of morality of law seen as the only possible
kind of morality.
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3. Doing good for others comes at a cost for one's own good (as goods are divergent).
4. Therefore, doing the morally right thing comes at a cost.
5. The cost of morality will not be spontaneously or voluntarily undertaken (as people are
thought to be naturally egoistic).
6.  Therefore,  in  order  for  morality  to  be  followed,  a  kind  of  law,  a  constraint,  an
obligation is needed. Therefore, acts of morality (i.e. of doing good for another) have
to stay under an “ought” as they are an unwelcome burden on the individual.
There are several elements of this picture that might be said to be unfriendly towards
supererogation, but I will take into discussion only two of them because I think they can lead to
an alternative way of thinking about morality, one that can be more accommodating. These two
elements of morality of law are its focus on obligation and the zero sum game between one's own
good and the public good. I think that changing these two coordinates in ways that would make
morality friendlier towards supererogation will lead to an account of morality broadly similar to
the one espoused by the contemporary theories in virtue ethics.  
Let  us  start,  then,  by  analyzing  how  exactly  morality's  being  obligation-centered
interferes  with supererogation.  Broadly speaking,  any idea or complex of  ideas  that  inclines
towards  expanding the domain of moral obligation will present a threat for supererogation for
obvious reasons. If all good, remarkable moral deeds are under an “ought”, then there is no room
left for supererogation, no room for optional good deeds. But is the focus on obligation always
going to lead to such an expansion of obligation? It would seem that there are theories that are
centered upon obligation, but which do leave some room for supererogation. For example, Mill's
conception about morality is obligation centered: the domain of Morality is built entirely around
a strong legalistic  notion of obligation;  but he also speaks about  the domain of Worthiness,
where obligation  is  left  behind.  Therefore,  it  would seem that  it  is  quite  possible  to  have a
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conception that is obligation-centered and also makes room for supererogation. Not only Mill,
but also contemporary theories like Slote's or Scheffler's could be credited with the same kind of
success. However, my point about morality being obligation-centered was not that no theoretical
devices could be improvised to make room in such theories for supererogation. Of course, there
are  such theoretical  devices  being  employed  in  several  of  the  positions  surveyed.  My point
regards, rather, a certain tendency of expansion of moral obligation, a tendency that must be
curbed or limited by introducing agent-centered prerogatives or by expanding permission, for
example.  In  other  words,  these  theoretical  devices  are  “pushing back”  against  the  claims  of
dominance made by obligation in the moral domain. This idea, of the tendency of obligation to
monopolize the domain of morality is noticed by Williams (1985):
There are actions (…) that are either more or less than obligations. They may be 
heroic or very fine actions, which go beyond what is obligatory or demanded. Or 
they may be actions that from an ethical point of view it would be agreeable or 
worthwhile or a good idea to do, without one's being required to do them. (…) 
How does the morality system deal with the considerations that seemingly do not 
yield obligations? One way in which the central, deontological, version of 
morality deals with them is to try to make as many as possible into obligations. 
(Williams 1985, p.49)
Williams thinks that “It is a mistake of morality to try to make everything into obligation. But the
reasons  for  the  mistake  go  deep.”131 He discusses  several  factors  that  might  lead  to  such a
tendency,  such as reductionist  attitudes (i.e. the tendency to reduce all important concepts to
obligation) or, more prominently, the idea that “only an obligation can beat an obligation”132 and
that any action deemed obligatory can find its justification in a general obligation. Combined,
these two result in a tendency to judge merely permissible actions or indifferent actions as some
special  kind of obligation because otherwise they could not be justified: if there is a general
obligation to help others, for example, then anything else one might do (i.e. attending to their
own private business) can be morally approved only if it also has some moral weight, because
131  Williams (1985, p.50).
132  Williams (1985, p.51).
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“only an obligation can beat an obligation”. The problem is that in obligation-centered theories
this “moral weight” or justification can be given only by another, competing obligation. And
therefore,  the  usage  of  the  concept  of  obligation  has  the  tendency to  expand to  the  private
domain:
But if we have accepted general and indeterminate obligations to further various 
moral objectives, (…) they will be waiting to provide work for idle hands, and 
the thought can gain a footing (I am not saying that it has to) that I could better 
be employed than in doing something I am under no obligation to do, and, if I 
could be, then I ought to be: I am under an obligation not to waste time in doing 
things I am under no obligation to do. At this stage, certainly, only an obligation 
can beat an obligation, and in order to do what I wanted to do, I shall need one of
those fraudulent items, a duty to myself. If obligation is allowed to structure 
ethical thought, there are several natural ways in which it can come to dominate 
life altogether. (Williams 1985, p.52)
Williams'  points  depict  the  situation  accurately,  I  believe,  but  they  do  not  refer
specifically  to  the  relation  between  supererogation  and  moral  obligation.  I  think  that
supererogation is not 'at home' in an obligation-centered approach to morality mainly because
such an approach regards obligation as the  sole indicator of moral value, or at least, the sole
indicator  of important moral  value.  In  other  words,  if  something  is  morally  important  (the
supposition runs), then it will be codified in terms of obligation; if it is deemed to be not so
important,  then  it  can be left  outside  obligation  and this  sometimes  has  the  consequence  of
placing it outside morality itself. Again, Mill's theory is a good example: actions that are deemed
very useful, essential  for the survival of society,  are the ones deemed obligatory;  the rest of
moral action, evaluated as less central or important, or useful, can be left outside obligation. In
this  picture,  if  supererogation is admitted,  it  will  be admitted as a curiosity,  a peculiarity of
commonsensical moral intuitions or as a “parochial”133 moral phenomenon, albeit an admirable
one. Therefore, even if the tendency to expand obligation is not followed, and some room is
made for supererogation, this still means that the important moral action takes place within the
domain of obligation, not beyond it. According to this point of view, what is morally important is
133  Crisp (2013).
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to attend to what one ought to do, to what we owe to others, to the moral common denominator,
the moral rule or the moral law. What is beyond that, can be extraordinary in some sense, but it
is not the main preoccupation of morality. In this light, Urmson's complaint that the category of
morally permitted acts amalgamates very important moral deeds with indifferent moral deeds
(e.g. sacrificing one's life is in the same category with buying apples), is quite perceptive. To put
it in the usual metaphorical terms, an obligation-centered morality will deem important134 the
'threshold'  of  duty;  what  goes  beyond  that  might  be  sometimes  morally  significant  but  is
something  of  an  irregularity.  What  matters  is  to  follow  the  rules  and  obligations.  The
extraordinary  behavior  of  exceptional  individuals  (the  hero,  the  saint)  can  be  treated  as  an
interesting moral quirk at best, not only because of the perceived difference in importance but
also because the theory does not have the theoretical resources to speak about extraordinary good
deeds, to differentiate or rank them or to ask what motivates them (other than obligation). 
When trying to shift the accent from the good that everyone should follow to the best
someone could do (morally),  a different view of morality emerges,  one that is not based on
obligation, but on moral excellence. In other words, its main preoccupation will be moral virtue.
After all, it should not come as a surprise that a theory centered upon moral virtue would turn out
to be more friendly towards supererogation than other theories: supererogatory deeds are usually
defined as excellent moral deeds or as having higher value than what is usually required. And it
is  quite  common for virtue ethics  in  general  to be presented as an alternative to obligation-
centered theories (“Certainly,  it  is  characteristic  of modern virtue ethics  that  it  puts primary
emphasis  on  aretaic  or  virtue-centered  concepts  rather  than  deontic  or  obligation-centered
concepts.”)135 or as a critical alternative to legalistic ways of seeing morality. 
Virtue ethicists have often accused the deontological conception of morality as 
134 This implication, between obligation and importance, was noticeable at several points in previous chapters: one
presupposition in Urmson, for example, was that if something is not obligatory, then it is not important, it is
indifferent to morality. The other way around for Mill: if the outcome of some type of behavior does not have a
high enough utility, then it is not going to be deemed obligatory.  
135  Crisp and Slote (1997), Introduction to Virtue Ethics, p.3. 
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being too 'juridical' and overly preoccupied with justice, contracts, promises and 
rights. In other words, it is too minimal in its scope of norms and gives priority to
prohibitions of causing harm over positive duties to do good. (Heyd 2015, p. 30)
Another, more vivid way of drawing the contrast between the two viewpoints on moral
theory is in terms of the agent's motivation to act towards the good:
Virtues are sources of good behavior. Moral rules and laws set standards for 
doing right, but there is nothing about a rule that makes you feel like following 
it. In fact, there is something about many rules that makes most people feel like 
breaking them. According to virtue ethics, a good person is one who feels like 
doing what is right. (Woodruff 2001, p.12)
My  second  reason  for  maintaining  that  virtue  ethics  might  be  a  more  welcoming
environment for supererogation is connected with the good life of the agent who is engaged in
pursuing  the  good.  This  advantageous  feature  of  virtue  theory  is  often  times  called  the
eudaimonist project, i.e. “the idea that there should be some fundamental connection between
what  makes  for a moral  good life,  on the one hand,  and what makes  a life  worth living or
intrinsically rewarding on the other.”136 
My claim is that the eudaimonist  project, roughly speaking, is opposed to one crucial
presupposition present in the picture of morality of law, namely the presupposition of the zero-
sum game between the agent's own good and the other's good, the general good. In other words,
the assumption is that, if one acts morally then this is a loss for the well-being of the agent and
the other way around (an example is Susan Wolf's position discussed in a previous section).
There is no overt opposition between the zero-sum game hypothesis and supererogation, but I
think it is a rather intuitive idea that the more difficult moral actions appear to be, the likelier it
will be for them to be made obligatory, because otherwise it becomes unrealistic to hope that
agents will act, as a rule, against their own interest (that is, without a force to oppose their own
interest – the deontic force of obligation). This is another foreseeable reason for which obligation
136  Railton (2011, p. 305).
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can  be  expanded  to  comprise  the  domain  of  all  relevant  moral  actions.  This  expansion
undermines  the  credibility  and  the  possibility  of  a  theoretically  satisfactory  account  for
supererogation: once the zero-sum hypothesis is in place, supererogatory action becomes socially
necessary, apparently impossible, and when it occurs, inexplicable – to paraphrase MacIntyre. 
Of course, there are obvious circumstances where no one can deny that acting morally
takes its toll upon the well-being of the agent, but to say that this is  inevitably  the case or, at
least, generally the case, is a completely different thing. Once the competition between the moral
life  and  the  good  life  is  portrayed  in  these  sweeping  terms,  it  becomes  a  philosophical
assumption, not a mere observation about moral life. This assumption is, I think, opposed to the
idea that the moral life and the well-being of an agent can enhance each other:
Classical virtue theory held that asking how to live well, and asking how to act 
well, were closely allied questions. Indeed, these two were to be united in the life 
of the virtuous person: acting in the best way was best not only for the 
individual's family, friends, and polis, but for the individual herself. (Railton 
2011, p.325)
This is not to deny that sometimes the harmony between the two is hard to achieve.  In this
respect, I agree with Railton's (2011) observations about the eudaimonist project as not being a
very obvious position, especially in certain cultural environments:
Too often, it seems, virtuous action is its own punishment: standing up for what 
is right or doing what is best regularly collides with powerful interests bent on 
other purposes, and often is personally and socially 'inconvenient', to put it 
mildly. Much post-Enlightenment English-language moral and political thought 
has tended to take it for granted that the natural condition of most of us – even if 
we are fortunate enough to live together peaceably – is fundamentally 
competitive. And getting ahead – amassing wealth, power, recognition, or status 
– seems to have no intrinsic connection with moral worth. (Railton 2011, p.325)
However, Railton claims (in defending one of his favorite traits of virtue theory), that it is not too
optimistic or far fetched to think that, at least in special circumstances, the eudaimonist project is
a realistic claim. When the agent is in a social environment that she cares about (and I would like
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to also point out the lack of impersonal context here), then it is more likely that the personal and
the general good can be indeed brought together:
At least at this admittedly local level, doing well and living well can work to 
reinforce and sustain one another. And when genuinely painful self-sacrifice is 
called for, we may find ourselves with the enlarged psychological and 
interpersonal resources needed to do and sustain the harder thing. (Railton 2011, 
p.329)
To summarize my point about supererogation and virtue theory: I believe virtue theory
has better premises to accommodate supererogation mainly because it is not obligation-based;
this  means  that  there  is  no  danger  of  expanding  moral  obligation  to  deeds  considered
supererogatory in virtue theory, as morality is not essentially seen in terms of what is obligatory,
what one ought to do. Another favorable premise of virtue theory is that it does not take the
personal good and the general good to be at odds, locked in a zero sum game. Supererogation has
better chances to be accounted for in these conditions because it will not appear as the strange
occurrence of agents acting against their self-interest and natural inclinations while no obligation
is  present.  One  might  notice  also,  when  considering  the  zero-sum  premise,  the  theoretical
necessity of expanding obligation to cover all morally good deeds, especially ones presupposing
sacrifice. For in a morality of law framework there is no other explanation available for agents
acting against their self-interest, but the force of the moral obligation. 
In the next section, when discussing objections to my claim, that theory of virtue is better
equipped theoretically  to  account  for  supererogation,  this  idea will  play in  important  role.  I
believe virtue theory appears to be in a difficult position to some authors because it appears to
claim (among others) that agents act against their self-interest by sacrificing themselves with no
reason at all (because the force of obligation has disappeared and, therefore, what else could
lead someone to act heroically?). Of course, as I will show, this is not a fair accusation exactly
because virtue theory is  not committed to the zero-sum game hypothesis  and has instead an
approach corresponding to what Railton has called “the eudaimonistic project”.
209
4.9. The Case Against the Theory of Virtue
In the previous section I have argued for the thesis that virtue ethics might have better
theoretical instruments to account for supererogation. Metaphorically speaking, supererogation
would  be  more  'at  home'  in  virtue  ethics  than  in  other  classical  theoretical  frames  (e.g.
utilitarianism). My arguments are that virtue theory is not obligation-centered (and therefore it
does not run the risk of expanding obligation, and it focuses on the moral behavior that goes
beyond the threshold of duty), and it does not have the assumption of a zero-sum game between
agent's morality and agent's well-being.
There  are,  obviously,  other  possible  angles  on the relation  between virtue  ethics  and
supererogation. Heyd (2015) argued that, contrary to my thesis, supererogation does not have a
better chance of accommodation and theoretical justification within virtue ethics. He offers two
main arguments for his position, the first one aiming to show that the concept of 'supererogation'
is dependent upon the concept of 'duty', and a second one aimed at showing that one cannot have
supererogation in an Aristotelian frame.
The  first  argument  is  based  on  a  supposed  correlativity  of  concepts:  supererogation
cannot  be  understood without  a  reference  to  a  certain  threshold  of  duty (beyond  which  the
domain of supererogatory freedom is established):
(…) I want to suggest that supererogation and duty are mutually dependent. 
They are correlative concepts. Supererogation cannot be conceptually articulated
without reference to duty and duty cannot be normatively justified without 
reference to what lies beyond duty. In that respect, supererogation is essentially a
deontic concept or a phenomenon which is naturally accounted for in 
deontological theory. (Heyd 2015, p.31)
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Heyd's aim here is to show that “a deontological framework is much superior to that of virtue
ethics  in  both  recognizing  the  special  place  of  supererogation  in  moral  behavior  (…)  and
accounting  for  supererogatory  action(...).”137 According  to  Heyd,  the  superiority  of  the
deontological framework consists in providing a clear threshold of duty, that would be necessary,
to even be able to fully have a concept of supererogation. This is because “going beyond duty”
indeed, analytically presupposes a duty to go beyond. However, I think Heyd equivocates here
on the possible meanings of the word “duty”. Nothing in the commonsensical understanding of
“going  beyond  duty”  guarantees  that  the  'duty'  in  question  is  the  one  belonging  to  the
deontological  framework.  In  other  words,  supererogation  might  presuppose  some concept  of
duty,  but  not  a certain concept  of  duty,  specifically  the  deontological  one.  The analytically
presupposed threshold of supererogation may very well be a moral obligation imposed by social
convention, convenience or utility. This is not the same kind of threshold that a deontological
theory would want to designate by the term 'duty'. Mill and Urmson state clearly that, for them,
social utility will determine where this threshold will be situated, and that it can vary with time
and location.138 Again, this is not what a Kantian will mean by 'duty'.
 Maybe the point can be made clearer with an example: there is a law (in Texas) that
certain seats in a public bus are reserved for senior citizens. There was a time when there was no
such law, and giving your seat to a senior on the bus meant that one has done more than the law
requires.  But  now,  doing this  benevolent  gesture  would be  merely  to  comply  with the  law.
Similarly, there might be moral rules that become rules from a certain point on, after a certain
society  has  decided  to  add  something  to  its  list  of  moral  obligations.  Before,  it  was
supererogatory to act according to the rule, but now it is not. A new threshold for supererogation
was  imposed.  But  surely  this  is  not  what  the  threshold  of  absolute  'duty'  looks  like  in  a
deontological framework. In short, what I want to say is that other theories might have their own
way of imposing a certain threshold for supererogation to go beyond. It does not have to be 'duty'
137  Heyd (2015, p.26).
138 I owe to Paul Woodruff the observation that the threshold could also be set by the concept of human virtue. 
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in the deontological sense. And, I think, virtue theory has its own means of accounting for such
thresholds – more details about how this might be done will be provided when answering to the
next argument. 
Heyd's second argument is a bit more convoluted. He claims that virtue ethics cannot
have the same partition that supererogation has, between acts that are excellent and go beyond
what  is  required  and  acts  that  are  still  good  (i.e.  virtuous)  but  they  do  not  go  beyond  the
threshold. He presents it as a dilemma:
If the virtuous person has only one moral option in any particular situation, then 
the question of whether this choice is obligatory or supererogatory does not 
make sense. It is simply the only right choice. If, on the other hand, virtuous 
agents can choose between doing what is their duty and doing what goes beyond 
it, then there must be two kinds of virtuous people or virtuous choices. And 
indeed there are suggestions that we should distinguish between the ‘maximally 
virtuous’ and the ‘minimally virtuous’ person, between ‘supreme’ or ‘saintly’ 
virtue and ordinary or ‘perfectionist’ virtue. (Heyd 2015, p.32)
Heyd believes that virtue theory has no theoretical resources to make such a distinction:
“But such categorical distinctions between degrees of virtue are not easy to explain.”139 Of course
people  can  be  more  or  less  virtuous,  but  can  there  be  moral  models  that  are  more  or  less
virtuous? Heyd claims that this is impossible because the less virtuous “cannot themselves serve
as a model for the non-virtuous individual trying to become a good person.”140 I must confess
that I do not understand why the person giving 10$ to charity cannot be a (modest) moral model,
alongside  the  person  who  gives  much  more.  Nevertheless,  Heyd  concludes  that  “Aristotle's
doctrine  of  the  mean  seems  to  suggest  that  indeed  virtue  allows  for  no  such  categorical
degrees.”141 Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is a delicate and ample topic that I cannot hope to
undertake  here.  However,  I  can  hope  to  be  able  to  respond  to  this  argument  by  invoking
arguments  made by Rebecca Stangl (2015) against  similar objections raised mainly by Crisp
(2013). Her main goal is to give an account of supererogation in neo-Aristotelian terms (i.e. what
139  Heyd (2015, p.32).
140  Heyd (2015, p.33).
141  Heyd (2015, p.33).
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Heyd  claims  to  be  impossible),  but  I  cannot  get  into  the  theoretical  details  of  the  account.
However, I think that her reply – to the claim that an Aristotelian account of virtues does not
have  the  resources  to  distinguish  between  more  virtuous  and less  virtuous  or  to  establish  a
threshold for supererogation – is the correct reply to give. 
Rebecca  Stangl  (2015)  takes  into  account  at  least  two  possible  interpretations  of
Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. The basic intuition behind Heyd's objection is that, if the main
idea of virtuous behavior is to do what is 'fitting' in the circumstances (the right response, at the
right  time,  for  the  right  reasons),  then  it  cannot  be  something  that  is  more  or  less  virtuous
because there is no such thing as more or less 'fitting':
This seems to suggest that, in every situation, there is only one possible action 
that qualifies as virtuous. Any other action, moreover, will count as vicious. If 
this is right, there can be no action whose commission is virtuous but whose 
omission would not be vicious. (Stangl 2015, p.352)
Her reply to this objection is that Aristotle himself uses the metaphor of hitting a target 142 when
speaking about the right way to act. This means that doing the right thing can be seen as falling
within a certain range. One can hit closer to the center of the target or further away, but the right
behavior would still count as 'hitting the target'. Consequently,  there can be degrees of being
right or being virtuous:
(…) that the simile also illustrates nicely how one virtuous action might be more 
excellent than another virtuous action. In most real world cases, one need not hit 
the bull's-eye to hit the target, but hitting the bull's-eye might be the most 
praiseworthy shot of all. Likewise, hitting just shy of the bull's eye might be more
praiseworthy than just making it onto the target. If hitting the mean is analogous 
to hitting a target, circumstances in which one can and does perform a 
supererogatory action might be analogous to hitting closer to the bull's-eye.  
(Stangl 2015, p.353)
I  think  this  is  a  convincing  reply.  The  metaphor  is  particularly  apt  in  several  other
respects (I am grateful to Paul Woodruff for pointing this out to me). For example, it can leave
142  Stangl (2015) quotes Peter Losin (1987) as having this interpretation of Aristotle. 
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room for variations in results depending not only upon the agent, but also on luck: for both the
marksman and the moral agent, wind and other contingencies might play some role in attaining a
good result. Even more significant, there is a minimal qualification that one has to achieve in
order  to  qualify  as  marksman  and,  similarly,  as  a  virtuous  agent.  But  once  this  minimal
qualification is attained, there is always room for improvement because the perfect marksman
and the perfectly virtuous are ideals. Therefore, it might well be the case that one action or one
person is more virtuous than the other, because it can be closer or further away from the ideal –
which shows that Heyd had no good reason to worry about this aspect. Most importantly, I think,
the metaphor of the target reveals another way in which virtue theory can accommodate and
explain supererogation: famously, omitting a supererogatory deed should be allowed (i.e. should
bring no blame or punishment); similarly, one might say, missing the target does not mean that
one did anything wrong, only that there is room for improvement, that one can do better. 
However, I also believe that Heyd's skepticism towards a virtue-theoretical account of
supererogation is not one rooted in the difficulty of the theoretical construction or the difficulties
in interpreting Aristotle. I think that the uneasiness towards virtue theory comes from a more
general worry, a worry that, broadly speaking, virtue theory cannot account for a strong notion of
obligation, one that can serve as a firm 'threshold' of duty. This is a worry capable of raising the
doubt that a firm distinction can be made between actions that go beyond the threshold and those
which do not. For what it is worth, I think Heyd's worry is misguided and that virtue ethics is,
indeed, the best candidate for accounting for supererogation. 
Nevertheless,  I  believe  that  Heyd's  way  is  an  interesting  way  of  not  seeing  things
correctly, because it shows how the adherence to an obligation-centered frame can distort one's
view about other theoretical frames. Heyd might seem right in his unspoken intuition that it is
awkward to ask, in a virtue theory framework, the same kind of question one can easily ask in an
obligation-centered framework, namely “how virtuous should someone be to be deemed virtuous
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enough?” The question springs from the idea of a threshold, of course. The idea is that it is easy
to conceive a threshold for obligation and to ask “when does obligation end, when has someone
fulfilled their moral obligation?” but not so easy for virtue. As the discussion about utilitarianism
and supererogation has pointed out, establishing the limit  between obligation and supererogation
can be seen in terms of admitting satisficing requirements instead of maximizing, i.e. about being
required to do enough instead of one's best. Therefore, it would seem that the same question is
justified in a virtue theory environment: “when would be virtue deemed as enough?”. The point
of 'enough' being needed, of course, as a mean of establishing what is supererogatory and what is
not.  However, I think the the impression of strangeness comes not from some supposed intrinsic
impossibility to come with an answer or a threshold, but from the suppositions hidden in the
question itself. This is why, I think, Heyd's failure is relevant, because Heyd questions virtue
theory  while  preserving strong presuppositions  belonging  to  morality  of  law.   The  point  in
finding out  when obligation  stops or when there is  enough virtue is  that  the agent  looks to
minimize own losses (which is a rational strategy under some hypotheses). The question “when
is virtue enough?” makes sense only under a zero-sum game hypothesis  that acting virtuously
means acting only for the general good, and acting for the general good implies acting against
one's  own  self-interest. Of  course,  this  is  a  hypothesis  that  is  false  in  a  virtue  theoretical
environment. 
Virtue theory, I believe, can establish a threshold for supererogation, but in doing so it
will not answer this particular question, because this is a question that can be meaningfully asked
under another set of premises. 
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4.10. Supererogation and Virtue: Conclusion
The  previous  chapters  were  dedicated  to  underlining  the  difference  between  various
problems of supererogation. The present fourth chapter emphasizes their connection by bringing
to light a particular view of morality, one present behind most conflicts represented by problems
of supererogation. I have labeled this view of morality, “morality of law” because it conceives of
moral  rules  in  analogy  with  laws  and  it  is  centered  upon  the  obligation  to  follow general,
impersonal moral requirements. To remind, the main tenet in a morality of law is that if some
deed is  deemed to be morally good in an impersonal,  impartial,  objective manner,  then that
should be deemed morally  obligatory,  even if  this  demands  considerable  sacrifices  from the
agent.
It is clear why such a tenet would place morality of law at odds with supererogation:
because it is an instance of the good-ought tie-up principle. More difficult to see was why would
a theory adopt such a counter-intuitive supposition, namely that all morally good deeds should be
made obligatory? My response is that there are two plausible sources for this supposition: first, it
is the moral intuition that one  ought to help whenever one is able to;143 second, it is a certain
theoretical framework (its historical context is described by MacIntyre, 1984), one that gives the
blueprint for what I have called (following MacIntyre, 1984) “morality of law”. According to the
morality of law framework, the general good diverges from the personal good and humans are
seen as naturally egoistic. Consequently, according to this view, morality(seen as having to do
with the public good) and self-interest are locked in a zero-sum game: whatever someone does
for the public good it counts as a loss for the self and the other way around. Acting morally is
seen  as  a  difficult  and  demanding  task  and  this  is  why,  in  order  to  counter-balance  the
(presupposed) naturally powerful self-interest, moral obligation is brought into picture to play
the role of counterbalancing force. The result is that any morally good deed has to be subsumed
143 This intuition alone is not enough for obtaining the good-ought tie-up, but it is a plausible starting point. 
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under the ought of moral obligation because of a permanent risk of agents ignoring the demands
of  morality  to  follow their  own interest  (morally  good deeds  are  implying  a  cost  that,  one
suspects, is not going to be voluntary undertaken). Obligation becomes, therefore, the core of this
moral view, of morality of law. 
I have argued that wherever these presuppositions, of morality of law, are adopted, the
adopting theory will not be a friendly environment for supererogation. But what would it be a
friendly  theoretical  environment  for  supererogation?  The  second  part  of  this  last  chapter  is
concerned  with  arguing  in  favor  of  the  thesis  that  a  frame  pertaining  to  virtue  theory  is  a
theoretical environment that can accommodate supererogation with less difficulty.
I have offered two main reasons in favor of this thesis  and I have also offered some
arguments  for  why  I  think  Heyd's  claim  (2015)  that  virtue  theory  cannot  accommodate
supererogation is wrong. 
The main reasons in favor of virtue theory as supererogation-friendly, were constructed
in the following manner: I have picked two presuppositions that are central to morality of law
and which make accommodating supererogation difficult and then I have shown that removing
or  replacing  them with  suppositions  of  virtue  theory144 would  lead  to  the  removal  of  some
problems or threats for supererogation. 
In short,  I  have claimed that virtue theories  are better  candidates  for accommodating
supererogation because they are not obligation-centered and they do not have the supposition of
a zero-sum game between the personal and the public good. 
144 I am aware of the wide variety of theories of virtue. The traits discussed are chosen to be as general as possible
in order to belong to most of the theories in this group and at the same time specific only to this group of
theories. 
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Chapter Five: Problems of Supererogation: Final Remarks and Future Study
The main ideas I have argued for in the previous chapters are, first, that what is usually
called  “the  problem of  supererogation”  would  be  more  accurately  described  as  a  family  of
problems (i.e. different but related problems); second, that the difference between problems is
generated by the disruption brought by supererogation within different theoretical frames; and,
third,  that  the  various  problems  of  supererogation  are  actually  different  points  of  conflict
between supererogation and various traits of a certain general view about morality. Because in
most of cases, supererogation clashes with the same general picture of morality, the result is that
the problems, even though different, are connected among themselves because they represent
conflicts with the same conception of morality (i.e. morality as obligation-centered, impersonal,
impartial, and legalistic and difficult to follow)  
The first  chapter  presents  supererogation,  its  problems and how the discussion about
supererogation started (by Urmson, 1958) by pointing out its odd status within morality, as the
excellent  moral  deed that  cannot  be required.  It  also underlines supererogation's  tendency to
bring into discussion the status of moral obligation and the limits of the domain of morality in
general. 
The  second  chapter  presents  the  actual  differences  between  various  problems  of
supererogation  in  consequentialist  and  utilitarian  frameworks  together  with  their  proposed
solutions. The third chapter is also a presentation of problems of supererogation, but in terms of
reasons for action. In both chapters, the attempt to make room for supererogation usually resulted
in  introducing  exceptions  to  general  rules  (e.g.  agent-centered  prerogatives),  or  introducing
alternatives  to  impersonal/impartial  evaluations  of  what  is  morally  best   (e.g.  agent-relative
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reasons vs. agent-neutral reasons) or allowing for restrictions of the scope of moral requirements
(e.g. satisficing, agent-centered permissions).
The fourth chapter brings the various problems of supererogation together by showing
that  what  they have in  common is  what  supererogation  is  opposed to,  namely the image of
morality as a 'morality of law': obligation-centered, impersonal, impartial and requiring sacrifices
from the agent. The chapter ends by pointing in the direction of a theoretical framework that
might be more welcoming for supererogation, namely a 'morality of virtue' type of frame. 
There are many issues that unavoidably remain untreated or insufficiently treated. The
regret of having to let them be that way is only compensated by the hope that they might be
future topics of study. I would like to describe briefly two of them.
First, I would like to refer to an issue related to the self-other asymmetry, as Slote has
called it.  Several times I was under the impression that some problems of supererogation were
depending upon an equivocation between what one can require from oneself and what one can
require from others. To remind, I have claimed that the expression “this is something we all
should do” has this kind of ambiguity hidden in the usage of the pronoun “we”. I think that this
kind of asymmetry may be responsible also for the departure from the impersonal and impartial
frames  of  thinking  and  that  more  could  be  said  about  supererogation  by  studying  the
consequences of a second person point of view in morality.
Second, I would like to refer to the issue that was treated only in passing at the end of the
last chapter, namely  the relation between virtue ethics and supererogation. It is obviously a topic
larger than I can treat here. I cannot say,  here and now, if adopting a virtue ethics frame is
supposed  to  solve,  dissolve  or  prevent  some  of  the  conflicts  that  are  the  core  of  problem
proliferation  regarding  supererogation.  However,  I  think  one  might  have  better  chances  to
account  for  supererogation  in  a  virtue  ethics  frame  mainly  because  the  problems  of
supererogation seem to have in common a certain puzzlement about morality functioning without
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the compelling force of obligation. And this is a puzzle only when the presupposition is that the
core  of  morality is,  actually,  obligation.  In  other  words,  it  is  puzzling  that  some  morally
excellent deeds are not obligatory simply because, generally speaking, what is morally good is
also seen as obligatory (or as something one should do). I think virtue ethics, not having at its
core this presupposition and not being obligation-based, has an obvious initial advantage. How
this project might proceed from this point, is a matter for future research.
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